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Jinting Deng
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CHINA’S CHANGE-OF-VENUE
SYSTEM IN ANTI-CORRUPTION LITIGATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTICORRUPTION REFORM

Presenting the first empirical study of the change-of-venue (COV) system in Chinese
corruption cases, this dissertation assesses the role of the COV system in China’s anti-corruption
campaign. Although COV is routinely triggered in Chinese corruption cases, COV remains
understudied and poorly understood. Scholars, judges, and practitioners expected that the COV
system would increase sentences by removing defendants from the jurisdictions of local judges
where they would benefit from bias and cronyism. However, this dissertation’s empirical findings
– from an analysis of over 800 corruption cases in Beijing – indicate that, after accounting for
other variables, sentences for corruption did not increase after COV. COV utilization patterns and
their effects are therefore inconsistent with official claims that the COV is intended to prevent
local bias, and also to protect the public image and authority of the judiciary.
Contradicting the accepted wisdom, this dissertation instead demonstrates that COV
works to concentrate certain types of corruption cases in a small handful of courts known for
efficiently rendering convictions. Given that COV has not achieved its stated goals, this
dissertation explores other explanations for its widespread use in anti-corruption cases. Using iniii

depth, qualitative interviews with procurators, judges, and lawyers, and an institutional analysis of
incentive structures shaping the behavior of actors tasked with anti-corruption work, this
dissertation reveals that the true incentives for COV lie in serving the political interests and needs
of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership (CCP).
This dissertation presents three potential alternative explanations for COV behavior.
First, rather than preventing local judicial bias towards local officials, COV reallocates resources
within the city and cracks down on challenging and notorious cases to ensure the rapid and efficient
completion of anti-corruption work. Second, COV enables superior party officials to direct offsite anti-corruption forces to investigate corruption cases when the on-site anti-corruption forces
have failed to function because they were “captured” by the influence of the same local party
leaders whom they were supposed to supervise. This addresses a deep-seated problem with
China’s previous anti-corruption system, where local party leaders primarily controlled local anticorruption investigations. The COV system works to undermine local governmental control over
local anti-corruption investigations, revitalize the non-functioning local anti-corruption forces, and
invigorate China’s recent anti-corruption campaign. Third, due to the institutional problems of the
old anti-corruption system, the CCP has sought to weaken local protectionism and consolidate
central CCP control. COV helps realize the central CCP’s goal of maintaining leadership in anticorruption, and thus constitutes an essential part of China’s new anti-corruption model. These three
alternative explanations help to illuminate COV’s failure to respond to the types of local bias found
in the data.
iv

The dissertation ends with a discussion of the limits of the new anti-corruption model
in China. Vague laws, weak legal institutions, and insufficient supervision make it easy for the
new anti-corruption agency to abuse its anti-corruption power and avoid supervision, so that the
whole system ends up relying heavily upon the existence of a strongly committed political
leadership.
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I

INTRODUCTION
Like most criminal justice systems around the world, China’s includes a mechanism for

moving a trial from a court in the default jurisdiction to a court in another jurisdiction – what
in this dissertation I call “change of venue” (COV) or “trying a case alternatively.” My
underlying research motivation is to assess the operation of China’s COV – when, how, and
why it is used – and its consequences. I collected and analyzed over 800 court decisions from
corruption cases in Beijing between 2008 and 2015. I initially expected to use these court
decisions to tell a story consistent with official narratives about the purpose of COV.
However, the results contradicted these narratives and instead suggested alternative
explanations for the functions of COV.
Officially, COV fulfills two main purposes in public corruption cases. First, COV serves
to prevent intensive local bias and protect the interests of justice. “Local bias” refers
primarily to the protection of, or leniency towards, criminal suspects by local judges and
other judicial actors. Some corruption cases involve high-level local officials who have
strong influence over local judges and can thereby gain favor for themselves. Second, COV
addresses the public’s widespread suspicion about the fairness of corruption trials in default
venues, so as to protect the judiciary’s public image.
If the first of these official narratives – that the COV prevents local judicial bias in favor
of local officials – were true, I would expect to find that COV has the overall effect of
producing harsher criminal sentences for otherwise seemingly identical cases. The results of
my analysis, however, fail to support this expectation. Instead, the data show that COV has
no net positive effect of increasing sentences, and may actually have a negative effect of
1

decreasing sentences, net of other factors.
Furthermore, I found that the more serious the criminal offense, the greater the
likelihood COV will be invoked. However, because the decision to invoke COV usually
precedes the investigation stage of the case, and because the seriousness of the crime can be
accurately and thoroughly determined only through the investigation process, it is apparent
that “seriousness” is often predetermined. In other words, much of China’s anti-corruption
work can be characterized as “seeking facts from truth.”
My study of the Beijing COV data revealed a number of related anomalies:
(1) I expected to find that COV is used in response to specific types of local bias
observable in the data. For example, the data shows that defendants who hold state-owned
company positions tend to receive increased sentences in corruption cases compared with
defendants who do not have such positions, whereas defendants holding official village
positions tend to receive lesser sentences than defendants without official village positions,
after controlling for all other legal factors. This would seem to be a prime example of the
kind of local bias that COV is supposed to address. My empirical findings show, however,
that the use of COV is unrelated to such examples of local bias.
Among otherwise seemingly identical cases (i.e., holding the use of COV and other case
characteristics constant), sentencing varied greatly between courts, strongly suggesting that
sentencing is not determined solely by legal factors. Yet specific measures of local influence
that should have been associated with the use of COV, such as the defendant’s administrative
rank or degree of control over state assets, were actually unrelated to the use of COV, net of
other factors.
2

(2) My empirical findings show that the use of COV is associated with other factors that
do not significantly influence criminal sentencing. Certain factors that did not statistically
affect sentences – such as holding a judicial position or governmental association position
(i.e., associations that are established by governments, such as public universities and
hospitals), or being a member of the general public – turned out to have a statistically
significant influence on the use of COV.
(3) For certain factors that tended to produce increased sentences, such as holding a
position with a state-owned company, the use of COV worked to further increase the
sentence in these cases. This is because COV made these cases more likely to be tried at the
Xicheng District Basic-Level People’s Court or the Beijing Number 1 Intermediate Court –
both of which generally mete out harsher punishments than other courts. By contrast, for
other factors that tended to decrease sentences, such as the holding of an official village
position, the use of COV actually functioned to further decrease the sentence in these cases,
because these cases were very unlikely to be transferred to the two harsher courts.
With respect to the second official narrative for COV: If COV is intended to protect the
judiciary’s public image, I would expect to find that COV frequently works to transfer cases
involving the types of local officials that are most likely to be – or at least to be perceived by
the public as being – favored by local judges. Instead, with the exception of judicial officials,
most local officials were actually more likely than ordinary people to be tried locally,
indicating a conservative and protective attitude in using COV when local officials are
involved. Even when extralegal factors – such as holding village leadership positions,
economic or other executive agency positions, or local congressional or state-owned3

company positions – were found to have statistically significant effects on the sentences of
cases with the same legal factors, the use of COV did not function to move the trials of these
local officials elsewhere.
Overall, and despite my original expectations, I found that the court decisions failed to
support the two official narratives for COV. My search for an account of the purpose of COV
that better fit the data then led my investigation beyond the court decisions and into: (1) a
series of in-depth, qualitative interviews with procurators, judges, and lawyers, and (2) an
institutional analysis of incentive structures shaping the behavior of actors tasked with anticorruption work.
In this dissertation, I challenge the official narrative of COV by revealing behavior that
appears to serve primarily the political interests and needs of the Chinese Communist Party’s
leadership. In particular, I offer three alternative explanations for COV behavior:
First, rather than preventing local judicial bias towards local officials, COV serves to
reallocate anti-corruption resources within the city – especially in challenging and notorious
cases – thus helping to ensure the rapid and efficient completion of anti-corruption work.
Second, COV allows Chinese Communist Party superiors to mobilize anti-corruption
forces from outside the local area to investigate local corruption cases – thus addressing the
problem of local party leaders “capturing” local anti-corruption forces. This can help to break
the power of the local officials over corruption investigations, revitalize local anti-corruption
investigators, and invigorate anti-corruption efforts.
Third, in institutional terms, COV helps to realize the CCP’s leadership in, and
consolidate central CCP control over, anti-corruption efforts. This constitutes an essential
4

part of China’s new anti-corruption model.
These three alternative explanations illuminate COV’s failure to respond to the types of
local bias found in the data, and explain why it has not corrected such biases.
Regarding the first alternative explanation, interviews with prosecutors and judges in
Beijing disclose that the Xicheng District Procuratorate and the No.1 Intermediate
Procuratorate are generally better equipped, and have more anti-corruption staff strength,
than other procuratorates in Beijing. This explains why the data indicate that public
corruption cases involving officials were much more likely to be transferred to these two
procuratorates – because such an arrangement could utilize the greater capacity of these two
procuratorates in resolving difficult or complicated public corruption cases.
At the same time, the data shows that a large number of public corruption cases were
still investigated locally, and overall, the use of COV was only loosely related to the political
level or job position of the defendants. The most likely explanation is that only difficult and
complicated corruption cases involving public officials need to be transferred to the two
resource-rich procuratorates. The allocation of these resources by the chief procurators of the
city-level procuratorates (in other words, their concentration of corruption cases in a small
handful of courts) appears driven by incentive structures: namely, the imperative to achieve
results with limited resources. And once the chief procurator chooses to invoke COV, the
chief procurator’s control over subordinate procurators, performance evaluation systems, and
informal arrangements of sharing recovered illicit funds ensure that subordinate procurators
fall in line.
The second alternative explanation for the data must be understood in light of the well5

recognized problems of China’s previous anti-corruption systems, before the most recent
anti-corruption campaign. Public corruption in China has traditionally been handled through a
dual-leadership, dual-track anti-corruption system.
“Dual-leadership” means that both the local party leader and the superior anti-corruption
agency lead the local anti-corruption agency. Before recent reforms, the local party leader
substantively controlled the nomination and promotion of the local anti-corruption agency
leadership and provided the funds, equipment, and staffing capacity for the local anticorruption agency. This meant that the local party leader actually prevailed over the superior
anti-corruption agency in local anti-corruption issues.
Under the “dual-track” system, the first track involves the Commission of Party
Discipline Inspection (CDI) investigating the case, primarily as an internal CCP disciplinary
matter, and then deciding whether to transfer the case to the prosecutors. The second track is
the judicial system. Such a “dual-track” system failed to combat local corruption effectively,
because both tracks were primarily controlled by the local party leaders, making the local
anti-corruption agencies subject to influence and “capture” by the agencies they were
supposed to supervise.
In light of the malfunctioning local anti-corruption mechanism, it appears that COV is
being used strategically to consolidate the central party’s control and initiate the nationwide
anti-corruption campaign that has been ongoing since 2012, after President Xi Jinping
assumed power. The COV system provides the superior anti-corruption authorities with a
legitimate means to call upon lower-level anti-corruption forces from outside the local area –
and thus not subject to influence by the local party leader – to investigate whenever there is
6

suspicion of a large amount of corruption cases in that particular local area.
Because COV decisions are made by central party officials, COV greatly increases the
anti-corruption power of the party center, by enabling the mobilization of all lower-level anticorruption forces nationwide and avoiding the limitations of the default jurisdiction’s ability
to disrupt local corruption networks. Through the two key steps of cracking down on highlevel “tigers” (i.e., prominent leaders, or “big game”) and having offsite anti-corruption
agencies deal with relevant lower-level corruption, the party center has successfully initiated
the recent anti-corruption campaign and revitalized the previously non-operative local anticorruption mechanism. This explains why COV has been routinely used in the current
campaign. It also explains the null relationship between the use of COV and local judicial
bias based on different types of extra-legal factors – because the decisions by the superior
about whether or not to use COV are based on institutional factors that can affect anticorruption investigations, rather than on factors that might correlate with such local judicial
bias.
Regarding the third alternative explanation, I bring into sharp focus the top-down
reforms that have made COV an important part of the new anti-corruption system the CCP
has been establishing in recent years. Targeting the institutional problems of the old anticorruption system, the CCP has taken a number of steps to move anti-corruption work out of
the local party’s control and to emphasize the role of the judicial system in anti-corruption –
such as strengthening the seamless connection between the CDI and the procuratorates, so as
to remove the arbitrariness of the CDI’s selection of cases to transfer for prosecution, and
leaving all cases possibly involving criminal violations to be handled by the procuratorates.
7

Moreover, the new National Supervision Commission (NSC) system will consolidate the
CDIs and the procuratorates’ anti-corruption forces, and the new Law on Supervision
Committees (SC) will regulate the SCs’ anti-corruption behavior, bringing the CDIs’
previously discretionary behavior under legal regulation.
It would be natural to believe that such efforts would weaken CCP control and promote
the rule of law. However, evidence I present in this dissertation fails to support the hypothesis
that the CCP is relinquishing control, and instead supports an alternative hypothesis: that the
CCP efforts to move anti-corruption into the SCs actually serves as a way to weaken local
protectionism and consolidate central CCP control.
In this dissertation I introduce and develop the concept of CCP “leading control” over
anti-corruption work. This concept helps us understand how the SC system, in conjunction
with the COV, actually serves to strengthen the central authority of the CCP. “Leading
control” refers to the CCP’s continued dominance over anti-corruption work, despite a
dramatic shift away from traditional mechanisms of local party leaders’ control and towards
judicial mechanisms of party control – namely, the SC system combined with the COV. New
mechanisms to help realize this CCP “leading control” include (1) institutional arrangements
that centralize control over local anti-corruption agencies, (2) cultivation of a well-controlled
anti-corruption agency, (3) vague and incomplete anti-corruption laws that leave more room
for party control, (4) provision of clear instructions, and (5) the COV system.
Basically, the COV system provides a routine, institutionalized mechanism by which a
superior authority can scrutinize an inferior’s loyalty, by deploying another offsite inferior’s
investigative force through the COV system. The power to decide whether and how to use the
8

COV system belongs to the superior, who is subject to the “leading control” of the party
center, with very weak legal limits and few entities who can challenge the decision. Thus,
COV works as part of the party center’s leading control over the local anti-corruption agency,
and provides a method within China’s legal framework for the party center to influence the
workings of the judicial system to realize its own interests.
I will elaborate upon the empirical study and unexpected empirical findings in Chapters
2 and 3, and the three alternative explanations in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, respectively. I will
conclude in Chapter 7 by discussing some implications regarding the new anti-corruption
system in China.

A. CHINA’S CHANGE-OF-VENUE SYSTEM (COV) IN THE ANTI-CORRUPTION
CONTEXT
According to China’s Criminal Law, for a court to have jurisdiction to try a criminal
case, it needs to be at the correct level, i.e., “level jurisdiction” (级别管辖), and in the right
venue, i.e., “geographic jurisdiction” (地域管辖). Level jurisdiction means that the
importance and complexity of the case corresponds to the administrative level of the court. In
China, there are four levels of courts: district, intermediate, high, and supreme. All four can
handle the trial of a criminal case. The more complicated and important the case is, the higher
level the court must be to try the case.
After deciding the level of the trial court, the geographical jurisdiction determines the
specific location of the court, i.e., its province, city, or district. The default venue of a
criminal trial is the place where the crime was committed. In some circumstances, for the
9

sake of convenience, the place where the criminal suspect resides can also be the venue.
Article 26 of China’s Criminal Procedure Law grants a superior court the power to
instruct an inferior court that is not located in the default venue to try a case.1 This is the
change-of-venue (COV) system in China. There are few rules regulating the activation and
operation of this system. Besides Article 26, some other relevant rules are Articles 16, 17,
and 18 of the Supreme People’s Court’s (SPC) Interpretation on Several Issues When
Enforcing the Criminal Procedure Law (2012), and Articles 14, 15, and 18 of the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate’s (SPP) Rules on People’s Procuratorates’ Criminal Procedures
(2012).2
The COV system provides temporary authorization to courts that do not have ordinary
geographic jurisdiction to try a particular case. COV does not affect the “level jurisdiction,”
i.e., whether a high, or intermediate, or district court should hear the case. It only affects the
venue of the case. Although the superior court could instruct the inferior court to try cases
inconsistent with its level, thus affecting the level jurisdiction, this is beyond the scope of this
dissertation, and I have not included it as a type of COV in the empirical study.
According to the above rules, COV can be activated through two mechanisms. First,
when inferior courts have a dispute regarding the default venue of a criminal case, they can
submit a request to their shared superior court for a decision about which court shall try the
case. Second, when a case is special, the superior court can instruct an inferior court outside
the default venue to try the case.
However, the rules do not provide any specific guideline or principle regarding when a
1

China’s Criminal Procedure Law, art. 26 (1997).
Supreme People’s Court Interpretation on Several Issues When Enforcing the Criminal Procedure Law, arts. 16, 17, 18
(2012); Supreme People’s Procuratorate Rules on People’s Procuratorates’ Criminal Procedures, arts. 14, 15, 18 (2012).
2
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case is eligible for the application of COV. The rules provide two kinds of cases as examples:
(1) when the inferior courts have a dispute regarding jurisdiction over the case, and (2) when
the president of the default court must withdraw from the case. In the second example, COV
is used to address an extreme case within China’s system of judicial withdrawal. According
to China’s recusal rules, a judge must recuse himself from the case if he has a personal
relationship with the criminal suspect or a direct financial interest in the case. When a judge
withdraws, other judges from the same court can fill in the vacancy. However, when the
withdrawing judge is the president of the court – considering the leading role and strong
influence of the president – other judges on the court may find it difficult to be impartial.
Thus, in such a case, the whole court is considered to be biased, necessitating a change of
venue. In this sense, COV could be seen as addressing the need for the entire court to
withdraw.
The superior court can also decide to use COV in other circumstances. But as an
exception to the default venue system, the use of COV shall be limited to extreme cases.
According to the law, whenever COV is applied, the alternative court will try the case
according to the same procedural rules as if the case were being tried in the default venue.
Although it is an exception to the usual rules of venue, COV has been routinized in
investigating and trying public corruption cases involving officials at the ministerial level and
higher. Since its first use in 2001 in the Mu-Ma case, which involved the former vice party
secretary of Shenyang and more than one hundred officials, over 90% of all public corruption
cases involving ministerial level officials have been tried in courts other than the default ones.3
3 How to Judge the Use of COV in High Level Official Corruption Cases,
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0205/c112851-20440156.html.
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This includes the 2004 case of LIU Fangren, the former party secretary of Guizhou province;
the 2004 case of ZHANG Guoguang, the former president of Hubei province; the 2005 case
of HOU Wujie, the former vice party secretary of Shanxi province; the 2007 case of HE
Minxu, the former vice president of Anhui province; the 2012 case of BO Xilai, a former
member of the CCP Politbureau; and the 2015 case of ZHOU Yongkang, a former standing
committee member of the CCP Politbureau. In the recent anti-corruption campaign, COV has
even been frequently applied in public corruption cases involving lower level officials. Based
on the judgments analyzed in this dissertation, over 30% of such cases have been tried in an
alternative venue. However, no further rules have been issued by SPC regarding the use of
COV in public corruption cases.
The purpose of COV is not specifically provided in the law. However, an official
narrative about the purpose of COV emerges from articles published in the official journal of
the SPC and the general consensus of legal scholars. This official narrative has two parts.
First, COV serves to prevent intensive local bias and protect the interests of justice. Some
cases may be of great interest in the community and may challenge the impartiality of the
local judges in the default venues. To ensure a fair trial, these cases can only be tried in
alternative venues. Second, COV responds to the public’s widespread suspicion about the
fairness of corruption trials involving important political figures in the default venue.
Several problems have arisen during the application of COV. A change of venue can be
highly expensive and time consuming, because the alternate procuracy, located elsewhere,
must send people and equipment to carry out investigations, transfer witnesses and relevant
persons elsewhere to collect evidence, provide housing for these personnel, and so on. COV
12

also deprives the local public of the opportunity to closely follow the case, and diminishes the
original court’s local image as impartial and capable in trying the case. Oftentimes, the
superior procuracy fails to communicate with the superior court in advance about their
intention to use COV when directing an offsite subordinate prosecutor to investigate cases.
Then the corresponding subordinate court may turn out to be unable to try the case for
reasons such as having an overload of cases. This has caused coordination problems between
the procuracy and the court system in using COV. Moreover, because the defendant has no
right to either activate or appeal COV, the superior court may arbitrarily use COV to satisfy
its own purposes, which can undermine the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Notwithstanding all these problems, however, COV has become increasingly popular in
anti-corruption cases.4 This is because the COV system is believed to have important value in
preventing local bias, thus realizing the interest of justice and protecting the people’s trust in
judiciary.
There are a handful studies on the COV system in China, which can be divided into two
types. The first type regards the use of COV in administrative cases and can be further
subdivided into three kinds of studies: (a) Some studies analyze the basic function of the
COV system, summarizing the situations when such a system has been applied and its aims.
Normally, COV has been used in cases that involve a strong governmental interest and attract
a lot of public attention, and thus aims to avoid local governmental influence over courts.5 (b)

4 Zhenhui Wang & Gangju Xie, Practical Obstacles and Suggestions on the Change of Venue in Senior
Official Crimes, 39 J. WULING 74–77 (2014) (王贞会&谢刚炬，高官异地审判的实践困境与完善构想，武
陵学刊 J. WULING, 2014 年 9 月 39 卷 5 期，页 74–77).
5 Binlin Wang, Judicial Routes in Building up Legal Institutions --- From the Formation of the Change of
Venue System in Administrative Cases, 6 WESTERN L.R. 26 (2011) (王斌林，法律制度建构的司法进路 --以行政诉讼异地审判制的诞生为例，西部法学评论，2011 年第 6 期页 26)
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A few studies involve empirical research on the effects of COV in administrative cases. One
important study showed that in the studied city, administrative cases that were tried at a
different court received a judgment in favor of the plaintiff (the person suing the government)
at a 150% higher rate than those that were tried locally.6 (c) Many studies have detailed the
initial development, function, and improvement of the COV system with jurisdictional
reforms in administrative cases, especially to combat the difficulty of the courts in accepting
administrative cases and trying them impartially without local governmental influence.7
The second type of COV study is about the use of the COV system in criminal public
corruption cases involving senior officials. In the beginning, there were academic debates
regarding whether it is legal and fair to use the COV system in such cases. But as the anticorruption campaign persists, COV has been applied more frequently in these cases and such
debates have waned.8 Recent attention focuses more on how to regulate the scope and
procedures of the system, how to make its use more transparent and institutionalized, and
how to improve the coordination among the CDI, the procuracy, and the court during the use
of COV. These studies also discuss the benefits and drawbacks of the COV system, and
analyze the use of such a system in senior public corruption cases. The problems include:
conflicting with the existing criminal jurisdictional system; being highly expensive and time

Cailin He, Reforms from the Crevice --- From the Administrative Jurisdiction Perspective, 2 PEKING
UNIVERSITY L.R. 520 (2009)（何才林，夹缝中的变革---以行政审判管辖权为视角的叙事，北大法律评论
2009 年第 2 期页 520）； Zhejiang High Court’s Project Team, Empirical Studies on Administrative
Jurisdiction Issues, 1 J. L. APPLICATION 52 (2007) （浙江高院课题组，行政案件管辖问题的调研报告，法
律适用 2007 年第 1 期页 52）.
7 Xiangshui Bao et al., Research on Administrative Jurisdiction Issues, 2 RES. ON RULE OF L. 44 (2007)
（包祥水等，行政案件管辖问题研究，法治研究 2007 年第 2 期页 44）； Bixin Jiang, Research on China’
s Administrative Judicial System Reform, 4 ADMIN. L.R. 3 (2013) （江必新，中国行政审判体制改革研究，
行政法学研究 2013 年第 4 期页 3）.
8 Yuening Wei, A Critical Look at the Change of Venue in Senior Official Crimes, 2 PEOPLE’S TRIB. 54
(2013) (卫跃宁，高官犯罪异地审判之检讨，人民论坛，201302 期，页 54-55).
6
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consuming; depriving the local public of the opportunity to follow the case closely; tarnishing
the original court’s local image with respect to skill and impartiality; causing coordination
problems among the CDI, the procuracy, and the court; and deteriorating the defendant’s
right to a fair trial. The justifications of the COV system include: preventing local
protectionism and protecting justice and the people’s trust in the judiciary.9 Some studies also
address the effectiveness of the system in preventing the media’s influence.10
However, to date there has been no empirical study to test the effects of the COV system
on the punishment of corruption cases, and previous discussions of the issue were based upon
assumptions derived from the commonly believed purposes of the COV system. To fill this
gap, I conducted an empirical study, detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, to test whether COV
functions according to those purposes from an empirical perspective.
In practice, when COV is activated in public corruption cases, it includes three stages. In
the first stage, the superior party’s discipline commission (CDI) or the superior procuracy
instructs an alternative inferior CDI or procuracy to investigate the case.11 The instructed
alternative CDI or procuracy sends its own personnel and equipment to collect evidence and

Binzhi Zhao, Research on Important Reality Issues in China’s Anticorruption Criminal Rule of Law, 3
L.R. 8 (2014) (赵秉志，中国反腐败刑事法治的重大若干现实问题研究，法学评论，2014 年第 3 期，页
8-11)；Zhihua Ge, The Chinese Model of Judicial Anticorruption --- Research on the Venue of Change in
Public Corruption Cases, 7 POL. SCI. & L. 143 (2009)（葛治华，司法反腐的中国模式---职务犯罪异地管辖
研究，政治与法律 2009 年第 7 期页 143）; Yuping Li, The Change of Venue and the Reforms and
Improvements of China’s Criminal Jurisdictional System --- From the Perspective of Senior Public Corruption
Cases’ Jurisdiction, 2 CHINA CRIM. SCI. 1 (2009) (李玉萍，异地审判与我国刑事管辖制度的改革与完善 --以高官职务犯罪案件的管辖为视角，中国刑事法杂志，2009 年第 2 期，页 1-7); Zhenhui Wang & Gangju
Xie, supra note 4, at 74–77 (王贞会&谢刚炬，高官异地审判的实践困境与完善构想，武陵学刊 J. WULING,
2014 年 9 月 39 卷 5 期，页 74-77).
10 Qian Liu & Kunming Su, On the Building of the Court’s Firewall Preventing Public Opinion Pressures,
12 J. L. APPLICATION 18 (2012) （刘茜、苏坤明，论人民法院舆论防火墙机制的构建，法律适用 2012 年
第 12 期页 18）.
11 For detailed discussions on the CDI and the procuracy’s role in China’s investigations in public
corruption cases, please see Fenfei Li & Jinting Deng, The Arbitrariness by China’s Local Party Discipline
Commissions in Anticorruption, 25 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 75 (2016).
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investigate the case from the original location. Upon approval from the superior CDI or
procuracy, the alternative CDI or procuracy will normally detain the suspected officials and
collect the confessions or witnesses’ testimonies in its own facilities, rather than in the default
original location.
The second stage occurs once the investigation is over, when the superior procuracy
instructs an inferior procuracy to prosecute the case in court. Normally, the investigating
procuracy or the procuracy at the same venue as the investigating CDI will prosecute the case.
However, when the investigating procuracy has insufficient capacity, another procuracy may
prosecute instead.
In the third stage, once the procuracy decides to prosecute the case, the superior court
instructs an alternative inferior court to try the case. According to China’s Criminal
Procedure Law, a procuracy can only prosecute in its corresponding court, which is at the
same level and located in the same area as the procuracy. For this reason, when deciding
which procuracy to prosecute the case, the superior procuracy will normally communicate
with the superior court to ensure that the corresponding inferior court will be capable of
trying the case. Otherwise, either the prosecuting procuracy or the trying court must be
changed according to the law, which wastes time and money.
The empirical study in Chapter 2 focuses on the third stage, i.e., the effects of COV on
judges’ decision-making regarding the punishment of these public corruption cases. To
remove the influence of the first and second stages, so that only the effects of COV could be
studied, the following two measures were taken:
First, when comparing judgments, only the facts recognized by the court – rather than
16

the facts claimed by both parties – were examined. This limited the impact of the first stage,
as the quality and quantity of the evidence collected during that stage will affect the judge’s
decision. This also served to exclude the influence of selective investigation by the CDI and
selective prosecution, in which the procuracy intentionally drops the prosecution of certain
criminal activities due to either plea bargain or prosecutorial misbehavior.
Second, when comparing judgments, I used the punishment, i.e., the sentence, as the
dependent variable (the object of inquiry), rather than the conviction. Due to the procuracy’s
dominant role in criminal trials and its internal evaluation system that incentivizes only
prosecuting cases that are likely to result in conviction, defendants in these cases were almost
always convicted. Among all the collected judgments, fewer than 1% of defendants were
acquitted. The very small number of acquittal cases precludes statistical analysis. Although I
still included these cases, and created a dummy variable “acquittal,” the sentence was used as
the dependent variable. Since the procuracy has no legally authorized power to suggest a
sentence and no authority to evaluate a given sentence, the punishment is for the court to
decide according to the law. Thus, analyzing these cases based upon the recognized facts and
the punishment largely excludes the effects of the first two stages on judges.
After I completed the empirical study and uncovered unexpected findings inconsistent
with the commonly believed functions of the COV, my search for the real purpose of the
COV took me beyond the court decisions and into (1) in-depth, qualitative interviews with
procurators, judges, and lawyers, and (2) an institutional analysis of incentive structures
shaping the behavior of actors tasked with anti-corruption work. I conducted qualitative
interviews with CDI officials and prosecutors regarding their work during the first two stages
17

of anti-corruption cases, and with judges regarding the use of COV. To understand the role of
the CDIs in corruption cases, I had previously conducted interviews in three city-level CDIs
across two provinces.12 The interviewees were the CDI leaders in charge of cases,13 the Case
Division Chief, Section Directors in charge of anti-corruption cases, and frontline
investigators who directly investigate cases (together, hereinafter, the “CDI Officials”).
Interviewees also included businessmen who had experience with or information about
corruption and the CDIs’ anti-corruption work.14 To understand the procuratorates’ role in
handling corruption cases, I had also previously interviewed 39 prosecutors at different
administrative levels from eight provinces, representing the north, south, middle, west, and
east parts of China. Interviewees included prosecutor-generals,15 ordinary prosecutors, and
investigators at the prosecutor’s office.16
For this dissertation, I conducted further interviews with several prosecutors and judges
12 The studies were conducted intensively from mid-March to early May of 2014 and the data collected
reflect the situations at that time. For security concerns, I have concealed the names of the interviewed CDI
officials, the CDIs, and their located provinces.
13 The leadership of all CDIs nationwide includes one Secretary and several Vice Secretaries. Sometimes,
the Secretary oversees cases. Other times, a certain Vice Secretary handles cases. For security concerns, the case
leader I interviewed requested that whether he was the Secretary or a Vice Secretary be concealed. Thus, I only
used the term “case leader” to show that he is in charge of cases.
14 These interviews were conducted to verify the data collected from the CDI officials. However, given the
security concerns and the secrecy of this information, these interviews were done informally from mid-March to
mid-June of 2014. The names and locations of these interviews have also been concealed.
15 The head of a procuratorate in China is the prosecutor-general. In this dissertation, unless specified as
ordinary prosecutors or investigators, the word “prosecutor” also refers to the prosecutor-general.
16 These interviews were conducted in Beijing, Henan, Tianjin, Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, Jiangsu and Hainan
from March 2014 to April 2015. I interviewed: in Beijing, one director of the prosecution preparation
department of a provincial procuratorate, one director of the research office of a municipal procuratorate, three
prosecutor-generals of district procuratorates, one director of the anti-corruption department and one deputy
director of the approving arrest department of district procuratorates; in Tianjin, one prosecutor of a provincial
procuratorate and one prosecutor-general of a district procuratorate; in Hunan, two prosecutor-generals, one
deputy prosecutor-general and one director of the research office of municipal procuratorates; in Hubei, one
deputy prosecutor-general of a municipal procuratorate, one prosecutor-general and two deputy prosecutorgenerals of ratorates, one deputy director of the anti-corruption department and one prosecutor of district
procuratorates; in Jiangsu, one deputy prosecutor-general and one director of the anti-corruption department of
municipal procuratorates, two prosecutor-generals and one deputy prosecutor-general of district procuratorates;
in Anhui, one deputy prosecutor-general of a provincial procuratorate, two prosecutor-generals, two deputy
prosecutor-generals and two prosecutors of municipal procuratorates; and in Henan, one deputy prosecutorgeneral of a provincial procuratorate, two prosecutor-generals and two deputy prosecutor-generals of municipal
procuratorates, and two prosecutor-generals and one prosecutor of district procuratorates.
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in Beijing, Henan, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang from October 2016 to February 2017 to understand
the motivations and decision-making involved in the use of COV.17 I also reviewed annual
work reports of the SPP, the SPC, and the CCDI from 2008 to 2016, studied internal records
and files, and analyzed procedural and substantive rules and regulations regarding anticorruption and the work of the prosecutors and the CDIs.
Through this investigation, I developed three alternative explanations regarding the
purposes of COV, which can better explain the unexpected findings in my data than the
commonly believed narratives. I will elaborate on the empirical study and unexpected
findings in Chapters 2 and 3, and on the three alternative explanations in Chapters 4, 5, and 6,
respectively. (The second and the third alternative explanations must be understood in light of
China’s old anti-corruption system and its recent anti-corruption campaign, which I briefly
introduce in the following section.) I will conclude, in Chapter 7, with implications regarding
the new anti-corruption system in China.

B. CHINA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM
Before the recent campaign, China’s anti-corruption system was a dual-leadership, dualtrack anti-corruption system. This system failed to effectively combat local corruption
because the local party leaders had primary control over both tracks – the CDI and the
judicial system – leaving the local anti-corruption agencies prone to influence and “capture”

These interviews were conducted in Beijing, Henan, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang from October 2016 to
February 2017. I interviewed: in Beijing, two prosecutor-generals of district procuratorates, one director and two
frontline prosecutors of the anti-corruption department of a district procuratorate, six judges of three district
courts and a director judge of a district court; in Henan, two prosecutor-generals of municipal procuratorates,
and two prosecutor-generals and one prosecutor of district procuratorates, and two judges of a district court; in
Jiangsu, one prosecutor-general of municipal procuratorates, and one prosecutor-generals and two prosecutors
of district procuratorates; and in Zhejiang, two prosecutor-generals of municipal procuratorates, and one
prosecutor-general and one prosecutor of district procuratorate, and two judges of a district court.
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by the agencies they were supposed to supervise. Failures in this existing anti-corruption
system, coupled with concerns about syndicated corruption, led the new leadership under
President Xi to initiate the recent anti-corruption campaign.18
Given the weakness of routine anti-corruption institutions, the already syndicated
corruption in China, and the malfunctioning of nationwide local anti-corruption systems, how
is it possible for the party leadership to run an anti-corruption campaign? One alternative
explanation (detailed in Chapter 5), inspired by the unexpected empirical findings in this
dissertation, provides an answer to this question. The COV system enables the party center to
legitimately instruct offsite anti-corruption forces to investigate corruption in a local area.
Given that offsite anti-corruption agencies are less susceptible to influence from local party
leaders of other jurisdictions, it is possible for the party center to mobilize the offsite anticorruption forces. Thus, COV largely enables the party center to mobilize local anticorruption forces across the country and revitalize the previously inoperative local anticorruption system.
Moreover, it seems the new leadership may be sincerely committed to combating public
corruption, as indicated in the three Decisions of the Plenums of the 18th CPC Central
Committee, the two Reports of the Plenums of the 18th Central Commissions of Party
Discipline Inspection (CCDI), and several speeches by political leaders, especially President
Xi and the CCDI Secretary Wang Qishan. Additionally, for the first time, the rule of law was
the topic for the Fourth Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee. But previous research
has shown that strong political will may be insufficient to achieve anti-corruption success,
Corruption in China Today: Consequences for Governance, Human Rights and Commercial Rule of
Law: Roundtable before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 113th Cong. 27 (2013).
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due to the social and economic roots of public corruption and the institutional and structural
weaknesses of China’s anti-corruption agencies.19
Even if China’s recent measures have achieved temporary success in fighting corruption,
this success cannot persist without deep reforms. To that end, this dissertation analyzes recent
structural and institutional reforms in China’s main anti-corruption agencies, i.e., the CDIs
and the procuracy systems, and studies the function of the COV system in these institutions
and its role in the new anti-corruption system that the new party leadership is trying to
establish.
There is already substantial scholarship on China’s problem with public corruption. This
scholarship addresses (1) how public corruption is defined, produced, and caused in China;20
(2) the consequences that result from such public corruption;21 (3) the extent of China’s
corruption;22 (4) what anti-corruption measures exist in China and their efficacy;23 and (5)
See MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY DESIGN: BUILDING CLEAN GOVERNMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA
AND HONG KONG (2004); Jon S.T. Quah, Controlling Corruption in City-States: A Comparative Study of Hong
Kong and Singapore, 22 CRIME, LAW & SOC. CHANGE 391 (1955).
19

See Kilko Ko & Cuifen Weng, Critical Review of Conceptual Definitions of Chinese Corruption: a
formal-legal perspective, 20 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 359 (2011); Ling Li, Corruption in China's Courts, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 196 (Randall Peerenboom
ed., 2010); Ling Li, Performing Bribery in China: guanxi-practice, corruption with a human face, 20 J.
CONTEMP. CHINA 1 (2011); Xin He, Black Hole of Responsibility: The Adjudication Committee’s Role in a
Chinese Court, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 681 (2012); Jiangnan Zhu & Yiping Wu, Who pays more “tributes” to
the government? sectoral corruption of China's private enterprises, 61 CRIME, LAW & SOC. CHANGE 309 (2014);
Ting Gong & Alfred M. Wu, Does Increased Civil Service Pay Deter Corruption? Evidence from China, 32
REV. OF PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 192 (2012); ANDREW WEDEMAN, DOUBLE PARADOX: RAPID GROWTH AND
RISING CORRUPTION IN CHINA (2012); Jose Atilano Pena Lopez & Jose Manuel Sanchez Santos, Does
Corruption Have Social Roots? The Role of Culture and Social Capital, 122 J. BUS. ETHICS 697 (2014); Ting
Gong, Corruption and Reform in China: An Analysis of Unintended Consequences, 19 CRIME, LAW & SOC.
CHANGE 311 (1993).
21 See Roderic Broadhurst & Peter Yang, After the Bo Xilai Trial: Does Corruption Threaten China's
Future?, (RegNet Research Paper No. 2013/22, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2347727; Lynette H. Ong,
Between Developmental and Client list States: Local State-Business Relationship in China (Aug. 12, 2010)
(unpublished paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909110; Aparna Mathur & Kartikeya Singh, Foreign Direct
Investment, Corruption, and Democracy, 45 APPLIED ECON. 991 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212956;
Hualing Fu, Stability and Anticorruption Initiatives: Is There a Chinese Model?, (University of Hong Kong
Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2013/032, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2293025; Zengyu Mi & LIU
Qiangzhi Liu, Income Inequality, Fiscal Redistribution, and Governmental Corruption: Evidence from Chinese
Provincial Data, 48 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 119 (2014).
22 See Mayling Birney, Decentralization and Veiled Corruption Under China's ‘Rule of Mandates’ (Mar. 1,
20
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how anti-corruption measures affect economic, political, and social development of China.24
These studies provide useful information on different aspects of the public corruption
situation in China, to predict whether the CPC will win or lose the battle against public
corruption.
This dissertation contributes to current scholarship from a viewpoint focusing on anticorruption models. China’s anti-corruption institutions are recognized as having two
approaches to anti-corruption, i.e., the traditional dual-leadership, dual-track style, and the
approach of the new campaign. Previous scholarship has thoroughly discussed the history and
current organization of the central and local CDIs, and their dominant role in anti-corruption
cases;25 the problems of the dual-leadership model, including the absorption of the role of
legal institutions by the CDI, selectiveness in the application of the law due to the political
intervention of local party leaders, and often overly lenient punishments;26 the influence of
new initiatives of social media and the “audit storm” (a term referring to the strong audit
initiative of the National Audit Bureau) on transparency, public participation, and democracy;27

2013) (unpublished paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2279059; Hilary K. Josephs, The Upright and the LowDown: An Examination of Official Corruption in the United States and the People's Republic of China, 27
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 269 (2000), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1312014.
23 See Hualing Fu, The Upward and Downward Spirals in China's Anti-Corruption Enforcement
(University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2011/014, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883348; Andrew Wedeman, Anticorruption Campaigns and the Intensification of
Public in China, 14 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 93 (2005); Ting Gong, Audit for Accountability in China: An
Incomplete Mission, 68 AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. S5 (2009).
24 See Margaret K. Lewis, Presuming Innocence, or Corruption, in China, 50 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L.
287 (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1932858; Roderic Broadhurst, The Suppression of Black Societies in China,
Trends in Organised Crime (June 12, 2012) (unpublished paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042298; Elizabeth A.
Quade, The Logic of Anticorruption Enforcement Campaigns in Contemporary China, 16 J. CONTEMP. CHINA
65 (2007).
25 See Hualing Fu, supra note 23; Ting Gong, The Party Discipline Inspection in China: Its Evolving
Trajectory and Embedded Dilemmas, 49 CRIME, LAW & SOC. CHANGE 139 (2008); Xuezhi Guo, Controlling
Corruption in the Party: China’s Central Discipline Inspection Commission, 219 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 597
(2014); 97 Graham Young, Control and Style: Discipline Inspection Commissions Since the 11th Congress
(1984).
26 See Broadhurst & Yang, supra note 21.
27 See Hualing Fu, supra note 23.
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the conflict of interest measures limiting public officials’ participation in business and
disclosing their assets;28 and surveillance of officials’ actions by the general public.29
However, few studies have systematically analyzed the recent reforms of the CDIs and the
procuratorates under China’s new leadership. It is important to understand these reforms as
they are turning the campaign into a new anti-corruption model.
Many existing studies have pointed out that the current anti-corruption campaign may
not last long. It is often deemed to be a mere instrument for recentralization by the new
leadership, adverse to the rule of law in China, because the campaign has been observed to be
politically selective and because it also serves to marginalize the legal system, keep the
system undisclosed and non-transparent, and even suppress the civil society.30 These studies
have focused largely on the political aspect of this campaign.
However, given the lasting strength of the campaign for over four years, the ability of
the leadership to mobilize anti-corruption forces nationwide, and the recent important
decision by the party center to establish the National Supervision Commission system (the
SC system), it is necessary to understand the campaign from an institution-building
perspective and to analyze its relationship to ongoing institutional and legal reforms.
Although the current campaign may seem, on its face, to indicate that the party wants to
decrease party control and promote the rule of law in anti-corruption, the efforts to reform the

See Ting Gong & Jianming Ren, Hard Rules and Soft Constraints: regulating conflict of interest in
China, 22 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 1 (2013).
29 See Xiaoying Zeng & Jiang Wu, Predicaments and Countermeasures of Network Supervision in the
Government of Anti-Corruption in China, 4 STUDIES IN SOC. OF SCI. 40 (2013).
30 See Xuezhi Guo, supra note 25; Hualing Fu, Wielding the Sword: President Xi's New Anticorruption
Campaign, in CORRUPTION AND MODERN STATE: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (Susan Rose-Ackerman &
Paul Lagunes, eds., 2015); Lin Zhu, Punishing Corrupt Officials in China, 223 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 595
(2015); Macabe Keliher & Hsinchao Wu, Corruption, Anticorruption, and the Transformation of Political
Culture in Contemporary China, 75 J. ASIAN STUDIES 5 (2016).
28
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CDIs and the procuratorates and to allow the CDIs to expand during the campaign actually
show that the party may have selected an institution other than the legal system to control
corruption at this stage. After all, the legal system may not be the only way to combat
corruption. Understanding the characteristics and directions of institution-building in the
recent campaign is important to understanding how the recent campaign has lasted so long,
and to analyzing how it may progress in the future.
The empirical evidence I present in this dissertation supports a story of the CCP
establishing a new anti-corruption model to consolidate the party center’s control, which I
refer to as “leading control.” The new model represents the CCP’s continued dominance over
anti-corruption work, despite a dramatic shift away from the traditional mechanisms of local
party leader control and towards newer judicial mechanisms of party control, namely, the SC
system combined with the COV. I elaborate upon the new anti-corruption system, and the
role of COV in that system, in Chapter 6. In the next chapter, I present the results of the
empirical study, which provides the key evidence for my alternative explanations for the use
of COV in anti-corruption cases.
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II AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE COV SYSTEM IN BEIJING
A. DATA AND METHODS
In this chapter, I detail the results of my empirical study of the operation of the COV
system in Beijing’s public corruption cases involving public officers. There are two reasons
for focusing the study only on public corruption cases. One reason is, as an exceptional
system, COV has seldom been applied in other kinds of cases. However, as the anticorruption campaign in China continues, COV has become routinized in cases involving
ministerial level officials and also frequently used in those involving lower level officials,
which increases the possibility for manipulation and the necessity for and interest in the study
of these cases. The other reason is that the commonly stated purposes for the application of
COV in these public corruption cases (i.e., local judicial bias toward the defendant, as well as
the protection of judicial reputation) are quite different from in other kinds of cases, such as
death penalty cases or organized crime cases, where the main concern is local prejudice
against the defendant. With this in mind, the current study has been limited to cases
involving public corruption crimes.
For this study, I collected all judgments in public corruption cases involving officials
decided by courts in Beijing between 2008 and 2015. This amounted to over eight hundred
cases in total (excluding judgments with incomplete information for essential variables).
Cases involving governmental or party officials, as well as officers of state-owned enterprises
or associations, were included in the dataset. Although positions in state-owned enterprises
are quite different from governmental or party positions with regard to power, local impact,
legal rights, and liabilities, officers of some state-owned enterprises or associations have
25

corresponding ranks so that they can be compared with governmental officials. These cases
were included in the analysis, using a dummy variable to indicate the category.
The judgments used in this study were collected from a public database that stores the
judgments of all Beijing courts. However, judgments issued earlier than 2008 are seldom
stored in this database and are difficult to collect. Following the SPC’s November 2013 rule
requiring courts nationwide to publish all judgments online within seven days after they
become effective (with limited exceptions), many of the public corruption judgments that
used to be inaccessible to outsiders are now being disclosed online.
To ensure that no judgments were overlooked, I then searched online for additional
judgments, including on the centralized case website run by the SPC for all courts to submit
their judgments online,31 and on two well-known databases of court decisions.32 I also
searched databases on the official websites of all high courts and all high procuratorates, as
some high courts publish their judgments only on their own websites and some high
procuratorates publish judgments that have not been disclosed by courts. I limited the scope
of my Internet search to cases involving bribe-accepting and graft crimes because these two
crimes account for the vast majority of criminal public corruption cases involving
governmental and party officials. I filtered the results to include only those in which the
defendants were public officials. This returned around one hundred judgments, all of which
were already included in the judgments collected from the Beijing court database.
The judges I interviewed in Beijing indicated that judgments involving the convictions

See CHINA JUDGMENTS ONLINE (中国裁判文书网), http://www.court.gov.cn/zgcpwsw/.
See PEKING UNIVERSITY LAW, http://www.pkulaw.cn/Case/; LAWYEE.NET,
http://www.lawyee.net/index.asp.
31
32
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of powerful officials at the ministerial level or higher may not be disclosed, even in the
internal database.33 However, fewer than twenty of these high-level “tiger” officials have
been convicted in Beijing since the recent anti-corruption campaign began, so there is no
large-scale systematic bias that could produce selective sample bias. I also created a dummy
variable in the statistical model to control for cases involving officials at or above the
ministerial level.
For this study, I analyzed only judgments from Beijing courts. I also collected data from
other provinces, but they were not included in the analysis because I could not ensure the
completeness of the collected dataset. Although the SPC requires the disclosure of all
judgments, well over half of all criminal judgments on average remain undisclosed. The
judges I interviewed indicated that some judgments have not been disclosed because they are
related to other senior pending cases.34 Some judges from Guangdong and Henan commented
that sometimes the leadership of the court feels reluctant to disclose judgments for
unspecified reasons. It may be because they want to avoid attracting too much attention to the
case, or the case has already attracted much attention, or they have a conservative attitude
toward the transparency reforms and want to publish the judgments online gradually rather
than all at once.
Regardless of the reason, the end result is that only around one-third of public corruption
judgments nationwide can be collected. Moreover, other provinces do not have a centralized
provincial case database like the one in Beijing. To collect the judgments from other

Interviews of five judges in Beijing, conducted between October 2016 and December 2016.
Interviews of two judges from Henan and two judges from Zhejiang in Beijing, conducted between
October 2016 and January 2017.
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34
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provinces, I would need to contact each court in that province to ask for their judgments,
which would exceed the time limitations of this study. Additionally, because well over half of
the public corruption judgments would be missing, this could produce selective sample bias
towards the judgments of other provinces. For these reasons, I decided to focus only on
Beijing. The findings therefore represent an example from only a single city of the functions
of COV in anti-corruption cases, and general nationwide predictions could not be made based
upon these findings.
“Public corruption” in China refers to multiple crimes, including bribe-giving, bribegiving for the employer’s benefit, embezzlement, graft, and bribery by nongovernmental
officials. Currently, China has no uniform anti-corruption law; relevant rules are included
primarily in the Criminal Law and Party disciplinary rules. China’s Criminal Law (1997),
which was last amended in 2015, has criminalized several corrupt activities, including bribery
and graft.35 Additional criminal judicial interpretations and procuratorate rules have
supplemented these rules.
Articles 385, 388, 387, 392 and 395 of China’s Criminal Law (2015) criminalize bribeaccepting activities, directly or indirectly procured, by public officials and employees and
their close relatives and close friends, along with former officials and employees and their
close relatives, close friends, and work units.36 The core crime is bribery committed by public
officials, defined in Article 385 as follows: “whoever, being a public official, takes advantage
of his/her official position, seeks or demands or illegally accepts any property from others,
and seeks profits for such others, shall be convicted of the bribe-accepting crime and
35
36

China’s Criminal Law (1997).
Id., at arts. 385, 388, 387, 392, 395.
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punished according to Article 383.”37 Other articles have extended the core bribery crime to
cover close friends, former officials, and procurers. Article 163 similarly criminalizes
commercial bribery committed by employees of non-state-owned companies, corporations,
and other units.38
Correspondingly, Articles 389, 391, and 393 criminalize the bribe-giving activities
committed by persons or units to public officials and public units.39 The core definition is that
whoever gives property to any public official with the intent to seek illegitimate profits shall
be convicted of bribe-giving and punished according to Article 390.40 However, China’s
bribe-giving crimes do not cover those who give bribes to close relatives or friends, former
officials, or employees, and the profits sought must be illegitimate for the conviction of bribegiving crimes, excluding legitimate profits. Thus, China’s bribery-related criminal laws are
asymmetric, leaning more heavily on bribe-accepting. However, the draft of the ninth
amendment of China’s Criminal Law (1997) has considered extending the bribe-giving
crimes to cover a bribe given to close relatives and friends of the public officers and has been
issued in 2015.41
Articles 382, 384 and 396 also criminalize several types of graft activities committed by
public officials, defined as follows: whoever, being a public official, or its agent, takes its
positional advantage to, or conspires to, misappropriate or embezzle public funds shall be
punished according to Article 383.42 And Article 164 of the Criminal Law (1997) prohibits

Id., at arts. 385, 386.
Id., at art. 163 (amended in sixth amendment on June 29, 2006).
39 Id., at arts. 389, 391, 393.
40 Id., at arts. 389, 390.
41 Id., at art. 40 (the draft of the ninth amendment of China’s Criminal Law,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/ lfgz/flca/2014-11/03/content_1885029.htm).
42 Id., at arts. 382, 384, 396.
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overseas public corruption, defined as follows: whoever gives property to overseas public
officials or officers of international organizations to seek illegitimate commercial profits shall
be convicted of overseas bribe-giving and may be imprisoned or fined.
Among the judgments in the dataset, over 90% involve bribe-accepting crimes or graft
crimes. Crimes other than bribe-accepting and graft account for only about 100 of the
judgments. Moreover, these remaining crimes normally do not involve public officers. Due to
China’s asymmetric anti-corruption laws, these criminals are not the focus of the anticorruption campaign. COV has been routinely used in public corruption cases involving
public officers, but not in other kinds of public corruption cases.
After excluding the judgments that do not involve bribe-accepting or graft crimes, the
final sample set consists of 771 judgments. To test whether COV affects the punishment of
corrupt officials, I constructed the following regression model:
totalsentence=α+βcov +γX +ε
In this model, totalsentence represents the final declared punishment the corrupt official
received in the judgment. The variable cov represents whether the case was tried at a court
that did not have ordinary geographic jurisdiction to hear the case, i.e., using the COV system.
If yes, cov is coded as 1; otherwise, it is 0. α is the intercept parameter. ε represents random
error. X represents all other variables that may affect the punishment. These variables include
both legal factors and extralegal factors. Legal factors are those legally established in
criminal rules and sentence guidelines that courts should consider when making their
decisions. Extralegal factors are those not legally established, but still deemed to have
substantial influence over judicial decision-making. Extralegal factors include the
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characteristics of the defendant himself/herself, as well as the characteristics of the court and
the judge.

B. MEASURES
Total Observations
Of the 771 judgments in the sample set, 161 have more than one defendant. Each
defendant has their own criminal activities, convictions, and sentences, so I created additional
observations to ensure that each “case” represents the situation of one defendant, thereby
increasing the total number of observations to 967. I also created a dummy variable (muldef)
to record whether the judgment includes multiple defendants.
Variables Representing the Punishment
For the variable to represent the punishment, the existing literature mainly uses the
natural log of the convicted sentence. The length of the sentence, in months, represents the
limited term of imprisonment.43 However, it is difficult to use the length of sentence in this
manner to represent life imprisonment or a death sentence. As is well known, a limited term
of imprisonment is a lighter sentence than life imprisonment, which is lighter than a death
sentence. But the magnitude of these differences remains unsettled. Because it is so difficult
to translate life imprisonment and the death penalty into concrete numbers of months, many
scholars have eliminated such cases from their samples.44

See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the US
Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON., 285 (2001); Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial
Discretion: Legal Factors and Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 35 J. L. & SOC’Y REV. 733 (2001); Sanford
C. & Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q. J. POL. SCI. 107
(2007); Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 75 (2015).
44 See Mustard supra note 43; Bushway supra note 43.
43
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Since life imprisonment means the convicted criminal must remain in prison until
his/her death, it seemed reasonable to use the average age of the defendant to deduce the
average length of life imprisonment.45 The study here focuses on bribe-accepting and graft
crimes. The average age of all of the defendants in the sample set was 48.0 years. Since
females and males in China have different life expectancies, I first calculated the average
length of life imprisonment for females and males separately and then calculated their
weighted average length, which turned out to be 26.5 years.
Notice that, because my data set focuses on official corruption, the average age of most
defendants is much older than for other types of crimes in other previous studies. For
example, in Abrams’ study, the average age in the sample was 29 years, whereas in Yang’s,
the average age was 34.7 years.46 As a result, deducting the average age in my data set from
the average life expectancy returned a much shorter sentence length to represent the
equivalent of life imprisonment. Abrams coded life imprisonment as 60 years and Yang used
470 months, while the calculated life imprisonment length in my data was 26.5 years, or only
6.5 years longer than a 20-year prison sentence.
I soon realized, however, that I needed to adjust my calculations. The youngest public
official who actually received life imprisonment in my sample set was a 36-year-old male,
who could be expected to spend around 40 years in prison – or much longer than the
calculated 26.5 years. Around 60% of all of the public officials who received life
imprisonment in the sample set had more than 26.5 years of remaining life expectancy at the

45

See David S. Abrams et. al., Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUDIES 347

(2012).
46

Id.; Yang supra note 43.
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time of their sentencing. To reflect this, I needed to replace the overall average age in the
sample set with the average age of only those defendants who received life imprisonment,
and then calculate the weighted average length of life imprisonment – which turned out to be
37.1 years. Thus I ended up coding life imprisonment as 37.1 years, or 445.2 months, in
prison.
An additional concern was how to code the total sentence length for a death sentence.
Death sentences are very rare in the United States, and I did not find any literature coding
death sentences in the United States. Jianjun Bai in China considered a death sentence as the
equivalent of two times life imprisonment.47 Based on this analysis, I coded a death sentence
as the equivalent of 74.2 years, or 890.4 months, in prison.
In the sample set, there are 16 observations where the defendant received a death
sentence with a reprieve of two years. This means that if the defendant did not commit any
serious crimes, or if they made substantial contributions to other investigations, while
confined in prison for two years, the sentence would be commuted to life imprisonment.
Frequently, such a sentence would in fact be commuted to life imprisonment. Thus, I coded
such a sentence as life imprisonment plus two years, or 39.1 years in prison.
For criminals who received imprisonment of less than (or equal to) three years, the
courts could grant a reprieve of up to five years. This kind of punishment is frequently seen in
public corruption cases involving public officials, and operates much like a suspended
sentence with probation in most U.S. criminal justice systems. If the criminal does not

47

Jianjun Bai, Practical analysis of the statutes and jurisprudence, 3 THE JURIST 37 (2001) （白建军，

法条与法理的实证分析，法学家，2001 年第 3 期，页 37-40）.
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commit any crime within the reprieve period, he/she will not serve any further imprisonment
at the end of the reprieve period.
For example, a three-year imprisonment without a reprieve means that the defendant
will serve a fixed prison sentence of three years after conviction. But a three-year
imprisonment with a reprieve of three years means the defendant will not serve any prison
time – provided he does not commit any crime within the three-year reprieve period after
conviction. However if he commits any crime during that period, he will then need to serve
the original three-year sentence in prison, beginning at the time of the subsequent crime.
It is unclear how to translate such a sentence with reprieve into a concrete length of
imprisonment for purposes of analysis. The existing literature does not address this type of
sentence. However, 156 of the observations in this study included sentences with reprieve,
accounting for 19.5% of all convicted defendants and 61.4% of all convicted defendants who
received imprisonment of less than three years. Such frequency makes it unreasonable to
exclude this special kind of punishment from the study.
An ideal way to measure the comparable imprisonment length of a one-year reprieve
would be to find the average length of the actual served imprisonments of those who
completed a reprieve sentence, but that data was not available for this analysis. So I needed to
come up with a reasonable estimate.
Given the relatively high probability of avoiding imprisonment entirely, a three-year
imprisonment with reprieve is obviously a lighter sentence than one without a reprieve. But it
still seems wrong to say that a three-year imprisonment with any length of reprieve is actually
lighter than a two-year imprisonment without a reprieve – especially since, even during the
34

reprieve period, the defendant is not completely free. Rather, he must regularly report to the
supervising agency and live under supervision. For these reasons, when coding the reprieve
cases, I used the original declared prison sentence the criminal received and then deducted a
certain number of months, based on the length of the reprieve. To determine exactly how
much time should be deducted from the convicted sentence, I used the following formulas,
where x represents the amount of time deducted for each year of reprieve, b represents how
many years of reprieve the defendant received, and a represents the defendant’s convicted
sentence length.
(1) to ensure the deducted sentence can never be negative: a-b*x>0
(2) according to the rules on reprieve length: a=<b<=2a
Thus, to ensure that the deducted sentence is never negative (Equation 1), x shall be less
than the minimum value of a/b, i.e., x<0.5. Based on a general sense regarding the severity of
living for one year outside of prison but under supervision, I gave x a value of 0.4, which
means the severity of a one-year reprieve period is equal to 0.6 year of imprisonment. Then
totalsentence should be adjusted by excluding the decreasing effects of the reprieve, i.e., the
total length of the reprieve period multiplied by the reduced effect of each year’s reprieve.
Since the original sentence has an effect on the final declared sentence, it is unreasonable to
use the cumulated length of all reprieve years, i.e., b*0.6, directly to calculate the adjusted
final sentence.
The model also had to account for the 166 defendants, out of 967 in the sample set, who
were convicted of more than one crime. In China, for defendants who commit multiple crimes,
the court first gives each of the convicted crimes a sentence according the rules and sentence
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guidelines for that crime, and then combines the sentences to declare a final total sentence,
called the “declared sentence” (宣告刑). To control for the effects of different crimes, I created
the following variables: (1) convictcrime1, convictcrime2, convictcrime3 (dummy variables to
indicate the crimes the defendant was convicted of); (2) sentence1, sentence2, sentence3 (to
indicate the sentence received for each respective crime); and (3) totalsentence (to indicate the
final declared sentence).
When a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes, the total declared sentence is not a
simple addition of all the individual sentences, but is generally lighter than that sum. To control
for this influence, I used the different sentences as dependent variables in different models,
rather than relying solely on the declared total sentence. Because these sentence variables are
highly skewed, and violate the OLS regression assumption of a normal distribution, I used the
log of the sentence in the following models. But to be robust, when running the following
models, I ran the models both ways, with different sentence variables as the outcome variable,
and found that the results are essentially the same and do not change my substantive
conclusions. For simplicity, here I only present the results using the log of the adjusted total
sentence as the outcome variable.
The cov Variable
To test the effects of COV on the sentence, it is first essential to decide whether a case
was tried using COV. I created a dummy variable to indicate which cases were tried using
COV. By definition, the COV system means that a case is tried at a court that ordinarily has
no jurisdiction to hear the case. Because the superior court instructs the receiving court to try
the case, that court thereby gains temporary jurisdiction. Thus when coding the judgments, if
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the trial court had no ordinary jurisdiction to try the case, the case was coded as having been
tried alternatively (cov=1).
But sometimes it may be unclear whether the trial court has ordinary jurisdiction. Some
scholars suggest relying on whether the judgment itself indicates that the case was tried
alternatively, according to the superior court’s instruction. However, after reading dozens of
judgments, I found many cases that were obviously tried alternatively, but which did not have
such a COV statement in the judgment. Also, judges told me in interviews that they were not
required to include such a statement in the judgments, and oftentimes forgot to include it.48
Therefore it is not possible to rely on the existence of such a statement.
According to my interviews with Beijing judges49 and observations of judgments, and
consistent with China’s criminal procedure law, when deciding whether a court has proper
geographic jurisdiction to hear the case, the judges look at both the place where the crime
was committed and the officially registered residence, or “hukou,” of the defendant. However,
in public corruption crimes involving public officers, such public corruption activities could
take place anywhere and can include multiple places, making it very difficult to decide the
appropriate court. It is thus unreasonable to try to define the exact place where the public
corruption crime occurred. Instead, in practice, the location of the organization or agency to
which the defendant belongs is generally deemed by the court or the investigators to be the
place where the public corruption crime was committed.
However, in some graft or bribe-accepting crimes, the criminal may not belong to any

Interviews of six judges from Beijing and two judges from Henan, conducted in Beijing between
October 2016 and January 2017.
49 Interviews of five judges from Beijing, conducted between October 2016 and December 2016.
48
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agency or organization, but instead temporarily undertakes some public project or task, thus
making him/her eligible to commit public corruption crimes. In these kinds of situations, the
defendant’s officially registered residence, or hukou, location is generally taken to be the
default venue.
For these reasons, when coding the judgments, I created the following dummy variables:
plemp for the place of the defendant’s agency or organization; residence for the place the
defendant frequently resides; hukou for the place of the defendant’s officially registered
hukou; and trialjd for the jurisdiction of the trial court. For defendants whose plemp was not
missing, if plemp was the same as or fell under the jurisdiction of trialjd,50 I coded cov as 0,
meaning the case was tried at the default venue; if they were different, the case was tried
alternatively and cov is 1. For defendants whose plemp was missing, if residence or hukou
was equal to trialjd, I coded cov as 0, meaning the case was tried at the default venue; if they
were different, the case was tried alternatively and cov is 1. For all cases where the defendant
worked outside Beijing but was tried by the Beijing courts, they were obviously COV cases
and were coded as such.
Variables Representing Legal Factors
Both legal and extralegal factors can affect sentencing. Legal factors are all those that
are legally established in the sentence guidelines issued by SPC in 2014,51 and in the criminal
law and judicial interpretations, which the court is required to consider when deciding the

If the trial court is an intermediate court, it has jurisdiction across several districts. In that case, as long
as the district where the defendant’s agency or organization is located falls in those districts, the case is tried
without COV applied. Although the intermediate court may be instructed by the superior court to try the case,
notwithstanding the level jurisdiction requirement, this is not taken as a kind of COV and is not studied in this
article as explained above.
51 The complete set of sentencing guidelines can be found at http://www.court.gov.cn/shenpan-xiangqing6622.html.
50
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sentence. To test the effects of COV, I needed to control for the effects of these legal factors.
For example, I needed to control for legal factors that determine the category of
punishment, such as whether the crime is bribery or graft or embezzlement, the monetary
value of the bribe or embezzled fund, and whether other criminal activities are involved. I
therefore created the following dummy variables: bribery to indicate whether any of the
convicted crimes was a bribe-accepting crime; and graft to indicate whether any of the
convicted crimes was a graft crime.
Graft crimes frequently involve multiple criminals. Both the amount obtained by the
specific criminal in question, and the total amount grafted by the entire group, substantively
affect the sentence of the criminal. Thus, I used the variable prograindtotal to record the
prosecuted amount of the grafted fund obtained by the defendant individually; progratotal for
the prosecuted amount of funds grafted by the defendant and his accessories together;
ctgraindtotal for the convicted amount of funds obtained by the defendant individually; and
ctgratotal for the convicted amount of funds grafted by the defendant and his accessories
together.
On the other hand, bribe-accepting crimes are seldom group crimes. Even in the few
such cases, the judgments failed to make clear whether the amount of the bribed funds
corresponded to a specific criminal or to the group as a whole. Thus, I did not include the
same coding distinction in bribery cases as in graft cases. I used the variable probriindtotal to
record the prosecuted amount of bribed funds obtained, either by the defendant individually
or the group together; and ctbriindtotal for the convicted amount of bribed funds obtained,
either by the defendant individually or the group together.
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To reflect accurately the complexity and seriousness of the cases, I also coded whether
the grafted funds were “special” funds, such as for earthquake or disaster relief; whether the
crime resulted in any serious accidents, injuries, or deaths affecting the general public;
whether it was a group crime and involved a large monetary value; and whether the defendant
committed other crimes at the same time.
I also needed to control for many other legal factors that could legally increase or
decrease the punishment, including whether the defendant turned himself/herself in to the
authorities; confessed his/her guilt; tried to overturn his/her confession during the trial;
voluntarily returned the bribed or grafted funds; actively asked for bribes; was merely an
accessory to the crime; contributed to the discovery and apprehension of other criminals; and
other similar legal factors.
Variables Representing Extralegal Factors
The variables representing extralegal factors that might nevertheless affect the
defendant’s punishment are drawn partly from academic discussions which consider them to
be influential, and partly from the specific hypothesis that I wished to test. Although these
factors are not supposed to have legal significance, judges sometimes include the influence of
these factors when making sentence decisions:
I introduced a control variable for whether or not COV was used in the case, i.e.,
whether the defendant was transferred from another jurisdiction.
I introduced a control variable for the political level of the official, ranging from
ministerial/provincial to city/“ting” (厅级) to district/“chu” (处级) to “ke” (科级) to village
levels.
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I introduced a control variable for the type of position the relevant official held, such as
whether the position was an economic, judicial, or party position. Officials of agencies that
have authority to investigate or try public corruption cases may have influence over those
cases involving themselves, so I created a category called judiciary under the variable area,
referring to procuratorates, CDIs, police, judiciary, and prison guards. For officials of
agencies closely connected with economic development and state asset management, their
corruption cases frequently involved large amounts of money, so I created the category
economy under the variable area, referring to financial, development, asset management, and
tax organs. Officials of agencies that are party committees and organs have strong political
power that can affect case investigations, making their corruptions a special concern, so I
created the category party under the variable area, referring to party committees,
organization departments, party propaganda departments and united front work departments.
I created several additional categories to reflect the political influence of the other agencies or
organizations: otherorgancon for local people’s congress/political consultative conferences;
association for public associations/universities; statecompany for state-owned enterprises;
village for village cadres; and public for those with no public position.
I introduced a control variable for personal characteristics including the ethnicity of the
official and whether the defendant was Han or minority; the gender of the defendant; and the
place where the defendant was tried. This last variable was to control for the fixed effects of
different judicial districts in Beijing.
I introduced a control variable for whether the judgment was from a first-instance trial
court or an appeals court. In previous research on court judgments, some scholars only take
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into consideration final judgments, regardless of whether they are trial or appellate judgments,
because non-final judgments may be overturned on appeal and thereby become ineffective.
Others limit their research to appellate judgments, because only these can be confidently
viewed as final and effective.
In Chinese courts, the court of second instance is the court of last instance. A trial
judgment becomes final and effective only when the defendant gives up his right to appeal or
the period for appeal expires. However, the trial judgment itself does not indicate whether it
is final and effective or whether the defendant later appealed, and sometimes an appellate
judgment may not be disclosed at all. Thus, in China, it is not safe to decide whether a trial
judgment is final and effective by searching for an appellate judgment in the same case.
I think it is important for the current study to include all trial judgments, and to make a
distinction between first-instance trial judgments and second-instance appellate judgments.
More than half of the judgments I collected for my data set are first-instance trial judgments.
Since only very few judgments are missing, very few trial judgments are included that may
later be overturned and become ineffective.
Moreover, even for final and effective trial judgments that are no longer subject to an
appeal, they can still be overturned someday through the retrial system that exists in China.
For this reason, “finality” should not be the standard to select judgments, because it is an
unstable and unfixed standard. Although a trial judgment may be overturned someday, or
even has already been overturned on appeal, that trial judgment nevertheless reflects the end
result of the trial court’s decision-making, and is thus meaningful for the current study.
Trial courts and appellate courts may have categorical differences towards sentencing,
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so I included all trial judgments as well as appellate judgments in the study and created a
dummy variable, triallevel, to reflect whether the judgment was a trial, appellate, retrial, or
appeal-of-a-retrial judgment.
I introduced a control variable for the administrative level of the trying court, i.e.
whether it was a district, intermediate, or high court. Other factors such as the decision date,
the defendant’s age, the defendant’s birthplace, and the defense lawyer’s location were also
included. These factors are frequently considered in the current literature to represent
extralegal influences over judges when deciding public corruption cases. Please refer to Table
2.1 for a complete list of operational definitions for the variables that are used in later tables.
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Table 2.1 Definitions of Variables
Descriptive Labels
sentence

Variable
Names
reptotalpenalty

lnsentence
bsentence
lnbsentence
gsentence
lngsentence
acquittal

lnreptotalpenalty
adbripenalty
lnadbripenalty
adgraftpenalty
lnadgraftpenalty
Innocent

reprieve
cov
gamount

reprieve2
cov2
ctgratotal2

lgamount
bamount

lnctgratotal2
ctbriindtotal2

lbamount
accessory

lnctbriindtotal2
congfan2

return

tuizang3

surrender

zishou2

confess
overturn

tanbai2
fangong2

contribute

ligong2

askbribe

suohui2

othercrime

othercrime

triallevel
ctlevel

Triallevel2
trialctlevel

jurisdiction
area
age
senior
party

trialj
area
age3
senior
party

judiciary

judiciary

Operational Definitions (1=Yes, 0=No; or the
numerical value of the variable)
the final total convicted sentence given by
the court to the defendant
natural log of reptotalsentence
the convicted sentence for bribery crime
natural log of adbripenalty
the convicted sentence for graft crime
natural log of adgraftpenalty
whether the defendant was found innocent
by the court
whether the defendant received a reprieve
whether the case was tried alternatively
the graft’s monetary value, in total, for the
entire defendant group convicted by the
court, in 10 million RMB
natural log of ctgratotal2
the monetary value of the bribe, in total, for
the individual defendant convicted by the
court, in 10 million RMB
natural log of ctbriindtotal2
whether the defendant is an accessory in a
group crime
whether the defendant has returned illicit
assets before the judgment is made
whether the defendant voluntarily
surrendered to the investigation agency
whether the defendant confessed
whether the defendant overturned his
confession during trial
whether the defendant contributed to the
investigation of other crimes
whether the defendant actively required the
bribe
whether the defendant was convicted of
multiple crimes
whether the case is a first trial case
the administrative level of the trial court:
1=district court; 2=intermediate court;
3=high court
the jurisdiction of the trial court
the type of position the defendant holds
the age of the defendant, in 10 years
whether the position is >= city level
whether the defendant held a party organ
position
whether the defendant held a judicial
position, including court, CDI, prosecutor, or
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economy

economy

othercon

otherorgancon

association

association

St.co.

statecompany

village

village

public

public

police
whether the defendant held an economic
public position
whether the defendant held other executive
organ or congressional positions
whether the defendant held a public
association position, including public
university, public hospital, or public research
institution
whether the defendant held a state-owned
company position
whether the defendant held a village public
position
whether the defendant held no public
position

Table 2.2 Descriptions of Variables
sentence
lnatp
bsentence
lnabp
gsentence
lnagp
acquittal
reprieve
cov
cgit
lncgit
gamount
lngamount
bamount
lbamount
accessory
return
surrender
confess
overturn
contribute
askbribe
brib
graf
othercrime
adml
Han
triallevel
ctlevel
jurisdiction
area
gender
age

Obs
967
967
520
520
459
459
967
953
945
435
435
967
967
967
967
967
967
967
967
967
967
967
967
967
953
967
967
967
967
967
967
966
967

Mean
108.999
4.164
106.994
4.199
125.439
4.276
.014
.164
.275
.112
.078
.128
.079
.083
.059
1.134
1.392
.273
.597
.011
.035
.101
.538
.474
.174
3.550
.934
1.267
1.528
10.244
5.891
1.156
47.961

Std. Dev.
102.485
1.280
115.529
1.101
144.856
1.247
.120
.370
.447
.406
.195
.561
.228
.311
.173
.932
.838
.446
.491
.106
.184
.302
.499
.500
.379
1.685
.249
.538
.665
6.370
2.167
.363
9.319

Min
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
15.314

Max
890.400
6.793
624.000
6.438
900.000
6.804
1.000
1.000
1.000
4.909
1.776
7.831
2.178
4.128
1.635
1.000
2.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
5.000
3.000
22.000
9.000
2.000
78.090

C. Models
Distribution of the Use of COV by Different Case Factors
As can be seen in Table 2.3, when not controlling for other factors that may influence the
sentence, COV has a statistically significant positive effect on punishments – and this effect
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is robust whether the total sentence, the bribery sentence, or the graft sentence is used as the
outcome variable. Use of COV is also statistically positively correlated with the amount of
graft or bribe convicted by the court, and negatively correlated with the age of the defendant.
Table 2.4 shows that the use of COV is also statistically significantly correlated with
whether the defendant has returned illegal funds before being convicted; whether the
defendant overturned his confession at trial; whether the defendant actively asked for the
bribe in bribery crimes; whether the defendant was of Han ethnicity; whether the case was
tried at Xicheng District Court or No.1 Intermediate Court in Beijing; whether the trial court
was a district or intermediate court; whether the defendant held a judiciary position, an
association position, a state-owned company position, a village leadership position, or some
other executive position; and whether the defendant was a member of the general public.
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COV

sentence
(N) judgments
lnsentence
(N) judgments
bsentence
(N) judgments
lnbsentence
(N) judgments
gsentence
(N) judgments
gamount
(N) judgments
bamount
(N) judgments
lbamount
(N) judgments
age
(N) judgments

mean of the variable
of total observations

108.522
945
4.157
945
106.250
513
4.198
513
125.078
442
.122
945
.081
945
.058
945
4.809
945

mean of the variable
when cov=0

102.967
685
4.094
685
99.597
343
4.124
343
117.876
348
.101
685
.063
685
.046
685
4.861
685

mean of the variable
when cov=1

123.155
260
4.321
260
119.674
170
4.347
170
151.743
94
.180
260
.130
260
.090
260
4.671
260

statistical
significance of
differences

all t-tests,
p =.007
all t-tests,
p =.015
all t-tests,
p =.060
all t-tests,
p =.030
all t-tests,
p =.045
all t-tests,
p =.0.052
all t-tests,
p =.003
all t-tests,
p =.000
all t-tests,
p =.005

Table
2.3
Distrib
ution
of
Contin
uous
Case
Factors
by the
use of
COV

Table 2.4 Distribution of the Use of COV by Dichotomous Case Factors
COV (yes 1; no 0)

proportion COV of
total observations

proportion COV
when variable =1

proportion COV when
variable =0

statistical significance
of differences

return
(N) judgments
overturn
(N) judgments
askbribe
(N) judgments
Han
(N) judgments
xicheng
(N) judgments
1stIntct
(N) judgments
ctlevel

.275
945
.275
945
.331
513
.275
945
.237
659
.364
286
.266
717
.275
945
.275
945
.275

.346
217
.272
934
.307
417
.159
63
.211
579
.226
124
.348
(2=int ct)
187
.246
854
.296
719
.249

all chi-squared
tests, p =.008
all chi-squared
tests, p =.044
all chi-squared
tests, p =.014
all chi-squared
tests, p =.032
all chi-squared
tests, p =.000
all chi-squared
tests, p =.000
all chi-squared
tests, p =.003

(N) judgments
judiciary
(N) judgments
association
(N) judgments
St.co.

.254
728
.545
11
.438
96
.283
882
.425
80
.469
162
.238
(1=district ct)
530
.549
91
.208
226
.353

(N) judgments
village

945
.275

235
.022

710
.302
47

all chi-squared
tests, p =.000
all chi-squared
tests, p =.010
all chi-squared
tests, p =.002
all chi-squared
tests, p =.000

(N) judgments
othercon
(N) judgments
public
(N) judgments

945
.275
945
.275
945

91
.155
161
.458
96

854
.300
784
.254
849

all chi-squared
tests, p =.000
all chi-squared
tests, p =.000

Baseline Models: Bribe or Graft Amount Only
When controlling for the amount of the bribe or graft funds held by the court, the COV’s
effect loses its statistical significance, although its coefficient is still positive. However, there
is a statistically significant positive correlation between the amount of the illicit funds and the
sentence; the larger the funds that were bribed or grafted by the official, the higher the
sentence he/she received. Although in graft crimes both the grafted funds obtained by the
individual official and the total funds grafted by the group were considered by the court, I
excluded the grafted funds obtained by the individual official after finding that the two are
significantly correlated. The correlation ratio of the two is 0.99.
The statistically positive relationship between the use of COV and the variable
representing the illicit fund amount, as shown in Table 2.4, helps to explain why the effect of
COV is no longer significant. If a public corruption case involving a public official concerns
a larger monetary value, the case is deemed to be more serious, and it is then more likely to
be tried alternatively. At the same time, because the official bribed or grafted a larger
monetary value, he/she is legally supposed to receive a much longer sentence and harsher
punishment. Thus, net of the effects of the illicit monetary amount, the COV itself does not
statistically significantly affect the punishment. In other words, courts do not hold a harsher
attitude towards COV cases simply because the officials in these cases are not local officials.
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Table 2.5 OLS Estimates of the Relationship of COV to Sentences, Controlling for Illegal
Fund Amount
lnsentence
lnbsentence
lngsentence
cov
.11
.16
-.01
(.09)
(.09)
(.14)
gamount
.53***
.40**
.50***
(.07)
(.13)
(.07)
bamount
1.08***
1.12***
1.88***
(.13)
(.11)
(.49)
_cons
3.97***
3.97***
4.09***
(.05)
(.05)
(.06)
adj. R2
.13
.20
.15
N
945
513
442
Models Adding Controls for Legal Factors
After adding the variables representing the legal factors of the cases, the COV’s effect
remains insignificant with regard to all of the sentence variables. There is still a statistically
significant positive correlation between the illicit monetary value of the case and the sentence.
Following the current literature, I also considered the effect of the monetary value
amount to be non-linear and instead used a quadratic function. As can be seen in Table 2.6,
the quadratic function of the monetary amount variables is also statistically significantly
related to sentence severity. Controlling for other legal factors and COV, the average
convicted sentence for bribe-accepting and graft crimes increases as the amount of the bribe
or graft increases. But the rate of the sentence increase gradually diminishes as the monetary
value gets larger, eventually reaching a peak and then declining.
Moreover, the results in Table 2.6 demonstrate that the effects of certain legal factors are
consistent with the requirements of criminal law and sentence guidelines. On average, and
holding all else constant, if the defendant returned the illicit funds before conviction, he/she
received a shorter sentence; if he/she voluntarily surrendered to the investigative agency,
he/she received a shorter sentence; if he/she was only an accessory to the crime, he/she
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received a shorter sentence; if he/she was convicted of multiple crimes, he/she received a
longer sentence.
Although the variables representing whether the defendant confessed during
investigation, whether the defendant overturned his confession during the trial, and whether
the defendant contributed to other criminal investigations had no statistically significant
effect, these results can be readily explained. Because those who voluntarily surrendered
would normally also confess, the effect of the confession is greatly lessened by the effect of
the voluntary surrender. Only 34 of the observations involved defendants who contributed to
the investigation of other criminals, accounting for only 0.3% of the sample, and thus there
were too few such cases to measure the effect of the contribution. The same reasoning holds
for the variable representing whether the defendant overturned his/her confession during trial,
which occurred in only 11 of the observations. Whether the defendant actively asked for the
bribe was a factor only in bribe-accepting crimes, and not for graft crimes. Within the smaller
subset of bribe-accepting crimes, a statistically significant effect was present – defendants
who actively asked for bribes received longer sentences than otherwise, all else being equal.
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Table 2.6 OLS Estimates of the Relationship of COV to Sentences, Controlling for Case
Factors
lnsentence
lnbsentence
-.04
.01
(.07)
(.08)
gamount
1.36***
(.15)
gamount2
-.18***
(.02)
bamount
2.04***
2.60***
(.25)
(.24)
bamount2
-.44***
-.58***
(.09)
(.09)
return
-.17*
-.04
(.08)
(.10)
surrender
-.56***
-.44***
(.08)
(.10)
confess
-.21**
-.21*
(.08)
(.09)
overturn
.31
-.25
(.30)
(.30)
contribute
.06
-.46*
(.18)
(.22)
askbribe
.33**
.42***
(.11)
(.10)
accessory
-.49***
-.74***
(.10)
(.16)
othercrime
.60***
.26*
(.09)
(.10)
_cons
4.33***
4.16***
(.08)
(.11)
adj. R2
.36
.38
N
931
513
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
cov

lngsentence
-.03
(.12)
1.68***
(.17)
-.21***
(.03)

-.15
(.12)
-.49***
(.13)
-.34**
(.12)
-.08
(.47)
.04
(.25)
-.46***
(.13)
.28*
(.12)
4.45***
(.12)
.34
442

Models Adding Controls for Different Trial Courts
After controlling for the effects of different trial court jurisdictions, I was surprised to
find that the effect of COV upon sentences became statistically significant once again. But
this time, it has a negative effect. Table 2.7 shows that in public corruption cases involving
public officials that were tried alternatively, the defendants received sentences that were more
than 10 months shorter, on average, than those tried at the original venue. Compared with the
positive effect of the use of COV on the sentences seen in Table 2.2, this change in the effect
of COV is astonishing. All of the other variables remain either positive or negative, with only
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slight changes in the absolute values of the coefficients.
To understand how the trialjd variable causes this change in the effect of COV, I used ttests to see how the use of COV is related to different trial jurisdictions. Since the jurisdiction
of the trial court includes both district-level courts and intermediate-level courts, which have
different “level jurisdictions” in China, I distinguished the district courts from the
intermediate courts. Table 2.8 shows that among the district courts, cases tried at Xicheng,
Chaoyang, Fengtai, Shijingshan, and Mengtougou District Courts were more likely to be
cases that had been transferred from elsewhere (i.e., COV cases). These five courts decided
58% of all COV cases, but only 37% of all cases. Xicheng District Court was the single most
likely court to try a COV case, with 43% of its cases being transferred from other districts,
while no cases at all were transferred to either Huairou or Miyun Districts. The average rate
of COV cases in the district courts was 28%.
Among intermediate courts, cases tried at No. 1 Intermediate Court were, on average,
more likely to be COV cases than at the other intermediate courts, with 47% of the cases in
No. 1 Intermediate Court being transferred from elsewhere. The comparable figure for the No.
2 Intermediate Court was 28%. In other words, COV cases were much more likely to end up
in No. 1 Intermediate Court than No. 2 Intermediate Court. Since the No. 3 and No. 4
Intermediate Courts were recently established, their data is not informative.
In short, the cases that were tried alternatively were not randomly distributed among
different trial courts. At the district level, COV cases were more likely to be transferred to
Xicheng District, and at the intermediate level, COV cases were more likely to be sent to the
No. 1 Intermediate Court.
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Moreover, Table 2.9 further shows that Xicheng District Court imposed much harsher
punishments on average, and at a statistically significantly level, than several other courts in
public corruption cases involving officials. It is also statistically significant that the No. 1
Intermediate Court had much harsher punishments than the No. 2 Intermediate Court, on
average.
This explains the change in the effect of COV after controlling for trial court jurisdiction.
Cases that were tried alternatively through the COV system were centered in specific courts
that normally imposed much harsher punishments than elsewhere, and this masked the actual
effects of COV. In fact, once the trial court was held constant, together with the monetary
amount and other legal factors, COV cases actually received, on average, shorter sentences
than cases originally tried in the same court’s jurisdiction.
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Table 2.7 OLS Estimates of the Relationship of COV to Sentences, Controlling for the
Amount of Funds, Squared, & Trial Jurisdiction
cov
gamount
gamount2
bamount
bamount2
return
surrender
confess
overturn
contribute
accessory
askbribe
othercrime
_cons
adj. R2
N
Standard errors in parentheses, ^ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
NOTE: The results of the jurisdiction variables are omitted for simplicity.
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Lnsentence
-.12^
(.07)
1.00***
(.15)
-.13***
(.02)
1.45***
(.25)
-.29**
(.09)
-.23**
(.08)
-.46***
(.08)
-.17*
(.07)
.31
(.28)
.17
(.17)
-.61***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.50***
(.09)
4.86***
(.65)
.43
931

Table 2.8 Number of Cases Tried Alternatively at Different Jurisdictions
Trial jurisdiction

Number of
transferred-in
cases

Total
judgments

% tried
alternatively in
that court

% of all districtlevel COV cases
tried by that court

% of all Int.-level
COV cases tried
by that court

Dongcheng
15
57
26
10
district
Xicheng
34
80
43
22
district
Chaoyang
49
31
10
15
district
Haidian
16
80
20
10
district
Fengtai
16
49
33
10
district
Shijingshan
17
47
36
10
district
Fangshan
8
38
21
5
district
Tongzhou
2
28
7
1
district
Shunyi
2
16
13
1
district
Daxing
9
35
26
6
district
Changping
8
58
14
5
district
Pinggu
1
15
7
1
district
Huairou
0
24
0
0
district
Mentougou
8
21
38
5
district
Miyun
0
18
0
0
district
Yanqing
5
29
17
3
district
Railway
0
15
0
0
district ct
No.1 Int. ct
76
162
47
73
No.2 Int. ct
28
104
27
27
No.3 Int. ct
0
13
0
0
No.4 Int. ct
0
2
0
0
Railway Int. 0
5
0
0
ct
Total
260
945
100
100
judgments
Table 2.9 OLS Estimates of the Effects of Xicheng District and No. 1 Intermediate Court to
Total Sentence
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Dongcheng
district
Chaoyang
district
Haidian
district
Fengtai
district
Shijingshan
district
Fangshan
district
Tongzhou
district
Shunyi
district
Daxing
district
Changping
district
Pinggu
district
Huairou
district
Mentougou
district
Miyun
district
Yanqing
district
No.2 Int. ct
No.3 Int. ct
No.4 Int. ct
Railway Int.
ct
N

lnsentence (trial
court=district, xicheng
as the base group,
COV controlled)

lnsentence (trial
court=district, xicheng
as the base group,
COV not controlled)

-.229

-.255^

-.173

-.163

-.077

-.041

-.049

-.082

.184

.157

-.356*

-.341*

.272

.290^

-.012

.034

-.441*

-.441*

-.021

.000

-.064

-.007

-1.078***

-1.016***

-.486*

-.495*

-.298

-.241

-.168

.136

638

652

lnsentence (trial
court=Int. court, No.1
Int. court as the base,
COV controlled)

lnsentence (trial
court=Int. court,
No.1 Int. court as
the base, COV not
controlled)

-.243**
-.171
-.200
-.207

-.238**
-.154
-.162
-.122

279

287

Standard errors in parentheses, p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001.
NOTE: The results of the legal case factors same as in Table 2.7 are omitted for simplicity.
^

*

**

***
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Models Controlling All Legal and Extralegal Factors
Having added all of the legal factors into the model, I next added the extralegal factors
which are most commonly recognized as having a high possibility of influencing judicial
decision-making. I first added variables representing the characteristics of the trial court and
the trial level. Because the variable jurisdiction already included the administrative level of
the trial court (jurisdiction<17 indicates the trial court is a district court while
jurisdiction>=17 indicates the trial court is an intermediate court), I substituted for it the
variable district, in order to control only for the fixed effects of different districts in Beijing.
The first column of Table 2.10 represents the results of the OLS regression after adding
court-characteristic variables. It shows that all legal factors remain similar to the models
above, and the COV’s effect is also similar to the models above, with a p-value of 0.051. The
administrative level of the court has a statistically significant positive effect on the total
sentence. On average in Beijing, public corruption cases involving officials concluded by
district courts receive shorter sentences than those concluded by the high court; and those
concluded by intermediate courts also receive shorter sentences than those concluded by the
high court, all else being equal.
The level of the trial also has a positive effect, although it is not significant. However,
the trial level is correlated with the trial court level, as the high court almost never hears trial
cases and district courts only hear trial cases, rather than appeals. After using the jurisdiction
variable instead of the ctlevel and district variables in column two, the effect of the trial level
becomes highly significant. On average, with all else equal, public corruption cases involving
officials receive shorter sentences at trial than at appeal. This seems to indicate that when all
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legal factors are the same, convicted corrupt officials receive harsher punishments when they
appeal, which would be inconsistent with the legal principle that the punishment cannot be
increased in an appeal by the defendant.
However, a closer look at the sample shows that the previous interpretation of the result
is incorrect. Among 750 trial observations, only 216 involved an appeal and had an appellate
judgment included in the sample set. Simply adding the triallevel variable to the full model
did not exclude those cases in which the defendant did not appeal. Since the non-appealed
cases may well have involved less serious punishments, thus making the defendants less
likely to appeal, it is reasonable to surmise that sample bias resulted in the finding of
statistically significantly lighter punishments for trial observations than for appeal
observations. Indeed, after excluding the non-appealed cases, the OLS regression results in
Table 2.11 reflect that the trial level did not have a significant net effect on the punishment.
This is reasonable because in China, not only can the defendant appeal for a lighter sentence
or acquittal, but also the prosecutor can appeal for a harsher sentence or conviction.
I next added additional variables representing the individual characteristics of the
defendant, including whether or not the defendant was a senior official,52 as well as his/her
gender, age, and minority status. The results in Columns Two and Three of Table 2.10 reflect
that, all else equal, male officials received, on average, longer sentences than female officials.
But the senior level, age, and minority status variables had no significant effect on the
punishment. The COV’s effect remained unchanged after adding in these individual
characteristics.
Since officials of political rank above city/“ting” (厅级) are normally deemed as senior officials, I coded
these officials as senior and for officials of lower ranks, such as district and village, I coded them as not senior.
52
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I then added variables representing the specific type of position the official held upon
being investigated. Party means the official held a party committee or party organ position,
including the party propaganda organ, the party committee secretary, and the party united
front work organ. Judiciary means the official held a position closely related with anticorruption work, including the court, the prosecutor, the party discipline inspection
committee, the police, and the jail organization. Economy means the official held a position
in an economic department, including tax, customs, finance, development, and reform
departments, and the state asset department. Othercon includes other executive departments
excluding those listed above, the local people’s congress, and the political consultative
conference. Association includes public universities, colleges, research institutes, hospitals,
and other nonparty non-administrative public associations. St.co. refers to state-owned
enterprises. Village means the official held a position in village governance, including village
party committee secretary, village head, and village cadre. (The village-level positions are not
included in China’s executive ranking system but are important leadership positions and
enjoy local autonomy.) Public means the defendant did not hold any public position. Such a
defendant may still commit a public corruption crime because he may be an accessory or
undertake a public project.
Because all of these positions are mutually exclusive, I added them into the model one
by one. Columns Five through Twelve in Table 2.11 show that only economy and village had
marginally statistically significant effects on the total sentence, at the p<0.1 level. The effect
of COV on the total sentence remained marginally statistically significant, at the p<0.1 level.
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Table 2.10 OLS Estimates of the Relationship of COV to Total Sentence, All in

cov

gamount

gamount2

bamount

bamount2

return

surrender

confess

overturn

contribut
e
accessor
y
askbribe

othercrim
e
triallevel

Districtct

Intct

Highct

senior

Han

men

age

party

economy

judiciary

lnsentence
w/ ct&trial

lnsentence
w/ senior
added

lnsentence
w/ indivi~
added

lnsentence
w/ party
added

lnsentence
w/
economy
added

lnsentence
w/ judiciary
added

lnsentence
w/
ot~organ
added

lnsentence
w/
associatio
n added

lnsentence
w/ st-co.
added

lnsentence
w/ village
added

lnsentence
w/ public
added

-.12^
(.07)
1.13***
(.16)
-.16***
(.03)
1.44***
(.25)
-.29**
(.09)
-.23**
(.08)
-.45***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.31
(.28)
.17
(.17)
-.59***
(.10)
.23*
(.10)
.49***
(.09)
.23
(.14)
-.69**
(.23)
-.26
(.15)
.00
(.00)

-.12^
(.07)
1.12***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.45***
(.26)
-.29**
(.09)
-.24**
(.08)
-.46***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.30
(.28)
.18
(.17)
-.59***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.49***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.12^
(.07)
1.09***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.43***
(.26)
-.29**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.26
(.28)
.19
(.17)
-.55***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.12^
(.07)
1.09***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.42***
(.26)
-.29**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.24
(.28)
.19
(.17)
-.55***
(.10)
.21*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.11^
(.07)
1.06***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.41***
(.26)
-.30**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.27
(.28)
.19
(.17)
-.55***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.10^
(.07)
1.07***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.42***
(.25)
-.29**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.45***
(.08)
-.15
(.08)
.29
(.28)
.18
(.17)
-.56***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.12
(.07)

-.11^
(.07)
1.10***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.39***
(.26)
-.28**
(.09)
-.26**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.16*
(.08)
.27
(.28)
.19
(.17)
-.54***
(.10)
.21
(.11)
.48***
(.09)
-.12
(.07)

-.12^
(.07)
1.09***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.42***
(.26)
-.29**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.26
(.28)
.19
(.17)
-.56***
(.10)
.21*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.13^
(.07)
1.09***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.43***
(.25)
-.29**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.28
(.28)
.18
(.17)
-.55***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.14*
(.07)
1.09***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.39***
(.25)
-.28**
(.09)
-.24**
(.08)
-.45***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.26
(.28)
.16
(.17)
-.52***
(.10)
.21*
(.11)
.49***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.12^
(.07)
1.10***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.43***
(.26)
-.29**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.26
(.28)
.19
(.17)
-.55***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

.12
(.14)

.05
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.21*
(.08)
.06
(.03)

.04
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.20*
(.08)
.06
(.03)
.12
(.19)

.04
(.14)
.11
(.12)
.21*
(.08)
.06
(.03)

.04
(.14)
.11
(.12)
.21*
(.08)
.05
(.03)

.03
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.21*
(.08)
.06
(.03)

.05
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.20*
(.08)
.06
(.03)

.05
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.19*
(.08)
.06
(.03)

.02
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.21*
(.08)
.07*
(.03)

.04
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.20*
(.08)
.06
(.03)

.34^
(.22)
-.15
(.11)

othercon

.12
(.09)

associati
on

-.02
(.07)

St.co.

.09
(.07)
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village

-.36**
(.12)

public

_cons

adjR2
N

cov

gamount

gamount2

bamount

bamount2

return

surrender

confess

overturn

contribut
e
accessor
y
askbribe

othercrim
e
triallevel

Districtct

Intct

Highct

senior

Han

men

age

party

economy

judiciary

4.55***
(.28)
.43
922

4.89***
(.41)
.43
922

4.19***
(.69)
.43
922

4.20***
(.69)
.43
922

4.22***
(.69)
.43
922

4.37***
(.71)
.43
922

4.22***
(.69)
.43
922

4.27***
(.47)
.43
922

4.29***
(.47)
.43
922

4.18***
(.47)
.44
922

-.02
(.11)
4.20***
(.70)
.43
922

lnsentence
w/ ct&trial

lnsentence
w/ senior
added

lnsentence
w/ indivi~
added

lnsentence
w/ party
added

lnsentence
w/
economy
added

lnsentence
w/ judiciary
added

lnsentence
w/
ot~organ
added

lnsentence
w/
associatio
n added

lnsentence
w/ st-co.
added

lnsentence
w/ village
added

lnsentence
w/ public
added

-.12^
(.07)
1.13***
(.16)
-.16***
(.03)
1.44***
(.25)
-.29**
(.09)
-.23**
(.08)
-.45***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.31
(.28)
.17
(.17)
-.59***
(.10)
.23*
(.10)
.49***
(.09)
.23
(.14)
-.69**
(.23)
-.26
(.15)
.00
(.00)

-.12^
(.07)
1.12***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.45***
(.26)
-.29**
(.09)
-.24**
(.08)
-.46***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.30
(.28)
.18
(.17)
-.59***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.49***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.12^
(.07)
1.09***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.43***
(.26)
-.29**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.26
(.28)
.19
(.17)
-.55***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.12^
(.07)
1.09***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.42***
(.26)
-.29**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.24
(.28)
.19
(.17)
-.55***
(.10)
.21*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.11^
(.07)
1.06***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.41***
(.26)
-.30**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.27
(.28)
.19
(.17)
-.55***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.10^
(.07)
1.07***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.42***
(.25)
-.29**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.45***
(.08)
-.15
(.08)
.29
(.28)
.18
(.17)
-.56***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.12
(.07)

-.11^
(.07)
1.10***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.39***
(.26)
-.28**
(.09)
-.26**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.16*
(.08)
.27
(.28)
.19
(.17)
-.54***
(.10)
.21
(.11)
.48***
(.09)
-.12
(.07)

-.12^
(.07)
1.09***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.42***
(.26)
-.29**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.26
(.28)
.19
(.17)
-.56***
(.10)
.21*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.13^
(.07)
1.09***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.43***
(.25)
-.29**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.28
(.28)
.18
(.17)
-.55***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.14*
(.07)
1.09***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.39***
(.25)
-.28**
(.09)
-.24**
(.08)
-.45***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.26
(.28)
.16
(.17)
-.52***
(.10)
.21*
(.11)
.49***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

-.12^
(.07)
1.10***
(.17)
-.15***
(.03)
1.43***
(.26)
-.29**
(.09)
-.25**
(.08)
-.44***
(.08)
-.15*
(.08)
.26
(.28)
.19
(.17)
-.55***
(.10)
.22*
(.11)
.47***
(.09)
-.13
(.07)

.12
(.14)

.05
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.21*
(.08)
.06
(.03)

.04
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.20*
(.08)
.06
(.03)
.12
(.19)

.04
(.14)
.11
(.12)
.21*
(.08)
.06
(.03)

.04
(.14)
.11
(.12)
.21*
(.08)
.05
(.03)

.03
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.21*
(.08)
.06
(.03)

.05
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.20*
(.08)
.06
(.03)

.05
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.19*
(.08)
.06
(.03)

.02
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.21*
(.08)
.07*
(.03)

.04
(.14)
.12
(.12)
.20*
(.08)
.06
(.03)

.34^
(.22)
-.15
(.11)

othercon

.12
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(.09)
associati
on

-.02
(.07)

St.co.

.09
(.07)

village

-.36**
(.12)

public

_cons

adjR2
N

4.55***
(.28)
.43
922

4.89***
(.41)
.43
922

4.19***
(.69)
.43
922

4.20***
(.69)
.43
922

4.22***
(.69)
.43
922

4.37***
(.71)
.43
922

4.22***
(.69)
.43
922

4.27***
(.47)
.43
922

4.29***
(.47)
.43
922

Standard errors in parentheses, ^ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
NOTE: The results of the district variables and the jurisdiction variables are omitted for simplicity.
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4.18***
(.47)
.44
922

-.02
(.11)
4.20***
(.70)
.43
922

Table 2.11 OLS Estimates of the Relationship of Trial Level to Total Sentence Excluding
Non-Appealed Cases

triallevel
cov
gamount
gamount2
bamount
bamount2
return
surrender
confess
overturn
contribute
accessory
askfor
othercrime

Lnpenaltysentence w/
fund amount
.10
(.10)
.05
(.11)
1.99***
(.25)
-.36***
(.06)
2.58***
(.43)
-.70***
(.18)

Lnpenaltysentence w/
legal factors
.01
(.08)
-.05
(.09)
1.72***
(.20)
-.32***
(.05)
1.73***
(.36)
-.40**
(.15)
-.26**
(.10)
-.46***
(.12)
.13
(.10)
.45
(.29)
.04
(.23)
-.56***
(.13)
.26
(.13)
.45***
(.10)

Han
men
age
St.co.
village
_cons

4.09***
4.45***
(.08)
(.10)
adj. R2
.24
.38
N
427
419
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

63

Lnsentence w/ all in
.02
(.08)
-.10
(.10)
1.59***
(.21)
-.30***
(.05)
1.65***
(.37)
-.41**
(.15)
-.28**
(.10)
-.44***
(.12)
.10
(.10)
.56
(.30)
.09
(.23)
-.36**
(.14)
.25
(.14)
.48***
(.10)
-.10
(.15)
.20
(.11)
-.01
(.05)
.27*
(.13)
-.43*
(.18)
4.17***
(.40)
.40
419

III REASSESSING THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVES ABOUT THE COV SYSTEM
A. INTERPRETATION OF QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS
Is COV a Response to Legal Factors?
From the findings presented in Chapter II, it is clear that COV has functioned to move
many serious public corruption cases to certain targeted trial courts. These cases are not
randomly selected to be tried alternatively, and the alternative trial court is not decided
randomly, either. As can be seen from Table 2.3, the monetary value of the illicit funds leads
to a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of a case being tried alternatively.
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show that at the district level, cases are more likely to be transferred to
Xicheng district, whereas at the intermediate level, cases are more likely to be sent to the No.
1 Intermediate Court.
I also looked at the effects of other legal factors on the probability of being tried
alternatively, and these results further confirm that the more serious the case, the higher the
possibility it will be tried alternatively. As seen in Table 2.4, if the defendant actively asks for
a bribe, which would tend to increase his sentence if convicted, he is statistically more likely
to be tried alternatively; and if he voluntarily returns the illicit funds before the trial, which
would tend to decrease his sentence, he is statistically less likely to be tried alternatively.
Moreover, in operation, the COV system functions to decrease the differences in
sentence caused by the change of the trial court. Since the targeted alternative trial courts
impose, on average, harsher punishments than other similar courts in Beijing, a change of
venue has a statistically significant negative net effect on the sentence, which cancels out
such difference. Table 2.9 shows that Xicheng District Court imposes, on average,
64

statistically harsher punishments than the majority of other district courts in Beijing; and
cases concluded by the No. 1 Intermediate Court involve, on average, longer sentences than
all of the other intermediate courts in Beijing, all else equal. Table 2.10 shows that COV
actually functions to decrease the sentence, all else equal.
Based on the data, it seems that COV operates to prevent local bias in serious public
corruption cases by transferring them to other courts, while at the same time ensuring that the
cases are still tried under the same standards as in their home courts by decreasing the
difference between the home court and the alternative court. However, such a conclusion may
not withstand further analysis.
First, the perceived seriousness of a public corruption case may not actually be the
reason to use COV, but instead the result of its use. It is always difficult to draw a causal
conclusion from a statistical relationship.
In China, cases tried alternatively are also investigated alternatively. When COV is
activated in public corruption cases, the alternative handling of the case involves three stages:
investigation by an alternative agency, prosecution by an alternative prosecutor, and trial by
an alternative court. According to China’s Criminal Procedure Law, a prosecutor can only
prosecute in its corresponding court, which is at the same level and located in the same area
as the prosecutor. Thus, a case that is tried alternatively is always a case that has been
investigated alternatively.
At the beginning of an investigation, however, the seriousness of a case is not obvious.
Factors like whether the suspect has actively asked for a bribe, or whether the suspect has
returned the illicit funds, cannot be readily known and thus cannot have an effect on the
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decision whether to implement COV. Only factors regarding the identity, position, and
political level of the suspect, the number of suspects, and a rough idea of the monetary value
can be easily obtained, and can therefore possibly influence the COV decision. Once a case is
selected to be investigated alternatively, the new investigator will be more motivated than in
local cases to dig thoroughly and to ensure that the case results in conviction. These
investigations thus may turn out to uncover larger monetary values than similar investigations
in the default jurisdiction. Moreover, factors like the position and the administrative level of
the suspects also have a positive relationship with the monetary value of the public corruption
case, increasing its seriousness.
In short, although COV is closely related to the seriousness of a case, COV is not
caused by such seriousness. Given that the true seriousness of the crime can only be
accurately and thoroughly determined at the conclusion of the investigation process,
“seriousness” for COV purposes is essentially predetermined.
Because the decision to invoke the COV often precedes the investigation stage, much of
China’s anti-corruption work can be characterized as “seeking facts from truth.” Although the
use of COV looks to be associated with the seriousness of corruption cases, the use of COV
actually produces such seriousness. In essence, the decision to invoke COV is predetermined,
and adheres to a political logic rather than a legal one.
Second, the use of COV has not prevented or corrected local bias, but instead has
increased punishments and/or exaggerated differences in sentencing. The statistically
significant difference in sentence among different trial courts remains, even after COV has
been used frequently. The effect of COV on decreasing sentences is too small to correct for
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the underlying sentencing differences between courts, and in some circumstances, COV even
increases the difference. As seen in Table 2.9, a case transferred from No. 2 Intermediate
Court to No. 1 Intermediate Court through the COV system still receives, on average, a
longer sentence than a case with the same legal factors tried ordinarily at No. 2 Intermediate
Court. The difference is even greater if the case is transferred from Shijingshan District Court
to Xicheng District Court.
The use of COV centralizes the transfer of the cases into certain specifically targeted
trial courts, like the Xicheng District and No. 1 Intermediate Courts. For the few transferring
courts that routinely impose harsher punishments than these targeted courts, COV makes the
punishment of transferred cases even lighter than cases with the same legal factors tried at the
transferring courts. And for the majority of transferring courts that impose, on average,
lighter punishments than the targeted courts, COV leads to significantly harsher punishments
for transferred cases than non-transferred ones with the same legal facts. In both situations,
COV has not functioned to make the judgment fairer, to correct local bias, or to protect
justice. This further confirms that the use of COV, in practice, does not correct for local bias
in serious public corruption cases.

Is COV a Response to Extralegal Factors?
As indicated in the section above, the relationship between COV and various legal
factors is insufficient to explain the use of COV, and extralegal factors may actually exert
substantial influence over decision-making regarding whether or not to activate the COV
system. I further studied this relationship, between the use of COV and extralegal factors, to
see whether COV functions to prevent local bias in cases involving certain extralegal factors.
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Table 2.4 shows that the use of COV has a statistically significant positive correlation
with whether the defendant holds a position in agencies including anti-corruption agencies,
police and the court, or state-owned enterprises; whether he/she is an ordinary citizen without
any public position; and whether his/her ethnicity is Han. At the same time, the use of COV
has a statistically significant negative correlation with whether the defendant holds a position
in agencies including public universities and associations, other executive organs, or local
congresses and political consultative conferences; whether the defendant holds a village
management position; and his/her age. Other extralegal factors do not have a statistically
significant relationship with COV.
The COV system is supposed to help correct for local bias against certain kinds of cases
and defendants, which can be operationalized to mean that COV should help to decrease the
differences in punishments between such cases and other cases containing the same legal
factors. It is therefore necessary to look at the differences in punishments between cases with
the same legal factors but different extralegal factors, which can reveal the effect of such
extralegal factors on the sentence.
Table 2.10 shows that some extralegal factors do indeed have statistically significant
effects (at a significance level of 0.1 or 0.06) on the total sentence, when all legal factors are
held equal. Since cases with the same legal factors should not be judged differently simply
because some extralegal factors are different, the existence of a net effect for some of these
extralegal factors indicates that there is evidence of unreasonable bias towards those cases
and defendants. To illustrate clearly how the use of COV is related to these extralegal factors
which have different relationships to the total sentence, I summarized their effects in Table
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3.1, which is based on the results in Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.9, and 2.10. Keep in mind that Table
2.10 shows that COV continues to have an overall effect of decreasing the sentence, even
after adding extralegal factors.
Controlling for all legal factors, the gender of the defendant does not have a statistically
significant effect on the sentence. But other extralegal factors – i.e., the defendant’s age or
ethnicity, and certain types of positions – do have such an effect. Moreover, when all legal
factors are the same, economic officials receive the highest sentence, followed by (party,
state-owned company, and other organ) officials, then by association officials and the general
public, then by judicial officials, and finally by local congress and village officials, who
receive the lightest sentence. This can be summarized as follows:
lnsentence as the outcome variable: economic officials > (party, state-owned companies,
other organs) > (associations, general public) > judiciary > (congress, village)
With these findings in mind, let us return to COV’s relationship to extralegal factors.
When analyzing the effect of extralegal factors on the use of COV, I did not control for all
legal factors, but simply correlated COV with each extralegal factor. But as we have already
seen, the decision to try a case alternatively through the COV system is actually pre-decided
at the investigation stage, during which time the legal factors do not have an influence
because they have not yet been determined. Because an alternatively tried public corruption
case necessarily follows an alternatively investigated case, the cov variable here actually
represents the use of COV during investigation, which will necessarily be the same as the use
of COV during trial. Thus the legal factors actually do not need to be controlled in this model.
Only facially obvious factors, i.e., extralegal factors like the defendant’s characteristics and
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official position, can possibly make a difference at the start of the investigation stage.
Some of these factors overlap or are correlated with each other. Table 2.4 shows that, at
a significance level of 0.1, defendants who are of Han ethnicity tend to hold judicial positions,
are from state-owned companies, or are members of the general public, and are much more
likely to be investigated alternatively; while defendants who are older, hold positions in other
executive organs, are from governmental associations, or are village officials, are much less
likely to be investigated elsewhere through the COV system. Gender, senior-level position, or
economic or party positions do not have a statistically significant effect on the use of COV.
Using each area (or type of position) as the base group to compare with cases involving other
position areas, I further found that economic and village officials are least likely to be
investigated alternatively, followed by governmental associations and other executive organs,
then party organs and state-owned companies, then the general public, with judicial officials
being the most likely to be investigated elsewhere, as follows:
judiciary > general public > (party, state-owned companies) > (governmental
associations, other organs) > (economic, village officials)
From these findings, it is clear that the use of COV does not actually respond to the
perceived existence of local bias as represented by the extralegal factors that have a
statistically significant effect on the punishment. With the exception of judicial officials, most
public officials are more likely than ordinary people to be tried locally, indicating a
conservative and protective attitude in using the COV towards non-judicial public officials.
Even when village, economic, state-owned-company, and congressional or other executive
organ positions are found to have a statistically significant effect on the sentence of cases
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with the same legal factors, the use of COV did not function to move cases involving these
officials elsewhere.
Moreover, the use of COV is mismatched with the effects of extralegal factors. Use of
COV does not have a statistically significant correlation with any of the factors that
statistically affect the sentence, such as the senior level of the defendant and economic
positions. On the other hand, for factors that do not statistically affect the sentence, such as
judicial positions, governmental association positions, and the general public, the use of COV
turns out to be statistically significantly related to each of them.
Furthermore, for factors that result in a statistically significant increase in sentence, such
as state-owned company positions, the use of COV works to further increase the sentence in
these cases, as it makes these cases more likely to be tried at Xicheng or No. 1 Intermediate
Courts, which generally impose harsher punishments. In contrast, for factors that result in a
statistically significant decrease in sentence, such as village positions, the use of COV
functions to further decrease the sentence in these cases, as it makes these cases very unlikely
to be transferred to the harsher courts. Even when COV works in the correct direction to
cancel out the biased effect of extralegal factors, the effect of the use of COV is too slight to
make a substantive difference.
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Table 3.1 A Summary of Each Extralegal Factor’s Effect on Total Sentence and the Use of
COV
Lnsentence
COV
age
+
Han
+
+
men
X
X
int ct
+
+
senior
+
X
village
party
X
X
judiciary
X
+
economy
+
X
othercon
+
association
X
St.co.
+
+
public
X
+
NOTE: X means there is no statistically significant effect; detailed results in Tables 2.3, 2.4,
2.9, and 2.10.
B. DISPROOF OF OFFICIAL NARRATIVES
As indicated in the previous chapter, it is widely agreed (even if not legally established)
that two prevailing theories may uphold the routine use of COV in public corruption cases
involving officials. The first theory posits that COV serves to prevent intensive local bias so
that justice can be realized. Some cases may greatly affect the interests of the local
community and be so serious that the impartiality of local judges cannot be ensured. Such
cases must be transferred to alternative venues. “Local bias” in public corruption cases refers
primarily to the protection of, or leniency towards, criminal suspects by local judicial actors.
The second prevailing theory posits that COV serves to protect the image of judiciary, as the
public may distrust the fairness of the trial in these cases, if they were tried locally. However,
as indicated by the analysis earlier in this chapter, the first theory may not stand at all, while
the second theory is insufficient to explain the use of COV, thus calling for alternative
explanations.
Limitations of the First Prevailing Theory
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Based on the data, I have demonstrated that – contrary to the fear of local judicial
protectionism – in actuality, there is local judicial hostility towards certain kinds of cases and
defendants. Some district courts in Beijing, in areas with similar levels of economic
development, impose much harsher punishment than others in cases with the same legal
factors. Within the same district and for the same criminal activities, economic officials
receive harsher punishment than judicial officials; and senior level officials receive harsher
punishment than low-level and village officials. However, the use of COV does not respond
effectively to these local hostilities toward certain cases and defendants. COV fails to move
senior officials to other courts, or to transfer serious public corruption cases elsewhere, in a
manner that reduces the severity of the sentences. On the contrary, COV operates to transfer
such cases to courts that generally impose harsher punishments than most courts, and thus
increases the severity of sentences.
As compared with the public perception, the data here does not indicate that there is a
problem with local protectionism towards public corruption cases involving officials.
Although the effects of the monetary value indicate that as the amount of bribed or grafted
money increases, the sentence increases at a decreasing rate, such an effect – which generally
favors public officials who corruptly obtain larger amounts of money – is actually caused by
China’s criminal rules, not local judicial favoritism, and is constant across different judicial
districts. The COV system cannot alter this result, because no court is better than any other in
this regard.
It is possible that because of the use of COV, local protectionism has been completely
corrected and thus does not appear in the sample set. In other words, if the cases in the
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sample set had not been transferred, perhaps they would have received statistically
significantly lighter sentences. And since the COV system is operating to transfer cases
disproportionately to targeted courts that generally impose harsher punishments, it seems
plausible that COV does have the aim to increase the punishment of the transferred cases,
thus eliminating the original protectionism.
But the data reveals that even if COV is intended to eliminate local protectionism, such a
function is being used selectively and has been targeted at only certain groups, indicating at
best a mixed mission for the use of COV. As shown above, different groups of public
officials receive differential treatment with respect to COV. Judicial, village, and
governmental association officials generally all receive much lighter punishments than
economic and congressional officials in the same types of cases. If the COV system is meant
to prevent local protectionism, it should work by transferring the cases involving all three of
these types of public officials, all of whom typically receive lighter sentences. However,
cases involving village officials are almost never moved to other places, as are less than onethird of the cases involving governmental association officials, whereas half of those
involving judicial officials are transferred.
Limitations of the Second Prevailing Theory
The second prevailing theory is that the COV system serves the purpose of protecting
the public reputation of the judiciary, by transferring difficult cases that could undermine the
public’s view of the integrity of judicial officials. A closer examination of the COV treatment
of corruption cases involving judicial officials reveals the limitations

of this theory.

The relatively widespread use of COV in public corruption cases involving judicial
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officials actually tends to support the theory that the COV works to protect public confidence
in judicial justice. First, when a judicial official is charged with public corruption, there is
great suspicion among the general public that the resolution of the case will not be fair or just,
due to the judicial official’s influence over the agencies that directly work on the
investigation and must reach a conclusion about his/her alleged criminal activities – although
the data shows there is actually no local protectionism towards judicial officials, as compared
with the general public. Moreover, as established in China’s criminal rules, whenever the
president of the default court has to withdraw from a case, that case needs to be transferred
elsewhere. The influence of the court’s president over the case judgment is comparable to the
influence of high-level leaders of other anti-corruption agencies over the resolution of the
case. Thus, the finding that COV has been used frequently in corruption cases involving
judicial officials tends to indicate that such use may, in fact, be intended to protect the image
of the judiciary.
Second, judicial officials do indeed receive lighter sentences than other types of public
officials. The possibility that judicial officials may be unreasonably favored in the default
court thus seems to be higher, further increasing public suspicion regarding these cases.
Under the COV system, cases involving judicial officials are more likely to be transferred
than cases involving other public officials. The same pattern occurs with governmental
association officials. Regarding village officials, in Beijing, the village is situated at a lower
administrative level than the district courts, and district courts are located at a district center
outside the village. District courts thus are not perceived as “belonging” to a village – there is
no “village court” in Beijing – and thus the fairness of district courts in trying village officials
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in Beijing is not viewed with public suspicion. So the relatively rare use of COV in cases
involving village officials is not necessarily contrary to the “judicial integrity” theory.
Third, the data about corruption cases involving judicial officials tends to show that the
COV system must be more about protecting the image of the local judiciary than it is about
affecting the actual sentences imposed in such cases. This is because judicial officials tend to
receive lighter punishments than the ordinary public in general, and as we have seen, the use
of COV actually decreases the severity of the punishments imposed against judicial officials,
all else being held equal.
However, the use of COV in corruption cases involving judicial officials only represents
a small part of its use in the overall sample set. If the purpose of COV was to protect the
judicial image, and to erase public suspicion towards local courts trying local public officials,
then why are some other types of public officials much less likely than the ordinary public to
be tried alternatively? Even cases involving party organ officials, who are generally deemed
to have great influence over the local judiciary, are seldom transferred elsewhere.
Moreover, COV is not well suited to protect the image of the local judiciary. Although
COV operates by removing a case from a local court that may be viewed with suspicion by
the local public, COV also deprives the local public of the chance to witness the trial of the
accused public official in a local forum. And in any event, the public’s primary focus is
probably not on the trial, but on the end result – i.e., the conviction and sentence imposed
against the accused public official. To build public confidence in the local judiciary, it would
be both more efficient and more effective for the superior court simply to instruct the original
court to punish judicial officials more severely than others – which would render it
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unnecessary (and inefficient) to transfer the cases elsewhere.
Furthermore, “public suspicion” and “judicial image” are both obscure and inoperable
concepts. It is unclear how much the judiciary’s position is affected by public suspicion in the
local judiciary. The data showing that some types of public officials receive generally harsher
punishment than the general public, and that judicial officials receive generally lighter
punishment than other types of public officials, further weaken the connection between
judicial position and public suspicion in the local judiciary. Such suspicion can also be
theoretically supported in cases involving other types of public officials, making the theory
incapable of distinguishing these other officials from judicial officials. Besides, the choice to
try a case alternatively is pre-decided at the investigation stage. Public suspicion is not likely
to be a concern during this early investigation stage, because the public likely does not yet
know much about the case. There must be factors other than judicial image that are affecting
the decision-making regarding COV.
Finally, considering China’s centralized authoritarian polity, the influence of public
opinion over agency decision-making is quite limited. The public not only lacks the
information and channels to influence decisions, but more importantly lacks the power and
resources to play a substantive role in political decision-making. This also applies in the COV
context. When the superior court or anti-corruption agency decides whether to use COV,
public concern about the local judiciary may be a factor, but obviously not the only factor.
In conclusion, the second prevailing theory about the purpose of COV may hold true
under certain circumstances, but it is inaccurate as applied to other situations, and in any
event does not suffice to explain the data concerning COV. The analyses regarding both of
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the currently prevailing theories indicate that COV has a mixed mission, and operates with
multiple factors playing a role in the decision making about COV.
Explaining the Gap between Intended Purpose and Actual Use
One possible way to reconcile the loosely coupled nature of the “official” purposes of
the COV and its actual use would be to claim that the COV system has malfunctioned.
Malfunction of an institution could be defined in several ways, and multiple forms exist even
within each definition.
(1) Malfunction could refer to a mismatch between the observed situations and the
intended ones, i.e., the observed operation of the institution deviates substantively from its
original design. The design of an institution normally consists of several parts. As in the COV
system, there are at least two parts: the designed use of COV and the designed results from
such use. If either of the two prevailing theories is used as the design, then the designed
results would be the prevention of local bias and the protection of public confidence in the
local judiciary; in short, fair trials in those cases that are designated to be tried alternatively.
Different parts of an institution may or may not have the designed interactions. The
designed interactions can take form in causal, correlative, or moderating relationships, or
many other kinds – with the exception, under normal circumstances, of contradictive or
cancelling relationships. As for the COV system, there is an intended causal relationship
between the use of COV and the results after its use. With the use of COV, trials in the
transferred cases should be fair.
A mismatch occurs when any observed part of the institution deviates from its
corresponding designed part, or any observed relationship between different parts of the
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institution differs from its corresponding designed relationship. But as is widely agreed, a
single mismatch would not constitute the overall malfunction of an institution. A malfunction
requires a mismatch of a certain degree and scope. A mismatch of a single part or relationship,
even if it is substantive, is not enough. There must be substantial mismatches in substantive
or essential parts or relationships of the institution in order to constitute an institutional
malfunction. Again, different mismatches could have different relationships between them,
such as causal, moderating, overlapping, contradictive, or no relationship at all.
If we assume that the COV system was designed according to the two prevailing
theories, the data indicate that the use of COV is substantively inconsistent with the supposed
use under both theories, including (a) which cases should be transferred, (b) where the cases
should be transferred to, and (c) how the alternative courts should judge the transferred cases.
The results of the use of COV represented in the sample set are also inconsistent with the
designed result under both theories: local hostility to some cases and defendants still exists,
many types of public officials remain more likely to be tried locally than the general public,
and officials holding different positions continue to receive different treatment.
Even the designed causal relationship between the designed use of COV and the
designed results of its use is not found in the data. Because COV is used to send cases to
targeted courts that generally impose harsher punishments, defendants in transferred cases
cannot be guaranteed fair trials, but instead can easily be treated more unfairly than in cases
that have not been transferred. Under this definition, the COV system’s operation could be
taken as a kind of malfunction from its theoretical design.
In some situations, even substantive mismatches should not be taken as an institutional
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malfunction. When mismatches happen, the operation of the institution can take several
forms. It may operate following a random or arbitrary pattern, following no rule. This is
recognized as a malfunction. Or its operation may still follow a rule, or multiple rules,
although not the designed rules. Or its operation may not be sufficiently regulated to be
considered to have rules at all, but the system may still have some sequences, orders, or
informal rules that are fluid and flexible. These rules or informal orders may further interact
with each other and have different or intertwined effects on different parts/relations of the
institution. Additionally, because an institution has several parts and relations, it is also
possible that its operation consists of some parts/relations having rules, some parts/relations
having transitional or quasi-rules, and some parts/relations operating randomly.
In the COV system, the use of COV and the results found in the data still do follow
some rules. The use of COV focuses on judicial officials, centralizes transferred cases in
harsher courts, and decreases the harsh punishment of those alternative courts in the
sentencing of transferred cases. The results of the use of COV are that most officials are tried
locally, local hostility remains, and different types of officials receive different sentences.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to claim that the institution has malfunctioned,
because there are still theories that can explain those rules or informal orders, to explain its
operation. Such theories may reflect an underlying design, an expected design that unfolded
later, or an unexpected but still allowable design. Or it can be argued that, although being
unexpected, such operation is still good because it protects or provides order. This brings us
to another type of definition of an institutional malfunction.
(2) An institutional malfunction could also mean that the observed deviating operation
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of the institution does not satisfy some normative evaluation. This means that if deviant
operations pass the normative standard, they cannot be called malfunctions. For example, the
deviating operation might be cost/benefit efficient; or it might be legitimate and have a
sufficient legal basis; or it might be moral and just. Philosophical, economic, psychological,
sociological, anthropological, jurisprudential, or historical theories may all provide such
normative standards for evaluating whether or not the institution has malfunctioned. They
may evaluate the operation of different parts or relations of the institution, or the rationality
of the rules or informal orders or their interactions or their accumulations of the deviating
operations, or even the theories or the normative standards that have been used to evaluate
such functions.
Under this definition, the mismatch of the function of COV with the two prevailing
theories may not simply be taken as a malfunction. The data already indicate that the
operation of the COV system at least represents some kinds of informal rules that could be
further explained or justified, and that the COV probably has a mixed mission.
Moreover, the answer to whether or not an institution has malfunctioned is never the end
of the analysis. It is only a way to guide the future of the institution: to decide whether, and
how, it should be continued or reformed. The main value of the malfunction question is that
identifying an institutional malfunction signals the need either to reform or to terminate the
institution.
Some may argue that since the answer is not stable, under different definitions of
malfunction, then it is not reliable as a signal for future action; and that, since the end result
of the malfunction question is to determine whether a specific and sound theory can be found
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to explain the deviation, then would it not be better to omit the middle step, i.e., the
malfunction question, and simply look directly for a theory to explain the data?
The first concern is justified, but the malfunction definitions can be integrated into two
steps. The first step is to determine whether there is a mismatch, and if so, its scope and
degree. The second step is to determine whether the mismatch satisfies any rule or informal
rule or sequence. The answers to these two questions would trigger different presumed
diagnoses for the operation of the institution or its parts/relations, leading to different
subsequent questions, and calling for correspondingly different actions.
The second concern cannot stand, because the way to find or build a theory to explain
the data is never a direct way. It is always a trial-and-error process: first, a possible theory is
offered to explain the data, and then the mismatch appears, which leads to the development of
another possible theory to explain, qualify, or eliminate the mismatch. In reality, the
malfunction is an inherent part of the operation of an institution, and thus cannot be skipped.
Before collecting data regarding the operation of an institution, there is a designed
theory that supported the rational decision to implement the institution in the first place. So
whether the institution operates according to the designed theory matters a lot, and different
kinds of deviations call for different actions. Furthermore, if the definition of a malfunction is
watered down to mean that only the completely random and arbitrary operation of an
institution qualifies as a malfunction – and as long as there is some theory (or rule or informal
order) that could explain the deviation, then the malfunction does not exist – then it would be
too difficult to identify a malfunction, because it would be necessary to understand and apply
all possible sound theories to the data before claiming a malfunction. At the same time, the
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signal value of the malfunction would decrease to almost zero, because almost no
malfunction could ever be found, and many deviating operations could pass the test. A
categorical definition of malfunction is important in order to realize the signal value of the
concept.
Using the two-part definition of malfunction proposed above, it is easy to achieve a
general picture of the categories of institutional malfunctions, with corresponding signals.
The method involves asking the following three questions: First, whether the institution or its
certain parts/relations needs to be corrected instantly, or conditionally, or within a certain
period, or in the long run. Second, how to correct the deviations, or which rule or theory to
follow when making the necessary corrections. Third, what concrete measures can be taken
to adjust the operation of the institution.
Within the second question, there are three sub-questions:
(1) The competition among different theories for the correction standard. As indicated
from second definition of “malfunction,” when a substantive mismatch occurs, it does not
necessarily activate a correction according to the designed theory. It depends upon the
importance of realizing the designed theory, as compared with other possible theory
candidates that support the mismatch or other correction plans. If the original designed theory
has constitutional value, then a substantive deviation should trigger a “must-correct” signal
according to the designed theory.
By contrast, if other possible theories have value superior to that of the designed theory,
or if they may be justified as another designed theory, then the correction will primarily
follow such other theories.
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In the middle, there could be mixed theories that produce the correction standard. For
complicated institutions, there could even be different theories supporting different
parts/relations of the institution. The competition of these theories could occur independently
in different parts/relations, or correlatively across groups of parts/relations. The standard for
the competition could vary according to the values or functional conditions of the competing
parts/relations.
(2) The correction of previously mistaken understandings about the relations and values
of different parts of the institution. The institution may have multiple parts which have
different relations between them, including direct/indirect, causal/moderating, and cumulative
relations. Different parts play respective roles in the whole operation of the institution and
have different values, which together create the values of the institution that are affirmed by
the winning theories, and also represent the reasons why they should win the theory
competition. Sometimes, the mismatch simply represents a misunderstanding of such
relations or the values of the different parts, or how they may be integrated into a single
institution. In these situations, a scientific correction, rather than a normative one, is required.
(3) Supplemental measures and the correction of side-effects. At this level, besides the
normative and scientific correction plans, some facilitating measures that can help the
correction fit into the already existing operation of the institution should also be considered.
It is also important to consider how the correction may influence the interaction between the
reforming institution and other closely related institutions, and even the operation of a larger
group of institutions. It is necessary to include in the correction plan some supplemental
measures to address contradictive parts of other institutions, to clean up obstacles for the
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institution’s operation, and to facilitate its role within the larger system. Moreover, using a
holistic and systematic perspective, or a periodic or long-term perspective, and putting the
isolated static institution back into the changeable dynamic and integral groups of institutions,
the answers to some of the earlier questions might be challenged and might need to be revised.

In the COV system, we have found in the empirical data a substantive mismatch with the
two prevailing theories about the purposes of COV. However, as explained, such a mismatch
does not necessarily mean a malfunction, and does not automatically call for a correction of
the institution’s function according to those two prevailing theories, even if they are deemed
to be the originally designed theories.
China’s criminal procedure law recognizes the basic principle that, in some special
situations, the superior court can instruct the default court to transfer a criminal case to
another court – even though no such rule has been passed, by either the legislature or
legislative organs, establishing the mission and the use of the COV system. The two
prevailing theories, claiming that this COV system has been established to prevent local bias
and to ensure public confidence in local judiciary, clearly have not been enacted by the
legislature and involve no other constitutional values. These two prevailing theories may
therefore be overcome or revised by other possible theories that can better explain the
observed data and can uphold superior values – especially because the use of COV still
follows some rules or informal order, as is evidenced by the data.
As for the mismatch that remains unexplained, the normative correction will be
implemented following a discussion of the revised theories. The mismatch in the data,
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regarding the causal relation between the use of COV and its results, is not explained by the
two prevailing theories and needs a scientific correction to reevaluate and rebuild the relation.
In addition, supplemental measures and holistic and periodic analyses will be used to
facilitate and justify the correction process of the COV system. The third and last step in the
reform process would be to develop a concrete correction plan, but that last step is beyond the
scope of this dissertation and will not be discussed herein. Finally, even if the substantive
mismatch with the two prevailing theories is seen as a malfunction, the two theories are
simply inadequate – and the necessary correction thus cannot be based on those theories,
without trying to better understand the true character of the unexplained observed data.
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IV ALTERNATIVE EXPLANANTION 1: RESOURCE REALLOCATION
A. THREE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
As discussed in the previous chapter, the two “official” narratives about the use of COV
– that COV prevents local bias and protects the public image of the judiciary – are
insufficient to explain the characteristics of the use of COV and its results as presented in the
data. In the remainder of this dissertation I will propose three alternative explanations for the
purpose and operation of COV that are consistent with the empirical findings in Chapter 2.
This sets an agenda for future research.
According to my first alternative explanation, rather than preventing local bias in favor
of local officials, COV actually helps to reallocate resources within the city and crack down
on hard cases to ensure the completion of the anti-corruption goals that have existed since
before the start of the 2012 anti-corruption campaign. According to my second alternative
explanation, rather than protecting the public image of the local judiciary, COV actually
works to disrupt local governmental control over anti-corruption work and revitalize
ineffective local anti-corruption forces, thereby helping to initiate the recent anti-corruption
campaign. The third alternative explanation is that COV helps to establish centralized party
leadership in anti-corruption work, and constitutes an essential part of China’s new anticorruption model. I will refer to this new, centralized, party-led approach as “the party
center’s leading control.” “Leading control” refers to the CCP’s ability to maintain continued
dominance over anti-corruption work without directly participating in such anti-corruption
work or directly deciding case outcomes.
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The institutional design, prosecutors’ incentives, and superior prosecutors’ control over
subordinate prosecutors’ anti-corruption work all support the first alternative explanation of
COV in reallocating resources. I will elaborate upon the first alternative explanation in the
remainder of this chapter; in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively I will discuss the other two
alternative explanations, and in Chapter 7, I will conclude with implications regarding the
new anti-corruption system in China.
B. THE COV SYSTEM’S INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Article 26 of China’s Criminal Procedure Law grants the superior court the power to
instruct an inferior court that is not located in the default venue to try certain cases. This is
the legal basis for the change-of-venue system in China. There are few rules regulating the
activation and operation of this system. Besides Article 26, additional rules are found in
Articles 16, 17, and 18 of the SPC Interpretation on Several Issues When Enforcing the
Criminal Procedure Law (2012) (最高院关于执行刑事诉讼法若干问题的解释), and
Articles 14, 15, and 18 of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s (SPP) Rules on People’s
Procuratorates’ Criminal Procedures (2012) (人民检察院刑事诉讼规则). Seen against the
backdrop of China’s entire legal and political system, these rules serve the main purpose of
establishing COV as a tool for the city-level prosecutor to reallocate resources for anticorruption work.
The power to initiate COV in public corruption cases is largely controlled by the
superior prosecutors, with very weak legal limits and few entities to challenge the decision.
First, according to China’s Criminal Procedure Law, a prosecutor can only prosecute in its
corresponding court, which is at the same level and located in the same area as the prosecutor.
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Thus, if the corresponding alternative court does not want to try a case that has already been
alternatively prosecuted and investigated by the prosecutor, there could be a conflict between
the alternative prosecutor and the court. However, because prosecutors play a dominant role
in public corruption cases, the courts are generally cooperative and will tend to go along with
the prosecutors’ decision to investigate a public corruption case alternatively. There are also
sometimes internal communications between the superior prosecutor and the court, when the
superior prosecutor decides to have a public corruption case investigated alternatively. Thus,
the prosecutor generally prevails over the court in initiating COV.
According to interviews I conducted with judges,53 when deciding whether to have an
alternative court try the case, or whether to agree with the decision of the procuratorate to
investigate the case alternatively, the courts indeed do take a look at the potential monetary
value involved in the case, the number of officials suspected, the political level and type of
position held by the suspected officials, and the complexity of the case. However, judges do
not play an independent role in the decision-making, instead mostly cooperating with the
decisions of the anti-corruption agency.54 This is consistent with the “iron triangle” structure
of the prosecutor, police, and court systems, and the relatively weak role that the court
usually plays in criminal cases55.
Second, according to the existing rules, COV can be activated in two ways. One occurs
when the inferior prosecutors have disputes regarding the default venue of a criminal case.

53 Interviews with seven judges from Beijing, two judges from Henan, and two judges from Zhejiang
conducted in Beijing between December 2016 and February 2017.
54 Interviews of four judges from Beijing, one judge from Henan, and two judges from Zhejiang conducted
in Beijing between December 2016 and January 2017.
55 Na Jiang, Iron triangle of the gong jian fa: Lessons from wrongful convictions in capital cases?, 46
INT’L J. L., CRIME, & JUSTICE 406 (2014).
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They can submit a request to their common superior prosecutor to decide which court shall
try the case. The other way occurs when a case is special, in which case the superior
prosecutor could instruct an inferior prosecutor outside the default venue to investigate and
prosecute the case. No matter how it is first activated, the power to decide whether COV is
initiated is in the hands of the superior prosecutor. The defendant can neither make a request
for, nor argue for or against the use of, COV at any stage. Nor can the defendant appeal the
decision to use COV in the investigation, prosecution, or trial.
Besides the inability to challenge the superior prosecutor’s decision regarding COV, the
legal limits are also too vague to truly constitute limits on such decision-making. Except for
the rules authorizing the superior prosecutor and court to decide to use of COV, there are no
rules to limit such decision-making, such as any principles or specific guidelines regarding
when a case is special enough to authorize the application of COV.
Moreover, the superior prosecutor decides where the case will be transferred to, without
any legal limits. Thus, the prosecutor has complete power in the use of COV, not only
regarding whether the system is initiated but also how the system is used, without any legal
limits or possibility of being challenged.

C. THE PROSECUTORS’ INCENTIVES TO REALLOCATE RESOURCES
The institutional context and incentive structure have the effect of motivating the
superior prosecutor to use COV to reallocate resources and crack down on hard cases in anticorruption. First, prosecutors have financial incentives to investigate sufficient numbers of
public corruption cases, including hard and complicated ones. The budgets provided by local
governments for most prosecutors remain tight. In the early 2000s, they were insufficient to
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cover even the salaries of some prosecutors.56 In some poor areas, the local government has
even partly relied upon the prosecutor to relieve its own financial stress.57 Things have
improved recently, and in wealthy areas expenses related to ordinary prosecutorial work and
case investigations can be resolved partly by the central government and partly by the local
government.58 However, in undeveloped poor areas, the finances of the prosecutor remain
under severe pressure.59
If the prosecutor wants to improve the working environment, build good office buildings,
purchase advanced equipment, hold trainings and team activities, and increase employees’
assistance, it needs to find money for itself. There has been an unspoken rule that the illicit
funds collected from public corruption cases investigated by the prosecutor would first be
submitted to the local treasury and then partly returned to the prosecutor as financial
assistance.60 In wealthy areas, this unspoken rule has since been terminated, but in poor areas
it is still effective.61 The ratio of how much of the fund is returned varies depending on the
place. For example, in one district interviewed, all of the illicit funds would be returned; in
another district interviewed, 80% of the illicit funds would be returned.62

56 Lin Ge, The Function of the Procuracy System From The Sufficient Finance Perspective, 1 J. Y UNNAN U.
(L. EDITION) 114 (2013) (葛琳，经费保障视野下的检察院运转，
《云南大学学报法学版》，2013 年第 1 期
第 114 页。)
57 Interview of a prosecutor-general from Henan, conducted in Beijing, November 2014.
58 Interviews of prosecutors from Beijing, Shanghai, and the south of Jiangsu, conducted in Beijing, April
2015.
59 Interviews of prosecutors from Henan, the north of Jiangsu, and Anhui, conducted in Beijing, April
2015.
60 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Prosecutor, the Ministry of Public
Security, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Justice, and the Legislative Affairs Commission of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Several Issues concerning the Implementation of the
Criminal Procedure Law, art. 36 (effective on Jan. 1, 2013). It requires the submission to the national treasury of
the illicit fund collected in convicted cases. According to the interviews, such fund in poor areas would still be
returned to the prosecutor.
61 Series of interviews in Beijing, Henan, and Tianjin between March 2014 and April 2015; Ge, supra note
56, at 115 (葛琳, 第 115 页).
62 Interviews in Beijing in November 2014 and March 2015.

91

Second, prosecutors aim for high conviction rates to ensure positive annual evaluations.
Each year, prosecutors have to be evaluated provincially, and the rankings are published
publicly and recognized as a factor affecting promotion. The numbers of public corruption
cases investigated and convicted annually are essential factors in this internal evaluation and
have substantial influence over the prosecutors’ reputations and promotions. To achieve high
evaluation points, prosecutors have to handle a sufficient number of cases, including a
sufficient number of cases involving large monetary values or senior officers. Prosecutors
also must achieve a high conviction rate for docketed cases.
Because China’s anti-corruption system is asymmetric and focuses largely on public
officials, cases involving the bribed party are more important than cases involving the bribers.63
Moreover, because of the “victimless” nature of public corruption, evidence is very limited
in these cases. China requires the prosecutor to prove an illegal motive in public corruption
cases under a high standard of proof.64 The motive must be specifically related to certain
incidences of official activities, decisions, or omissions.65 In some cases, there are notes or
diaries written by the officials to record these corrupt activities, which can be used as
evidence to prove the motive. Otherwise, however, it is difficult to prove the motive,
especially because China has a culture of maintaining social life or social networks through
gifts and “red envelopes” containing cash. Thus, confessions by the officials or bribers are
extremely important to ensure conviction in public corruption cases.
Because more important cases carry a heavier coefficient in the annual evaluation and

63 Fenfei Li & Jinting Deng, The Limits of Arbitrariness in Anticorruption by China’s Local Party
Discipline Inspection Committees, 25 J. CONTEMPORARY CHINA 75, 82 (2016).
64 Id.
65 Id.
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tend to involve larger monetary values, the successful investigation of these kinds of cases
means much more to the prosecutor than other, smaller cases. Thus, to secure a confession
and to increase the successful resolution of senior cases, the personnel assigned to these cases
must have good interrogative skills, investigative techniques, and rich experience. Thus, it is
much safer to allocate complicated public corruption cases to excellent and experienced
investigators and prosecutors than to less well-equipped prosecutors.
Interviews of prosecutors66 reveal that, when deciding whether to have an alternative
prosecutor investigate the case, prosecutors may look at some factors concerning the judges –
but they mostly care whether the case can be successfully resolved and whether the
conviction of the defendants can be guaranteed. The success of the investigation is the key to
deciding whether the local prosecutor can be trusted to investigate the case.67 This is due
mostly to the internal evaluation requirement within the procuracy system. As noted, annually,
the city-level prosecutors have to be evaluated provincially, and the rankings are published
publicly and recognized as a promotion factor.68
The prosecutors and judges I interviewed in Beijing further disclosed that the Xicheng
district procuratorate and the No.1 Intermediate procuratorate are generally better equipped
and have greater anti-corruption staff strengths than other procuratorates in Beijing.69 The
66 Series of interviews of prosecutors conducted in Beijing between October 2016 and February 2017. I
interviewed: in Beijing, two prosecutor-generals of district procuratorates, one director and two frontline
prosecutors of the anti-corruption department of a district procuratorate; in Henan, two prosecutor-generals of
municipal procuratorates, and two prosecutor-generals and one prosecutor of district procuratorates; in Jiangsu,
one prosecutor-general of a municipal procuratorate, and one prosecutor-generals and two prosecutors of district
procuratorates; and in Zhejiang, two prosecutor-generals of municipal procuratorates, and one prosecutorgeneral and one prosecutor of district procuratorate.
67 Id.
68 Interviews of five prosecutors from Beijing and two from Henan, conducted in Beijng between
December 2016 and February 2017, and interviews of three prosecutors from Jiangsu and two from Zhejiang,
conducted in Zhejiang in October 2016. This is also consistent with the findings of the interviews I previously
conducted, from 2014 to 2015.
69 Interviews of five prosecutors from Beijing, conducted in Beijing between December 2016 and February
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data indicating that public corruption cases involving officials are much more likely to be
transferred to these two procuratorates confirms that at least one main reason for such an
arrangement is to utilize the strong capacity of the two procuratorates for resolving public
corruption cases.
This also explains why a large number of public corruption cases in the data were still
investigated locally, and why the use of COV was only loosely and inscrutably related to the
political level and type of position held by the defendants – because only difficult and
complicated public corruption cases involving officials needed to be transferred to these two
procuratorates. Thus, at the city level, when the superior prosecutor in the city decides
whether to alternatively investigate a case, he/she first has to consider how best to utilize the
capacity and resources of different inferior procuratorates to satisfy the annual evaluation
requirements. The COV system allows him/her to avoid the default jurisdiction of the inferior
procuratorates when necessary, and thereby integrate the whole city’s anti-corruption
resources.
COV also provides the superior prosecutor with the chance to reallocate anti-corruption
resources in different situations, so that the hardest cases can be cracked by the most
advanced and most well-resourced inferior procuratorates, and the overall efficiency of the
whole city in resolving public corruption cases can be increased. Although in some cities the
district-level procuratorates also need to be annually evaluated, those evaluations are decided
mostly by the heads of their superior procuratorates, rather than being based on the numbers,
whereas the provincial evaluations are mostly determined by the numbers, such as the

2017.
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conviction rate and the number of resolved cases. Thus, it is quite reasonable for a city-level
procuratorate to want to integrate all of its subordinate district-level procuratorates to
accomplish the best provincial annual evaluations.
Furthermore, prosecutors consider anti-corruption work as their responsibility, and feel
proud and socially worthwhile when they are performing anti-corruption work. “This
[investigating public corruption cases] is the job. I should do it. Otherwise, why did I become
a prosecutor?”70; “When I investigate cases, people come to know me and consider me as
important. Otherwise, nobody cares about you.”71 Thus, successfully investigating and
prosecuting a sufficient number of complicated public corruption cases also provides strong
professional satisfaction for the procuratorate.

D. THE SUPERIOR’S CONTROL AND REGULAR INCENTIVES PROMPT
COOPERATION BY INFERIOR PROSECUTORS
Local Prosecutors’ Anti-Corruption Work Procedures
Public corruption crimes are a major kind of case directly investigated by the
prosecutors, rather than the police. After the investigation, only the prosecutors can prosecute
these cases in court and supervise the execution of the judgment after conviction. The
procuracy system has a structure similar to the courts. The Supreme People's Prosecutor (SPP)
sits at the top of the prosecutorial system and directs the work of the prosecutors at lower
levels, including prosecutors at the provincial, municipal, and district/county levels. Under
the dual leadership of both the superior prosecutors and the local governments, local

Interview of investigators of public corruption cases in the investigative department of a provincial
procuratorate and a municipal procuratorate, conducted in Beijing, September 2014.
71 Id.
70
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prosecutors are tasked with investigating, prosecuting, and supervising the execution of
judgments in public corruption cases, while also facilitating the leadership of the local
government and the coordination of the local CDIs in anti-corruption.
The procuratorate’s anti-corruption work generally has seven steps.72 First, when
receiving information, the prosecutor-general decides whether to perform a preliminary
investigation after a meeting with the director of the concerned department within the
procuratorate. Information regarding officers at district/county party secretary levels
(xianychu level, 县处级) shall be submitted one level up to the provincial procuratorate.73
Information regarding officers at municipal levels (tingyju level, 厅局级) shall be submitted
one level up to the SPP.74
Second, after the preliminary investigation, if there is evidence that a public corruption
crime may exist, the investigators write a report suggesting docketing the case, which the
prosecutor-general decides whether to approve.
Third, after the docketing of the case, investigative techniques restricting the personal
freedom of the suspects can be used according to the Criminal Law, such as bail, detention,
arrest, and living at a designated residence under supervision (LDRS).75 Among these
techniques, arrest and LDRS can be used only after the superior procuratorate approves.76 The
investigative department of the procuratorate formally investigates the case.

For the CDI's work process, please see Li & Deng, supra note 11. For the procuratorate's work process,
see China's Criminal Procedure Law, arts. 161-185 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
73 China's Criminal Procedure Law, art. 163 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
74 Id.
75 Id., at. Art 148.
76 Id., at art. 73.; Tentative Rules on Subjecting the Using of Arrest in Cases Investigated by Procuratorates
Below Provincial Level To the Approval of the Superior Procuratorates, art. 1, issued by SPP (effective on Sept.
4, 2009).
72
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Fourth, once the facts of the crime are clear and the evidence is sufficient, the
investigative department closes the investigation, writes an opinion for prosecution, subject to
approval by the prosecutor-general, and transfers the case files to the prosecution department
of the procuratorate, which reviews the files and prepares the prosecution. There may be
some back and forth between the two departments if the facts are unclear, or if there may be
insufficient evidence for prosecution.
Fifth, once the prosecution department is ready for the prosecution and the prosecutorgeneral agrees, the procuratorate prosecutes the case to the court.
Sixth, the court then tries and decides the case. If the court convicts the suspect, the
procuratorate can then close the case. The court may also suggest the procuratorate withdraw
the case if it thinks there is no case, or it may suggest supplemental investigation if it thinks
there is insufficient evidence.
Seventh, if the court denies the prosecution and acquits the suspect, the procuratorate
can protest the case to the superior court, subject to the superior procuratorate's approval, and
initiate the appeals procedure. With the appellate decision, the procuratorate can once again
close the case.
Unlike the CDI, the decisions regarding whether to accept, preliminarily investigate,
docket, formally investigate, prosecute, and protest the case must be filed with the superior
procuratorate, which could direct the inferior procuratorate to change its decisions if it finds
any such decision wrongful.77 The procuratorate also needs to notify any known
whistleblower of the decision not to docket the case, who can then appeal the decision to a
77

China's Criminal Procedure Law, arts. 165, 166, 167, 177, 178, 179, 183, 184 (effective on Jan. 1 2013).
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different department of the procuratorate.78
The Superior Prosecutor’s Control
The superior prosecutor has several checks on the local prosecutor. First, the superior
prosecutor has a large say in the nomination of the local prosecutor and the potential
promotion of the local prosecutor to the leadership role of superior prosecutor.
Second, the superior prosecutor has a good measure of control over the inferior’s
handling of casework through a detailed internal evaluation system, which consists of several
ratios, such as the numbers of cases and important cases that shall be docketed, investigated,
and convicted.
Third, there is a nationwide online casework reporting system. Once a case is docketed,
its files must to be uploaded into the reporting system. Delayed uploading is a disciplinary
violation. Once uploaded, the case cannot be removed unless it is closed with a conviction or
a withdrawing decision, and all the documents are open to the superior prosecutor which can
question the handling of the case.
Fourth, each essential decision regarding case investigation has to be filed with the
superior prosecutor, and during investigation, certain essential investigative techniques such
as arrest and designated residence under supervision (DRUS) cannot be used without the
superior prosecutor’s approval.
Fifth, when the local prosecutor receives an acquittal verdict, which is very harmful to
its internal evaluation, the superior prosecutor’s support is necessary in order for the local
prosecutor to appeal.

78

Id., at art. 184.
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Having such considerable control over the selection, promotion, evaluation, and the
handling of casework by the local prosecutor, the superior prosecutor can obstruct the local
prosecutor’s anti-corruption work simply by directing the inferior prosecutor not to start the
case or to passively investigate the case, or by disapproving the use of arrest and DRUS in
order to obstruct the investigation.
The whole work process of the prosecutors in anti-corruption cases is summarized in
Figures 4.1-4.3, where the interactions with the local party leader, the superior prosecutor
(abbreviated as “SP” in the Figures), and the CDI are bolded, underlined, and italicized,
respectively. As seen in these Figures, the superior prosecutors’ influence exists throughout
all of the subordinate prosecutors’ anti-corruption work steps.

Figure 4.1 The Investigation
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Figure 4.2 The Prosecution Preparation
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In the current situation – where public corruption is extensive, the anti-corruption
caseload is heavy, and anti-corruption resources are relatively insufficient79 – the rules
establishing the COV system grant to the superior prosecutors the complete power, without
legal limits or challenging entities, in initiating and deciding how to use the COV system.
Given the strong motivation to successfully investigate and prosecute a sufficient number of
hard public corruption cases, these rules make the COV system a direct tool for superior
prosecutors to break the default jurisdictional rules and to reallocate public corruption cases,
so that the anti-corruption forces within the prosecutors’ jurisdiction can be fully utilized to
realize a high success rate for investigation and prosecution of public corruption cases.
V ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION 2: DISRUPTION OF LOCAL CONTROL AND
FUNCTION IN INITIATING RECENT CAMPAIGN
This chapter will discuss the second alternative explanation of the COV system in
China’s recent anti-corruption campaign, in light of the well-recognized problems of China’s
anti-corruption agencies, i.e., local party control and the recent reforms aimed at decreasing

See MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY DESIGN: BUILDING CLEAN GOVERNMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA
AND HONG KONG (2004).
79
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such control. Against such a backdrop, the recent routinized use of COV functions to break
up local control over anti-corruption forces, and thereby helps to initiate the recent anticorruption campaign and series of reforms.80
In the next section, I will explain how the local anti-corruption mechanism has failed to
function. I will first explain the essential steps in anti-corruption investigations taken by the
two different anti-corruption agencies, and then argue that local authority leaders can
substantially influence local anti-corruption agencies by controlling the agency leaders and
by technically intervening in their work resolving public corruption cases. I will then explain
the purpose of recent reforms in centralizing control over anti-corruption investigative forces,
and finally argue that the routinized use of COV has helped to disrupt the local network,
recentralize control over local anti-corruption forces, and thus initiate the recent anticorruption campaign.
A. LOCAL CONTROL OVER THE LOCAL CDIS
Local CDI’s Work Procedures
Under the traditional system used in China for attacking public corruption, corruption
investigations begin with the Commission of Party Discipline Inspection (CDI), which
handles allegations of corruption primarily as an internal party disciplinary matter, and then
decides whether or not to refer the case to the prosecutor. This is part of the traditional anticorruption system previously referred to, in Chapter 1, as the “dual-leadership, dual-track”
system.
Several rules issued by the Central Commission of Party Discipline Inspection (CCDI)

80

Id. at 120-154.
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govern the performance of public corruption investigations and guide the work of local CDIs
in handling cases. These rules include the Rules on Case Work of CDIs (Work Rules) and
Rules Thereof for Implementation (Implementation Rules), both enacted in 1994.81 The
general procedures for the acquisition and handling of information and evidence are
established therein.
Step 1: Collecting Case Information. One major channel for collecting case information
is the general letter-and-visit center (hereinafter, the Center), independent of the CDI, serving
the entire city. Any citizen can report public corruption to the Center. Instead of reporting to
letter-and-visit offices of different agencies (including the CDI’s own letter-and-visit office),
citizens may report to the Center, from which all reports are collected and distributed.
Many public corruption-related files are transferred from the Center to the CDI.
Information indicating legal violations or concerning low-level officials will be distributed to
the procuratorate. Reporters can either report to the letter-and-visit office of the CDI, which is
independent of the Center and belongs to the CDI, or report to the CDI via hotlines and the
Internet. Moreover, the Internet provides another source, through the exposure of potential
public corruption online, e.g. photos of an official with many luxury watches. CDI officers
may also start to make an investigation by themselves.
Information sources are similar across China, except that the CCDI further dispatches
Central Circuit Inspection Teams (hereinafter, the Teams) to collect information on local
public corruption. China’s new leadership frequently sends the Teams to gather information
regarding the behavior of local officials. Rather than investigating or resolving cases, the
The Rules on Case Work of CDIs and the Implementation Rules for the Rules on Case Work of CDIs,
issued by the Central CDI (Mar. 25, 1994).
81
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Teams just collect information and submit it to the central leadership and the CCDI.
Information regarding possible corrupt activities of CPC members according to the Party
Constitution and disciplinary rules, or regarding the activities of public officers who are not
CPC members according to the Administrative Supervision Law and administrative
disciplinary rules, would constitute a possible public corruption file. Both CPC members and
non-CPC members with governmental positions are under the supervision of the CDI, which
merges with the executive supervision agency for public corruption and official misconduct.82
Activities that are supervised by the CDI include illegal activities that potentially violate
relevant laws, Party rules, or administrative disciplinary rules. Public corruption cases that
possibly violate criminal laws are later transferred to the procuratorate. Cases that involve
officials of certain levels or positions are first investigated by the CDI and later transferred to
the procuratorate. In addition, a CDI supervises only Party or non-Party public officials who
are at lower political levels.83 Whistleblowers are required to report to a CDI at the level
higher than the suspect’s highest level. If information regarding a public official at higherthan-city level is misdirected to a lower CDI, it will be transferred, level by level, until it
reaches a CDI that has jurisdiction over the case.
Step 2: Categorizing Case Information. Consistent with the Work Rules, public
corruption files transferred from the Center are divided into five categories based upon the
sufficiency and validity of proof in the file: (1) being sufficient to docket the case (立案) for
formal investigation (调查); (2) being enough for preliminary investigation (初核) but
82 The CCDI and the Ministry of Supervision have been merged together, with the same people under two
names, since 1994. See 7 Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhi shi ziliao 186 (2000) [Materials on the CPC
Organizational History], (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2000).
83 The Rules on Case Work of CDIs, art. 10, issued by the central CDI on Mar. 25, 1994; The Law on
Administrative Supervision, art. 16 (amended on June 25, 2010).
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insufficient for formal investigation (调查); (3) having some proof for a case but not enough
and thus going on the waiting list for preliminary investigation (暂存); (4) having no proof
and clearly no case; and (5) being a very small case that is quickly settled or resolved.
Although the CCDI’s Work Rules do not actually include Category 3, the Rules do not forbid
this category and Category 3 has been added in practice.
Normally, to divide up the files in a CDI, a meeting of the CDI Case Leader, the Case
Division Chief, and letter-and-visit officers will be held, during which they discuss the files
and the Case Leader makes the final decision on the categorization of the files. Meetings are
held fortnightly to divide files received in the previous two weeks. Besides the principled
standard provided in the Work Rules regarding the division between Categories 1 and 2, there
are neither concrete standards established in the CDI for the division of cases, nor reasons
provided on the record for the division.
Step 3: Preliminary Investigation.84 During the meeting, after the files are divided,
Category 2 files are assigned to two CDI investigators who make preliminary investigations,
or to a lower-level CDI for further investigation. After preliminary investigation,
investigators provide a report of collected proof, discovered facts, and suggestions for
resolution, and submit it to the Case Leader for approval. The investigators, Case Division
Chief, and Case Leader must all sign the report for the record. They are responsible for the
case during their lifetime.
According to the Work Rules, preliminary investigations aim to collect evidence and

The Tentative Work Rules on the CDIs’ Supervision of Law and Discipline has been passed by the
seventh plenum of the 18th session of CCDI members concluded on January 8, 2017, which has expanded the
techniques allowed for use in preliminary investigation.
84
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decide whether the case will be docketed and whether formal investigations should be
conducted.85 The standard for docketing a case is regulated by Article 16 of the Work Rules:
if, after preliminary investigations, there are facts related to violations of Party disciplinary
rules and such violations will receive disciplinary punishment, the case will be docketed
according to specified procedures, and formal investigations will be conducted.86 Thus, after
preliminary investigations, some Category 2 files may become Category 1 files and follow
the same procedures as other Category 1 files; other files may be closed, if no facts reveal a
violation or if the facts reveal a violation that is too light to warrant any punishment.
Step 4: Formal Investigation. Files in Category 1 are further discussed in a meeting of a
committee consisting of the CDI Secretary, Vice Secretaries, and Division Chiefs. This
committee is similar to the judicial committee in the court system in its function and
composition. The CDI committee consists of CDI leadership and important senior officials,
who decide on important issues collectively. Whether a file will finally be docketed and
receive a formal investigation is decided during the meeting, according to a majority vote. If
not docketed, the file may be closed or receive further preliminary investigation.
For Category 1 cases in which the suspect is at the same or higher political level as the
CDI or the allegations suggest a very serious violation, the committee can only provide
suggestions to the higher-level CDI, which decides whether the file will be docketed and
receive formal investigation. This procedure follows Articles 17–21 of the Work Rules.87 For
files that are selected to be docketed, formal investigations are conducted. After the formal

The Work Rules1994, art 12.
Id., at art. 16.
87 Id., at arts. 17–21.
85
86
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investigations, cases may be resolved in three ways: (1) suspects receive only Party
disciplinary punishment; (2) suspects’ activities warrant legal punishment, and the files are
transferred to the procuratorates to commence prosecution; or (3) investigations find no
violating activities, or the activities are too insignificant to warrant any punishment.88
Categorical division is essential because only the files in Categories 1 and 2 will be
further investigated, and the applicable investigative techniques are different in the formal
(Category 1) and preliminary (Category 2) investigations. The applicable investigative
techniques for preliminary investigations are limited, according to Work Rules and
information from the interviews I conducted.89
For example, tracking and monitoring techniques cannot be used. Typically,
investigators can only review relevant materials and documents, and check bank accounts.
Because public corruption activities are very secretive and money cannot be found on the
surface, CDI officers rely primarily on interviews with suspects and witnesses. Witnesses
from the private sector can and will most likely reject taking part in such interviews, but CPC
members and non-CPC member public officers cannot reject such interviews. No laws
govern these interviews. The informal, internal rule is that they will be undertaken during the
daytime and cannot last overnight.90 They are different from shuanggui (an extra-legal, Party
disciplinary process that involves possibly illegal detention and interrogation),91 which can be
used only after the file is docketed and the higher-level CDI approves the use of shuanggui.92
Id. at arts. 34, 35, 37; The Implementation Rules, arts. 36, 38 (1994).
The Work Rules 1994, arts. 13, 28.
90 According to comments made by the Chief Director of a city CDI, interviewed in April 2014 in X
province.
91 See, for example, the following article on the history, scope, organization, recent reform and character
of shuanggui: Flora Sapio, Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China, 22 CHINA INFO. 7 (2008).
92 Interview with the CDI Case Division Chief and the frontline investigators, anonymous, in early April
2014 in X province. The Tentative Work Rules on the CDIs’ Supervision of Law and Discipline issued by the
88
89
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Limitations on investigative techniques can greatly affect the attainability of evidence and the
results of investigations.
Step 5: Joint Investigation. Once formal investigations begin, CDIs frequently become
short-staffed. Therefore, CDIs cooperate with the public security bureau to investigate private
public corruption activities, with the procuratorates investigating public corrupt activities that
potentially warrant legal punishment, and sometimes with the audit bureau officials
facilitating investigations, which is called a ‘joint investigation’. During joint investigations,
the CDI works as an organizer and coordinator, making an overall investigative plan,
distributing responsibilities to involved agencies, facilitating communication among agencies,
collecting proof and evidence, and making suggestions or deciding the parts of the case that
concern breaches of Party discipline.93 The resolution of the parts that warrant legal
punishment is decided by the procuratorate.94
Shuanggui is used in many joint investigations. When a case is docketed, a request for
shuanggui may be submitted to the higher-level CDI, i.e., the provincial CDI, and upon its
approval, shuanggui can be carried out. In line with Professor Sapio’s research, I found that
currently, local CDIs can use shuanggui only with the approval of higher-level CDIs, which
strengthens higher-level CDIs’ control over shuanggui and limits lower CDIs’ abuse.
Although shuanggui measures now have a time limit of six months, the limit can be
extended to one or two years under the approval of a superior CDI. As far as the case is
concerned, shuanggui could last forever, and officials being shuangguied likely think the
CCDI on January 8, 2017 has eliminated the word “shuanggui” and substituted it with the technique “Tanhua”
(Interview, 谈话).
93 The Work Rules 1994, arts. 17–21.
94 Thus, the CDI only decides part of the case; different agencies decide different parts of the case
according to the respective power these agencies have.
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same. In current practice, shuanggui has, or at least seems to have, no real time limit.95 The
lack of a time limit is the most important value of shuanggui. This policy makes it more
likely that confessions will be obtained.96
During shuanggui, interrogation is neither video nor audio recorded, and suspects and
investigators are not separated. Because only Party members and supervised public officers
can be shuangguied – whereas public corruption cases frequently involve non-Party members
or non-public-officer suspects, such as relatives of Party members and private-sector bribers –
joint investigations must treat them together. During joint investigations, an area will be
isolated for investigation, e.g. an area in which several hotels are located. One hotel houses
suspects who receive shuanggui under the CDI’s supervision, and other hotels house suspects
who are detained without shuanggui but are under the public security’s or the prosecutors’
supervision. Then, all relevant suspects can be jointly investigated.
Moreover, if, before or during shuanggui, the activities of the suspects appear to violate
Party disciplines or break laws, then the prosecutors will join the investigations to ensure that
the confessions, depositions, and relevant evidence obtained during this period are legally
admissible for later prosecution. Such joint investigations are effective in resolving public
corruption cases but are legally problematic because after joining in, prosecutors’
investigations are also under the protection of shuanggui and are not restricted by laws,
particularly regarding the time and interrogative limits and the rights of the suspects in the
criminal procedure law.

95 Interviews with the Case Leader and frontline investigators of a city CDI conducted in X province in
March and April 2014.
96 Comments made by one frontline investigator. Interview with anonymous frontline investigators of a
city CDI in X province, in early April 2014.
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Control over Local CDIs by Local Party Leaders
(1) Local party leaders used to strongly control the nomination and promotion of the
leaders of the local CDIs, and provided the funding and work equipment support for the local
CDIs.
The finances of the local CDIs are governed by the local government under the
leadership of the local Party Standing Committee (hereinafter, PSC), of which the CDI
Secretary is a member. However, CDI Vice Secretaries are not members. Because local PSC
members are nominated by the next higher PSC without superfluous candidates, it is the
superior PSC that selects the CDI Secretary.97 However, previously, the superior PSC largely
followed the nominations proposed by the local PSC leader. The Vice Secretaries who are not
PSC members are certainly decided by the local PSC Secretary. Thus, the funding and the
Vice Secretaries of the local CDI are heavily controlled by the local government, as Professor
Fu Hualing concluded in his study.98
Moreover, there is no internal evaluation system like that of the procuratorates, i.e., a
CDI or CDI investigator does not need to resolve a certain number of public corruption cases
to fulfill his duty and qualify for further promotion. As the appointment power of the midlevel leadership of the local CDI is heavily controlled by the local PSC Secretary, the local
PSC Secretary’s instructions prevail over the higher-level CDIs because investigators are
afraid of not being promoted if they disregard his instructions, and the local PSC Secretary’s
close relationship with the local party leader makes it harder to cheat him. The higher-level

CPC Constitution, arts. 24, 25, 27, 29, the (amended on Nov. 14, 2012).
Hualing Fu, The Upward and Downward Spirals in China's Anti-Corruption Enforcement 13, 14
(University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2011/014, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883348.
97
98
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CDI can itself make investigations and break the local control of the case, however this
method is subject to the time and staff limits of the higher-level CDI.
(2) There exists substantial room for manipulation and arbitrariness in the essential steps
of local CDIs’ anti-corruption work.
When the case information has been transferred to the CDI, files are divided into the
above-mentioned five categories. Decision-making herein is vulnerable to arbitrariness.
Although many people attend the meeting, the normal CDI officials are at lower levels than –
and are appointed and promoted by – the CDI leader. The CDI leader is not restricted by
concrete established standards in any rule or internal regulation and does not need to provide
any reason for divisions on record. His decision-making when categorizing files is therefore
non-transparent to outsiders.
This internal decision-making system – in which the superior instructs the subordinate’s
work with no reasons kept on record, and in which such instructions provide the primary
basis, or legitimacy, for the subordinate’s decisions – is analogous to the decision-making
system argued by Professor Ling Li to be the reason for the existence of public corruption in
China’s court system.99 In fact, here it is even more arbitrary than in the courts, where a
subordinate is promoted considering a certain internal evaluation system, because in the CDIs,
promotion is purely subject to the superior’s wishes. The control of a superior over a
subordinate is even tighter in the CDIs than in the courts.
After the categorical division, Category 2 files are preliminarily investigated by two CDI

99 Ling Li, Corruption in China's Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN C HINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL
RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 196 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010). From comments received in the interviews of
the three CDIs, most of the cases investigated by the officials are because the superiors require the
investigations.
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officials who report investigative results and suggest possible resolutions based upon
collected evidence. Here, the potential for improper selection arises again because the CDI
officials can passively ‘investigate’ the cases that the officials or the CDIs superiors want to
dismiss. Such passive investigations are hard to track because limited investigative
techniques for preliminary investigations are allowed, and the evidence consists primarily of
confessions or testimonies from interviews. The effectiveness of interviews relies heavily on
the questioning techniques, preparation, and efforts of the interviewing officials and can thus
easily be manipulated by investigators. To be even more subtle in dismissing a case, the CDI
leader could assign it to two CDI officials who lack investigative abilities.
Moreover, because public corruption investigations require high confidentiality, the
skillful leakage of relevant secret information would further destroy investigations and
legitimatize the dismissal of a possibly good case. Particularly in small cities or towns, leaked
information can easily find its way to those under investigation. Because promotion within
CDI is decided by the CDI leader without considering investigative abilities, CDI officials
are under the control of their CDI leader. Therefore, the discretionary power within
preliminary investigations is significant.
However, the control of local CDI leadership over investigators could actually decrease
the risk of arbitrariness at the level of the individual investigator. At least two investigators
should be on the scene for such interviews, which decreases the arbitrariness of a single
investigator.100 However, this helps little in decreasing the CDI leader’s opportunity to aact

CCDI, ARTICLE 3, THE OPINION ON THE INTERVIEW WITH THE SUSPECTS OF CASES BY THE CDIS AND
THE SUPERVISION AGENCIES, PRACTICE HANDBOOK OF LAWS AND RULES COMMONLY USED BY CDIS AND
SUPERVISION AGENCIES IN THEIR WORK 1009 (2006).
100
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arbitrarily, because both investigators are subject to discretionary promotion by the leader.
Preliminary investigations at this stage are secret, even to higher-level CDIs, because
interviewing the suspects is neither audio nor video recorded. Although the new reforms
require the submission of investigative results to the higher-level CDI, these results are
prepared by the investigators with little supervision over their investigations.
Once a case is suggested for docketing, a meeting of the CDI committee is held to
decide whether to dismiss, close, or docket the case. There is also room here for arbitrariness.
No concrete standards or rules for such dismissals are established, no reasons are needed for
the record, and such decisions are neither available to the general public nor challengeable by
the whistleblower. Moreover, the decisions are made under the name of the entire committee,
rather than the CDI Leader, which likely creates a ‘responsibility hole’ similar to that created
by the judicial committee of the court, as analyzed by Professor Xin He.101
To summarize, in the traditional “dual-leadership, dual-track” anti-corruption system,
the local party leader used to strongly control the CDI leader’s nomination, promotion, and
work funding and equipment; the CDI leader in turn tightly controls the CDI investigators’
promotion and evaluation; and the rules regarding the information categorization, the
preliminary investigations, and the formal investigations provide insufficient limits and
supervision to control arbitrariness. Thus, the local party leader used to substantially affect
the local CDI’s anti-corruption work by controlling the CDI leader, having the CDI leader
report the case information to the local party leader, and technically manipulating the
loopholes in the essential steps of the CDI’s case work. When public corruption in China
Xin He, Black Hole of Responsibility: The Adjudication Committee’s Role in a Chinese Court, 46 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 681, 681 (2012).
101

113

became syndicated and serious, the local CDI was obviously incapable of combatting public
corruption involving the local party leader or his people.

B. LOCAL CONTROL OVER THE LOCAL PROCURACY
The Influence of Local Party Leaders and Local CDIs over Local Prosecutors
The work procedures of local prosecutors have been discussed in the previous chapter.
This section proceeds to discuss the local control over local prosecutors. Multiple agencies
are involved at different stages of China’s anti-corruption system. Normally, the party leader,
the CDI, the superior prosecutor and the prosecutor are involved in the investigation stage;
the prosecutor and the superior prosecutor in the prosecution stage; and the prosecutor and
the court in the trial stage. Due to the dominant role of the prosecutor in criminal trials,102 the
first two stages are deemed to determine the outcome of a public corruption case. In the
following section, I will discuss how the local party leader and the local CDI affect the local
prosecutor’s anti-corruption work during the first two stages.
(1) The Local Party Leader’s Control
The local party leader, who is also the head of local government, has several checks on
the local prosecutor. First, the local government decides the financial budget and the staff
strength of the prosecutor. Second, the nomination of the deputy prosecutor-general and the
promotion of prosecutors have to be approved by the local party head to be effective. Third,
to uphold the leadership of the local party leader in anti-corruption efforts, an internal rule
has been formulated that whenever anti-corruption cases involve senior officers103 within its
102
103

Jiang, supra note 55, at 406.
“Senior officers” refers to officers only one level lower than the prosecutor-general, as well as officers
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jurisdiction, the prosecutor needs to report such cases to the local government and needs its
approval before carrying out investigations.104
Accordingly, the local party leader has several ways to obstruct the work of the
prosecutor. First, if the case involves senior officers, whenever the prosecutor reports it to the
local government head, he/she could simply decline the investigation. In some districts,
around half of the cases reported had been turned down.105 Normally, without such approval,
the prosecutor will not start an investigation.
Second, the party leader can have the CDI investigate the case instead. For serious or
obvious cases,106 it is very risky for the local head of government to simply decline the
investigation, as it is difficult to hide such cases from the superior. Once it is disclosed, the
superior will blame the local leader for declining the investigation, probably as a dereliction
of duty, and if party disciplinary rules or laws are violated in such declination, the local
leader has to receive disciplinary or legal punishment. Having the CDI investigate is one way
to balance the risk of dereliction and the need to protect local colleagues. Given the operation
of the CDI,107 as previously discussed, it is easier for the CDI to hide the case under the guise
of legitimate reasons.
(2) The Local CDI’s Influence
Based on China’s anti-corruption policy in which the party head leads and the CDI
two levels lower than the prosecutor-general but holding essential positions, such as financial department deputy
heads.
104 I was unable to find formal documents specifying such rule. However, from interviews with dozens of
prosecutors from different provinces and cities, they all said such rule exists. Series of interviews conducted in
Beijing, Henan, and Tianjin from March 2014 to April 2015.
105 Interviews conducted in Beijing and Henan from March 2014 to December 2014.
106 Normally, cases involving important senior officers, or many officers, or large amount of monetary
value, or heavy public attention/complaints, causing instability of that area, will be deemed serious. Cases
having clear facts, concrete bribe-accepting incidents, photos, videos or radios, or financial statements indicating
corresponding fund movements are deemed having obvious evidence.
107 See Li & Deng, supra note 11.
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coordinates the anti-corruption work, corruption is never just a legal issue, nor is it purely an
institutional issue involving certain identified agencies’ independence. It is a much more
complicated matter, concerning numerous individuals, from the party head to every party and
governmental department. Accordingly, the CDI can influence the prosecutor’s anticorruption work in two ways. First, whenever the prosecutor reports the case to the local head,
the CDI’s suggestion will be important to the local head’s decision. Second, certain kinds of
cases have to be first investigated by the CDI, and the prosecutor can come in only after the
CDI transfers the case to it.108
Normally, when receiving such information about possible public corruption, both the
prosecutor and the CDI will report it to the local head. If the local head distributes the case to
the CDI, or if the CDI has already investigated the case, the prosecutor will withdraw from it.109
This is true not only for serious cases, as mentioned before, but also for highly sensitive and
influential cases. Until recently, all public corruption cases concerning provincial-level
officials were first investigated by the CCDI and then transferred to the SPP, and all public
corruption cases of municipal-level leaders were investigated by the provincial CDIs and then
transferred to the provincial prosecutors.
The higher the CDI’s level, the more important it becomes in anti-corruption efforts, the
more resources and staff strength it is equipped with, and the bigger say it has in the
prosecutor’s anti-corruption work. In high level public corruption cases, the CDI decides
whether to preliminarily or formally investigate, subject to the local head’s approval,

Series of interviews conducted in Beijing, Henan, Tianjin, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangsu from
March 2014 to April 2015.
109 Id.
108
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conducts preliminary and formal investigations of the case, and decides whether to transfer
the case to the prosecutor, subject to the local head’s approval. Sometimes, the CDI borrows
the prosecutor’s staff or coordinates a joint investigation involving the prosecutor, the public
security, the audit agency, etc.110 During such joint investigations, the CDI still has an
important influence on the direction, scope, and results of the investigations.111
The control of these special cases also affects the prosecutor’s work in other ordinary
public corruption cases. For example, when the incumbent municipal head of a district, whom
I had previously interviewed, was arrested by the provincial CDI under shuanggui, the
district prosecutor was instructed by the municipal prosecutor to suspend any public
corruption investigation.112 Whenever one or several such “tigers” are shuangguied, concerns
for possible political instability can arise; “if the prosecutor continues to investigate public
corruption cases strongly, many officials may be very worried and the situation may get out
of control.”113
Moreover, the CDI could influence the prosecutor’s work through the pressure of the
superior prosecutor and the local head. And at the central level, every public corruption case
is a special case and subject to the CCDI’s investigation; the president of the SPP is also a
member of the CCDI, and thus under the leadership of the CCDI chairman. Thus, the SPP is
subordinate to the CCDI in its anti-corruption work, and has no motive or ability to
counteract the CCDI’s obstruction.

Id.
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112 Interviews of prosecutor-generals from Henan, conducted in Beijing in December 2014 and April 2015.
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C. RECENT REFORMS CENTRALIZING CONTROL OVER THE LOCAL ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES
Recent Reforms Have Decreased the Local Party Control over the Local CDIs
(1) The Main CDIs
As indicated in the Decision passed at the 18th CPC Plenum, discussed previously in
Chapter 1, the local CDIs may be horizontally divided into the main CDIs, their dispatched
CDI teams, and their Circuit Inspection Teams (CITs). For example, at the provincial level,
the main group is the provincial CDI, established to supervise the provincial party
committees. Before the most recent reforms, the main CDIs operated under the dual
leadership of the provincial party committees and the CCDI.
Based on the most recent information available about the reforms, although the dual
leadership of the main CDIs will remain unchanged, the local party’s control will be
decreased to a considerable degree. First, the heads and vice heads of the local CDIs will be
nominated and evaluated by higher CDIs, together with higher organizational departments.114
Previously, vice heads were chosen by the local party head, and the vice head was also
largely affected by the local party head’s opinions. This reform will strengthen the control of
higher CDIs over personnel and weaken the local party’s control.
Second, case investigations will follow the direction of the higher CDIs over supervised
parties, and decisions about information and cases will be reported simultaneously to higher
CDIs and local parties.115 Previously, information and progress of investigations needed to be
submitted only to the local party head, and if he declined to pursue investigations, then the

WANG QISHAN, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMISSION FOR DISCIPLINE INSPECTION 2(1)
(2014), http://www.wenming.cn/djw/gcsy/yw/201401/t20140128_1721704.shtml.
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CDI could not investigate. After this reform, the CDIs will not need the local heads’ approval,
as long as the higher CDIs agree to authorize the investigation. This reform has weakened the
local head’s control over the CDI’s work.
Third, higher CDIs will strengthen their contacts with lower CDIs through various
methods, including interviews (约谈) and work reports (述职).116 Previously, because CDIs
were located close to the local governments, had frequent contact with them, and conducted
some work together, after several years they naturally developed close relationships with
each other, and certainly became strangers to and remote from the higher CDIs. This reform
seeks to strengthen the relationship between lower CDI’s and higher CDI’s, thus increasing
the possibility of control exerted by the higher CDIs.
(2) The Dispatched CDI Teams
The dispatched CDI teams are those dispatched by the main CDIs to investigate
different departments of the supervised party committees and governments. After 2004, they
were placed under the sole leadership of the main CDIs, although they still operated under the
substantial influence of the supervised departments. According to the 2004 resolution, the
power to nominate the dispatched CDIs’ team heads and members remained in the control of
the main CDIs, but the funding, workplace, and logistic services were all still provided by the
supervised departments serving as the hosts,117 which meant these departments still wielded a
large influence over the dispatched CDI teams.

Id.
NEWS OF THE COMMUNIST PART OF CHINA, CIRCULAR OF THE GENERAL OFFICE OF THE CPC CENTRAL
COMMITTEE AND THE GENERAL OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIRCULAR OF
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CENTRAL ORGANIZATION AND THE MINISTRY OF SUPERVISION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNIFIED
MANAGEMENT OF THE CENTRAL ORGANIZATION'S DISCIPLINE INSPECTION DEPARTMENT 3(7) (2004),
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The most recent reforms are basically continuations of the 2004 reforms, designed to
ensure the sole leadership of the main CDIs over the dispatched teams. First, the dispatched
teams are now “under uniform names and regulations.”118 Several specific measures have
been implemented, such as that the duties, structures, personnel, and work insurance of the
dispatched teams shall be established by the CCDI’s guidance opinions, which strengthens
the relevant codes of conduct for the dispatched teams; the main CDIs’ regulations are
enhanced through evaluation, incentive, and accountability systems; and, consistent with the
recent transformation in the mission of the dispatched teams, the team heads must withdraw
from other work unrelated to supervision.
All of these measures have helped to enhance the control of the CDI over the personnel
and work of the dispatched teams. But as noted previously, the experience after the 2004
reforms revealed that the superior CDI’s enhanced control over the local CDI is insufficient if
the superior controls only the appointment and removal of the local CDI heads and their work;
other aspects of daily regulation and contacts are still necessary to achieve the goal. In the
context of the dispatched teams, the work funds are still usually provided by the supervised
departments, although now it is required that such funds be secured and listed separately.
Such reforms may not be effective, however, because the department heads still tightly
control the budget and its use. And even if the funds are listed separately, there are many
opportunities for the department to make the funds insufficient or unrealized when the legal
protections are weak.

Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning
Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, Part 36 (promulgated by the Third Plenum of 18th CPC Central
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However, the party center has strongly encouraged creative, effective institutions to
further strengthen the dispatched teams’ work. Under the direction of the uniform names and
regulations, several cities and counties have pursued innovative new approaches to ensure the
adequacy of funding and capacities for their dispatched teams.119 For example, the
Sanxiamen city CDI abolished all previously dispatched teams and established ten large
dispatched teams supervising sixty-three departments.120 The personnel and funds for these
ten teams were provided by the city. The team heads’ positions were established at the same
level as the supervised department heads. And the Xiangyang city CDI established four
“section teams,” funded by the city, to supervise fifty-six departments, while still retaining
the old dispatched teams, funded by the departments, for ten important departments.121
The nationwide course of these reforms is still under discussion. If the concept of
“section” dispatch teams is accepted by the CCDI, this would greatly decrease the influence
of the supervised departments, because the funding for the teams would no longer come from
the departments and there would no longer be so much daily contact and strong emotional
relationships between the dispatch teams and the supervised departments.
(3) The Circuit Inspection CDI Teams (CITs)
The CITs are the circuit inspection teams established by the higher party committees and
operated by the higher-level main CDIs. The institution of “circuit inspection” has been
formally used ever since the Han Dynasty.122 In regard to the CPC, early in 1921, the central
E.g., Chengdu city in Sichuan and Xiangyang city in Hubei
YANGJIANG CITY, THE DIRECTION OF THE REFORM OF CHINA'S DISCIPLINE INSPECTION AND
SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.yjlz.gov.cn/html/?604.html.
121 Chengdu has similar reforms. See On the Spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 12th Session of the
Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection, CHENGDU DAILY (2014), http://www.cdrb.com.cn/html/201403/06/content_2010598.htm.
122 Tailei Gong (贡太雷), Historical Progress of the China’s Old Circuit Inspection Institution (中国古代
巡视制度的历史沿革), 3 CHINESE CADRES TRIBUNE (中国党政干部论坛) 28 (2014).
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party would send special commissioners to “circuit” and instruct on work.123 This historic
institution was strengthened during later periods in order to facilitate communication and
local organization construction.124 After the Reform and Open Policy, its work gradually
focused on internal supervision.
After several years of tentative exploration, a statement was finally written into the 16th
CPC Plenum Report “to reform and improve the discipline inspection system of the party and
to establish and improve the circuit inspection institution.”125 In the Interim Rules on CPC
Internal Supervision in 2004, the circuit inspection institution was principally noted as one of
the ten internal supervision institutions.126 In 2003, the party center established five teams for
local inspections and, in 2004, each of the provinces gradually established provincial level
circuit inspection institutions – 121 in total.127 In 2005, the party center added one institution
for financial inspection, three for enterprises, and two for central governments, totaling
eleven central level CITs.128
In 2007, the circuit inspection institution was written into the party constitution.129 In
2009, the Interim Rules on CPC Circuit Inspection Work (Interim Circuit Rules) provided
more concrete rules on this new form of the historic institution.130 In 2010, the institution was
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expanded into the military.131 Also, in 2010, the CCDI issued the Interim Work Rules for
Central CITs (CCITs), further regulating inspection work (Interim Central Circuit Rules).132
According to the Interim Circuit Rules, central and provincial party committees shall
each establish a Circuit Inspection Work Leader Team, whose head is normally the head of
the main CDI at the corresponding level.133 For example, the Central Circuit Inspection Work
Leader Team’s head is Qishan Wang; and the Guangdong Provincial Circuit Inspection Work
Leader Team’s head is Yaoxian Huang, the current head of the Guangdong CDI. The leading
teams are responsible for making circuit inspection work plans, monitoring their
implementation, and reporting to the relevant party committees.134 Their daily-operating
offices are located in the corresponding CDIs.135
Next, party committees also need to establish several CITs to carry out circuit inspection
work at the next-lower-level party committees, governmental leaders, and cadres.136 These
CITs are accountable and shall report to the Leader Teams. As both the head and the
workplace of the Leader Teams are the same as for the corresponding CDIs, these CITs
actually report to the CDI heads, and thus become effectively one part of the main CDI –
although theoretically, when the information obtained is too important or serious, the CIT
heads could report directly to the party center, thereby avoiding the Leader Team.
The CIT team heads are nominated jointly by the CDIs and the corresponding
organization departments.137 The main CDIs decide the salaries, evaluations, and promotions
Zhou, supra note 123, at 8.
BAIDU, Working Rules of the Central Visiting Section of the Central Committee of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://baike.baidu.com/view/12743058.htm?fr=aladdin.
133 Interim Central Circuit Rules, art. 5.
134 Id. at art. 9.
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of the team heads and members. Thus, the main CDIs have relatively strong control over the
CIT teams.
To summarize: The main section of the CDI is in charge of the party committees at each
level, including the party heads, the organization departments, the propaganda departments,
and the united front departments, and is responsible for all anti-corruption work in the entire
area. The dispatched CDI teams are responsible only for the supervised departments. These
are mainly executive departments and judicial organs at the corresponding level, including
the People’s Daily, the development and reform departments, the education departments, the
financial departments, the urban planning departments, the industrial and commercial
departments, the courts, and the procuratorates.138 The main CDIs often rely on the
dispatched teams for information and preliminary investigations of the dispatched agencies.
The CIT system exists for the purpose of vertical supervision, covering both party and
governmental agencies at the next lower level.
Recent reforms of the Central Circuit Inspection CDI Teams (CCITs) are very thorough
and worthy of discussion. Although the CCDI’s control over CCITs is relatively strong, with
control over the personnel, salaries, and organizational relations, the circuit inspection work
happens only twice and each time lasts for only several months per session.139 And the work
funding, as well as the worksite for the investigation, are provided by the inspected subjects.
Article 39 of the Interim Central Circuit Rules forbids the circuit inspectors from accepting
Id. at art. 48. The CCDI and the Central Organization Department shall explain these Rules together.
For the list of CCDI’s dispatched teams, see http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/11-07/5472591.shtml.
For the list of the Guangdong CDI’s, see CHINA NEWS NETWORK, The Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection of the Ministry of Supervision announced the presence of the agency discipline inspection team
leader list (Nov. 8 , 2013), http://www.gdjct.gd.gov.cn/pzcjg.jhtml. For the list of the Guangzhou City CDI’s,
see GUANGDONG PROVINCIAL COMMISSION FOR DISCIPLINE INSPECTION, CPC Guangdong Provincial
Commission for Discipline Inspection presences, http://news.sohu.com/20060712/n244213701.shtml.
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above-standard amenities, high-level accommodations, or reimbursement for individual
expenses,140 but all normal expenses for circuit inspection work are borne by the inspected
entities.
Although offering additional amenities to the circuit inspectors is forbidden, the reality
may well be different – especially after the fiscal decentralization in China, under which the
superior decides the fate of the subordinate officials and the amount of money transferred to
local government. Obviously, the subordinate has a strong incentive to offer circuit inspectors
accommodations, entertainment, and dinners that are as luxurious in nature as possible. In
2011, the media exposed that during the twenty days of the circuit inspection of Zigui county
– an impoverished county, based on national standards – thirteen members of the sixth CIT of
Hubei province had expensed around 800,000 RMB, all borne by the county, equaling
roughly 200 times the annual income of local peasants.141 After accepting such amenities and
even monetary payments, it is doubtful that the inspections were effective.
Traditionally, the heads of the CITs are not temporary positions, but are fixed. For the
CCITs, the heads are all cadres at the provincial (ministerial) level 正省（部）级 who have
just left the “front line” workplaces but have not yet retired. They typically remain as CCIT
heads until formal retirement at seventy years old,142 turning this position into a distorted
benefit for second-line or retired officials.143 Although CCIT members are sometimes

140 BAIDU, Working Rules of the Central Visiting Section of the Central Committee of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://baike.baidu.com/view/12743058.htm?fr=aladdin.
141 http://news.ifeng.com/shendu/xsjzk/detail_2011_09/13/9138550_0.shtml?_from_ralated(last visited Jun
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142 Chao Liu (刘超), Disclose the secret CCITs (揭秘中央巡视组), 6 Office Affairs 59 (办公室业务).
143 Deshui Zhuang (庄德水), The CIT supervision shall be fully covered and long lasting (巡视监督应实
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temporarily borrowed from other departments, they all report to the team heads.
Moreover, the CCIT teams are traditionally assigned to inspect certain fixed places. As
previously explained, CCITs for local places, for enterprises, for the central government, and
for finance are all distinct from each other. Thus, there is a fixed one-to-one relationship
between the CCITs and the inspected entities, similar to the situation of the dispatched CDI
teams with respect to the supervised departments. Given that the retired officials who serve as
the CCIT heads are no longer subject to evaluation or promotion, the control of the CCDI
over the CCIT becomes very weak.
However, recent reforms have alterered such relationships, strengthening the CCITs’
independence from the inspected entities. These reforms are represented by both the CCDI
and the Central Organization Ministry in the Opinions on Further Enhancing the Circuit
Inspection Works.144
The first example is the “three-unfixed reforms” (三不固定). First, the head of each
CCIT is no longer a fixed position. According to an interview with Yangchun Peng, the
department director of the CCIT Leader Team, at Renmin Net, on July 23, 2013,145 the party
center has established a pool for CCIT heads consisting of the first- or second-line provincial
(ministerial) level cadres. Before the beginning of each circuit inspection, the party center
will select each CCIT head according to the concrete situation, in order to strictly avoid
conflicts of interest. So far, I have found that none of the CCIT heads and vice heads selected

The opinions were issued in June 2013. The full text of these opinions could not be found. But several
comments have presented the reforms therein. See BAIDU, Central inspection work leading group,
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http://fanfu.people.com.cn/n/2013/0724/c64371-22303196.html.
144

126

under this new leadership reform came from the inspected places or industries, and they were
all selected and published before the beginning of each inspection. Each time a particular
CCIT conducts an inspection, there could be a different head.146
Second, the places inspected by each CCIT are no longer fixed. The CCITs do not have
any special names, and the CCIT teams are numbered from one to ten, with three additional
teams for special inspections. If the Number One CCIT inspects a particular place once, that
same team may inspect another place the next time. Similarly, the inspection area is not fixed.
One time it may be finance, and the next time it could be enterprise or local government.
The “three-unfixed reform” has completely changed the relationship between the CCITs
and the inspected entities. The pool of potential CCIT heads contains over one hundred
cadres, making it impossible for the entities to maintain a close relationship with all of them,
and meaningless to maintain a close relationship with just one or a few of them.
The second example of a recent reform affecting the CCITs involves a combination of
increased circuit inspections and an enhanced accountability system. Since second-line
officials are not concerned with their promotions or evaluations anymore, accountability must
be achieved by means of a different method. In both the Interim Circuit Rules and the Interim
Central Circuit Rules, there are articles regarding work discipline, responsibility, and
accountability of CIT and CCIT inspectors.147
The new leadership has further emphasized the implementation and concretization of
these existing institutions. At the central circuit inspection mobilization meeting on October

146 For the name list of each time circuit inspection under the new leadership, see BAIDU, Central
inspection work leading group, http://baike.baidu.com/view/10659959.htm?fr=aladdin.
147 Interim Circuit Rules, art. 40-42, 44, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/07-13/1771809.shtml;
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23, 2013, Qishan Wang emphasized, “it is a failure of duty to fail to discover big issues that
should be discovered; and it is dereliction to fail to report objectively the discovered
problems; and these activities shall be accounted for according to the situations.”148
A prerequisite for such accountability is that any problems could be later exposed;
otherwise, a breach of duty by the CCIT might not be discovered. Given that China’s
corruption is entrenched, and local CDIs and dispatched teams often fail to function
effectively, if there are only one or two circuit inspections during the whole term of a session
– and even with the “three-unfixed reform” mentioned above – the possibility for the second
CCIT to discover the malfeasance of the first is very low, and the chances are even lower to
discover a problem with the second CCIT. This makes it too easy for the two CCITs and the
agencies inspected by them to collude and hide any problems.
The new reforms have increased the number of routine circuit inspections and also
created special circuit inspections. From May 2013 to August 2014, four rounds of CCITs
were completed, and all provinces had been inspected once. Such routine inspection rounds
have increased from two in 2013 to three in 2014.149 In addition to the ten routine CCITs,
there were also three more CCITs created for special inspections,150 further increasing the
frequency and coverage of the circuit inspections. The possibility of discovering a previous
CCIT’s malfeasance is now much higher. Competition among the different CCITs further
strengthens the incentives to discover any problems.
The third example of recent reform involves increasing the focus of the CCITs on anti-
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corruption activity. Previously, the circuit inspection missions included a relatively broad
scope, ranging from monitoring policy implementations to democratic centralism to cadre
nominations.151 Now, the CCITs focus on discovering four kinds of information (四个着力):
(1) Pursuant to the current party policy of clean government without corruption, information
about the existence of exchanges of power for money, the exercise of power for personal
profit, the embezzlement of public funds, and bribery; (2) The implementation of the “Eight
Rules,” issued by Xi Jinping, regarding formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, and extravagancy;
(3) Breaches of party political discipline; and (4) Malfeasance and corruption in cadre
selection and appointment.152 Three of these four areas deal with the corruption problem.
Thus, with their new specialized mission, the CCITs are much less influenced by the general
affairs of the inspected entities, such as their economic growth and social stability, when
gathering information.
Recent Reforms Have Decreased Local Party Control over the Local Prosecutor
(1) Local Party Control Over Personnel, Funding, and Work Support of the Local
Prosecutor Has Decreased
Similar to the local CDIs, recent reforms will further strengthen the vertical control
within the prosecutor system, because the finances, personnel, and work equipment will all be
uniformly regulated by the provincial government. The municipal and district governments
will lose almost all control over local prosecutors. The goal is to strengthen the independence
of the local prosecutor from the local party leader. Therefore, if the local leader simply
declines an investigation, the prosecutor can turn to the superior prosecutor for help, who has
151
152
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the power to overcome the rejection of local leader and direct the prosecutor to continue the
investigation. This is workable because the superior prosecutor is at a political level at least
equivalent to that of the local party leader.
Moreover, the superior prosecutor is subject to evaluation, and therefore shares the same
incentives as the inferior, with respect to the numbers of cases and the respective rates of
conviction and withdrawal. In addition, being prosecutors, both the superior and the inferior
share many other common internal needs as well as similar attitudes and concerns – such as
the professional desire to be heavily involved in anti-corruption efforts, and the desire to
improve the financial situation of the office through anti-corruption work. It is rare for the
superior to obstruct the inferior’s anti-corruption work, according to interviews.153
(2) The Professional Strengthening of the Prosecutor and the Emphasis on the Party
Leader’s Responsibility in Anti-Corruption Efforts
Strengthening of the prosecutors’ professional standing is a natural extension of the
decades of reforms on professionalization of the prosecutors. Together with a strong
emphasis on the party leader’s accountability in anti-corruption efforts, when there is a strong
case, the local head is now likely to be hesitant to decline an investigation when he/she
knows that laws may have been broken. He/she is especially aware that the prosecutorgeneral could submit the case to the superior prosecutor to overturn its rejection. Thus, he/she
will often listen to the suggestions of the prosecutor-general to determine the possibility of
corruption crimes therein, the potential seriousness of the cases, and the willingness of the
prosecutor-general to investigate. With specialized legal knowledge and experiences in anti-
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corruption, the prosecutor-general has a strong chance of persuading the local head not to
suppress the investigation.154 Many prosecutor-generals have commented that the local heads
are easily persuaded and “controlled,”155 through such tactics as over-emphasizing the
strength and importance of the case and exaggerating the extent of public attention to it.

D. THE COV SYSTEM’S EFFECT ON LOCAL CONTROL AND ITS ROLE IN
INITIATING THE RECENT ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN
Against the backdrop presented in the previous sections of this chapter, the second
alternative explanation for the use of COV argues that COV helps the superior authority to
supervise its inferiors, disrupt the inferior’s protective network, and limit the inferior’s power.
The superior authority can constantly check on any inferior’s loyalty by deploying another
inferior through the COV system, regardless of the default localized jurisdiction, and the
frequency of the superior’s use of COV for this purpose largely depends upon its trust in the
inferior and its judgment of the inferior’s power within that area.
This function of COV explains the null relationship between the use of COV and the
local bias based on different types of extralegal factors, because the use of COV is subject
largely to the discretion of the superior. This function also works as a common foundation for
the use of COV in all areas of the Chinese polity – not only at the investigation, prosecution,
and trial stages of an anti-corruption case, but also with respect to the nomination, promotion,
and exchange of senior officials156 and the operation of the circuit inspection system, because
Series of interviews conducted in Beijing, Henan, and Tianjin from March 2014 to April 2015.
Interview conducted in March 2015 in Beijing.
156 Use of the COV in nomination and promotion of senior officials refers to the system in China that
selects senior or important positioned officials who reside outside the location area of the position and that
horizontally exchanges the location areas among the same level officials after a certain period of incumbency,
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in all of these areas the COV is designed in a similar way.
Such design also inherits from China’s historical COV system a similar function – to
strengthen imperial control over inferior authorities. As discussed above, the CITs are the
circuit inspection teams established by the higher party committees and operated by the
higher-level, main CDIs. They are intended to help the superior CDI’s achieve vertical
supervision, covering both party and governmental agencies at the next lower level. Thus, the
CIT system enables the superior anti-corruption force, i.e., the superior CDI, to investigate
the inferiors’ corruption and misbehaviour, constituting another kind of COV in China. In
this way, the COV system in anti-corruption cases helps the superior to interrupt the local
control over anti-corruption cases, and enables the superior to utilize a different inferior from
outside the default jurisdiction to deal with public corruption cases.
The frequent and routinized use of COV within the recent anti-corruption campaign
provides further evidence that the local anti-corruption mechanism no longer functioned
property, and probably had grown outside of the superior’s control – and that China’s public
corruption therefore had become quite entrenched. The routinized use of COV helps to
centralize the anti-corruption mechanism.
Since the 18th Plenum of the Communist Party of China (CPC), more than 150
provincial/ministerial-level cadres (or “tigers”) have been investigated and removed from
official positions for corruption, including: Zhou Yongkang, a previous Standing Committee
member of the Politburo; Caihou Xu, the previous Vice Chairman of the Central Military
Commission; and Rong Su, the previous Vice Chairman of the political consultative

normally five to ten years.
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conference. This is quite astonishing as, from 2009 to 2012, the number of “tigers” caught for
corruption was only eight, six, seven, and five, respectively. Given the local party’s history of
dominant control over the local anti-corruption agencies, how could this happen? The use of
the COV system in anti-corruption efforts has been very instrumental to the success of the
recent anti-corruption campaign.
At the beginning, the CCDI circuit inspection team, which is a part of the overall COV
system, is sent out by the CCDI to collect corruption information from the inspected local
areas, and then transfers the information to the CCDI’s anti-corruption investigative
departments, which consequently carry out the investigations of the cases disclosed by the
transferred information. Instead of relying on the local anti-corruption agencies to collect and
investigate corruption within that local area, the party center has utilized anti-corruption
forces from outside the local area to uncover the corruption cases within that area. The
existence of the COV system, as an exception to the default jurisdiction, legitimately allows
the party center to instruct alternative anti-corruption forces to break up the local network and
realize the central party’s leadership interests.
After cracking down on several high-level “tiger” officials in the local areas, routine
corruption cases involving lower-level officials may become too numerous for the CCDI’s
anti-corruption forces to handle. In that context, COV makes it possible for the CCDI to
instruct lower-level CDI’s anti-corruption forces from outside the local area to continue
investigating the large number of corruption cases involving lower-level officials in that area.
The COV system authorizes other CDIs, at the same level, to investigate corruption outside
their own jurisdictions. Thus, the COV system largely increases the anti-corruption power of
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the CCDI, by enabling it to mobilize all lower-level CDIs nationwide without being limited
by the default jurisdiction. Through these two steps, i.e., first cracking down on high-level
“tigers” and then having alternative CDIs deal with relevant lower-level corruptions, the
party center has successfully initiated the recent anti-corruption campaign and has revitalized
the previously non-operative local anti-corruption mechanism.
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VI ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION 3: USING COV TO REALIZE LEADING
CONTROL IN THE NEW ANTI-CORRUPTION MODEL
As presented in Chapters VI and V, while ordinarily COV helps the superior to achieve
its goals and constantly check on its inferior’s work, during unusual times – such as during
the recent anti-corruption campaign – the COV system helps to initiate the campaign and
centralize, or recentralize, control over local anti-corruption efforts. Thus, the COV system
plays an essential role in unitarian governance. This is the foundation for the third alternative
explanation for the newly expanded use of the COV system.
The third alternative explanation is closely related to this realization of unitarian control,
and must be understood from the holistic perspective of the overall reform of anti-corruption
efforts in China. Besides helping to initiate the recent campaign, COV also works as a part of
the party center’s new model of “leading control,” providing an important aspect of
legitimacy for such “leading control” within China’s new anti-corruption system – which
involves trying to consolidate the CDIs and the procuratorates into one, single anti-corruption
agency under the party center’s leading control.
The most recent anti-corruption campaign in China had a very different style from
previous ones. Previous campaigns lasted only a short time, normally around a year; relied
mostly on political pressure to activate ordinary anti-corruption agencies and mobilize the
general public; required both CDIs and prosecutors to significantly increase investigations of
corruption cases; encouraged self-surrender in exchange for lighter punishment; and ended
with kicking out only a few political figures and prosecuting very few corruption cases.157
By contrast, through targeting the well-noted problems of the anti-corruption agencies,
MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY DESIGN: BUILDING CLEAN GOVERNMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA
AND HONG KONG 180–200 (2004).
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the recent campaign has made significant efforts to institutionally reform the local anticorruption system while pushing forward anti-corruption efforts.158 Early in the campaign,
President Xi and CCDI Secretary Wang emphasized that anti-corruption work is a systematic,
continuous task that will be carried out through three steps: (1) Making officials afraid to be
corrupt; (2) Making officials unable to be corrupt; and (3) Making officials unwilling to be
corrupt.159
The first step is designed to buy time and help prepare for later reforms. The basic
mission of the first step – to make officials scared of corruption – explains why that part of
the campaign lasted four years, with the resulting dramatic impact of bringing down over a
hundred provincial/ministerial-level officials and occupying nearly 10% of all incumbent
ministerial-level officials nationwide – with more than 90% of those caught during 20122015 being transferred to judicial proceedings, and more than 90% of the concluded cases
leading to prosecution and conviction.160
Moreover, during this first step of the campaign, and in order to prepare for later reforms
to remake the CDIs into a single anti-corruption agency, the “three-transform” reform first
required the CDIs to focus on supervision; the centralization of control over the CDIs then
strengthened their independence from the local governors; the “three-unfixed” reform of the
CITs further enhanced the CDIs’ anti-corruption capacity; and the routinized use of offsite
See Xuezhi Guo, Controlling Corruption in the Party: China’s Central Discipline Inspection
Commission, 219 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 597–624 (2014); Hualing Fu, Wielding the Sword: President Xi's New
Anticorruption Campaign, in CORRUPTION AND MODERN STATE: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (Susan RoseAckerman & Paul Lagunes, eds., 2015).
159 See CHINA.COM, Xi Jinping: do not dare to achieve the initial goal does not want to destroy the dam is
building (Jan. 6, 2017), http://news.china.com/zh_cn/domestic/945/20170106/30147766_all.html.
160 See the data at:
http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=6eNEoscUctAqRbDXR1Yv9986hUzVjIj1ekNe5qrO5Kaxjbq9andgpq-QCwwJkPaC_9PVeU0Qdn3pVmYY9SEea1tq4Hjj_FM7UurRUoUVmldxEtYL7eBia8ksNxreZ9qS7l4XAHbJvzYYgL
6MT0e47CEezWiot4pyKAwQGvSMnVFC9y85BitT7mvk2rVSRyS1d47zhyMqgskTInqSDL9zoY7shVl9tdoCu2AYe3NODkj-XR4EkmUHPa4hKpwiIy#2 (last visited June 28, 2017).
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investigations (through COV) as well as the joint investigation systems temporarily resolved
the short-term problems of the CDIs, without addressing at such an early stage the more
difficult long-term reform of expanding the CDIs’ size. In addition, the CDIs won broad
public support, popularity, and enhanced reputation through successful investigations against
“tiger”-level corruptions; the opening of the CCDI’s website; and the promotion of the CDIs’
anti-corruption work in the public media. All of this provided enhanced legitimacy for the
CDIs ultimately to absorb other anti-corruption forces, especially the anti-corruption
departments of the procuracy.
With a new series of party-adopted provisions institutionalizing these reforms, and the
recent decision to establish the NSC system, the anti-corruption campaign has now moved on
to the second step: Reforming the prior anti-corruption system, together with reforming the
official asset reporting system, the cadre selecting and promoting institutions, and the
governmental power over markets, all with the ultimate goal of rendering public officials
incapable of being corrupt. The third and final step of the reform initiative – to make public
officials unwilling to be corrupt – has also been initiated, for example through the
strengthened idea of building up a clean party with integrity.161
Thus, although initiated by political pressures and by selectively fighting against “tiger”
corruption, the current campaign’s long-lasting strength and broad coverage – as well as the
reliance upon and permanent implementation of institutional reforms of the CDIs and the
procuratorates during the campaign and their strategic relation with the following steps –

161 Series of provisions to clean party have also been issued, including Provisions on the Standards of Inner
Party Democratic Life Under New Situation, issued on Oct. 27, 2016; and Provisions on the Standards of the
Party Members to be Honest and Self-Disciplined (effective on Jan. 1, 2016). Provisions will not be discussed in
detail in this article.
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have distinguished the current campaign from previous anti-corruption campaigns, and
demonstrate that it is a part of a strong overall reform plan.
Moreover, with the expanded role of the CDIs within the campaign, the decision to have
the CDIs absorb the procuratorates, and the increased centralized control over the CDIs and
the procuratorates, the current campaign has pursued institutional reforms designed to
transform the previous “dual-leadership, dual-track” anti-corruption model into a new model
based on the party center’s “leading control” over a single anti-corruption agency. In this new
system, COV functions to help realize the party center’s “leading control,” and to provide the
legal authority for such control.
A. THE PARTY CENTER’S LEADING CONTROL IN ANTI-CORRUPTION
The leading control of the central party in anti-corruption work constitutes another
example of “consultative authoritarianism,” which utilizes the causal role of local officials in
the furtherance of civil society in China to argue that operationally autonomous civil society
can exist even in an authoritarian regime.162 Similarly, here, the central party has played an
important causal role in enabling the substantive but controlled participation by outsiders in
anti-corruption efforts.
“Leading control” refers to the idea that when an authoritarian regime becomes
institutionally open and participative, with the inclusion of multiple entities and outsiders, the
scope, principle, direction, and focus of such participation in turn are substantively controlled
by the central party, and such control becomes institutionalized. As applied to the situation of
anti-corruption work, “leading control” means that the central party does not directly decide
162 Jessica

Teets, Let Many Civil Societies Bloom: the Rise of Consultative Authoritarianism in China, 2013
CHINA QUARTERLY 19 (2013).
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the outcome of the investigation or the prosecution of specific public corruption cases.
Instead, the central party outlines the principles for the anti-corruption initiative, and controls
the direction, the scope, and the degree of the anti-corruption work. The central party also
retains the power to decide some particular high-level, sensitive public corruption cases.
Party leadership over the legislature is legitimate under China’s legal framework, as
China’s constitution upholds the party’s leadership in every aspect of the country’s
governance and functioning.163 Moreover, the empirical findings in this dissertation closely
reflect the fundamental characteristics of this kind of “leading control.” The central party
does not participate directly or indirectly in the anti-corruption process, nor does it determine
any concrete decision during any stage of an anti-corruption case. The central party merely
leads the anti-corruption process by predetermining its directions, principles, and goals. The
party exerts such “leading control” in three ways: (1) By controlling anti-corruption agencies,
and creating balance between anti-corruption agencies; (2) By enacting vague laws; and (3)
By providing clear instructions through regulations, policy documents, and political talks.
B. ESTABLISHING LEADING CONTROL BY CONTROLLING ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES, HAVING VAGUE LAWS, AND ESTABLISHING
PARTY RULE SYSTEM
Centralizing Control Over Anti-Corruption Agencies
The previously discussed reforms have not only decreased the local party’s control over
the local prosecutors, but also centralized the control over the local prosecutors within the
central party. The elimination of the local party’s control does not create true independence
for the local prosecutors. Instead, the central party’s leading control has taken the place of the
previous system of local party control.
163

See XIANFA (1982) (China), http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/1982-12/04/content_1478495.htm.
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For the CDIs, the nomination, promotion, and evaluation of CDI leaders is determined,
level by level, up to the CCDI which reports to the president. Although the funding and work
support of the CDIs continue to be provided by the local government, reforms of the budget
law will contribute to ensuring a sufficient budget for the CDI’s work and decreasing the
local government’s ability to arbitrarily reduce the CDI’s funding.
More importantly, the local CDI does not need the local party leader’s approval to
initiate a corruption case investigation, but instead needs to report to the superior CDI and is
subject to the superior CDI’s decision on the case. The local CDI cannot decide the cases
entirely on their own. In practice, the local CDI must report to the superior CDI, and in many
situations must have the superior CDI’s approval, including on such matters as: (1)
categorizing the case information; (2) deciding whether to initiate a preliminary or formal
investigation; (3) deciding the scope, focus, and degree of the investigation; (4) deciding
whether to use a joint investigation; (5) deciding whether to use some strong or special
investigative techniques such as shuanggui; (6) deciding how to conclude the case; and (7)
deciding whether to transfer the case to the prosecutor. Thus, the CCDI effectively controls
the work of local CDIs, level by level. Recent reforms have successfully transferred control
over the local CDIs from the local party leader to the superior CDI and then, level by level,
up to the CCDI, and thereby to the party center.
For the local prosecutors, the superior prosecutor’s control used to be stronger than the
superior CDI’s control over the local CDI. With recent reforms further emphasizing the
decisive power of the superior prosecutors in the nomination and promotion of the local
prosecutor’s leader, and further strengthening the relationship between the superior and the
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inferior prosecutors, the local prosecutor is even more strongly controlled than previously by
the superior prosecutor – and, level by level, up to the supreme procuratorate leader, who
must report to the party center.
More importantly, the recent decision by the party center (and later adopted by the NPC
Standing Committee) to establish the National Supervision Committee (NSC) will help the
CDIs to gradually absorb the anti-corruption forces currently located within the prosecutorial
system.164 Previously, both the CDIs and the prosecutors served as the routine anti-corruption
forces in China. And with the CCDI and provincial CDIs now playing a leading role in
senior-official or other “hot” corruption cases, the prosecutors have become important figures
in combating ordinary local corruption, and possess a strong staff strength and good
equipment.165
With this recent NSC decision, the previous multiplicity of anti-corruption institutions in
China will become unified in the form of a single NSC system that will include, as “people
holding two titles,” the same anti-corruption investigators who currently work for the CDIs.
Beijing, Shanxi, and Zhejiang provinces have been selected to be the three experimental
locations to first carry out these reforms, moving the anti-corruption departments currently in
the procuratorates into the corresponding CDIs,166 in preparation for the nationwide
implementation of these NSC reforms during the nineteenth plenum of the party starting in
2017.

164 See PEOPLE.CN, China decided to carry out the national supervision system reform pilot in Beijing,
Shanxi and Zhejiang (Dec. 27, 2016), http://leaders.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1227/c58278-28979210.html.
165 See Fenfei Li & Jinting Deng, The power and the misuse of power by China’s local procuratorates in
anticorruption, 45 INT’L J. L., CRIME & JUSTICE 12 (2016).
166 See PEOPLE.CN, China decided to carry out the national supervision system reform pilot in Beijing,
Shanxi and Zhejiang (Dec. 27, 2016), http://leaders.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1227/c58278-28979210.html.
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The meeting communique of the seventh plenum of the 18th session of CCDI members,
concluded on January 8, 2017, further clarifies that the Supervision Committees (SCs) will be
organized as a three-level system, with the NSC at the national level, then the provincial SCs,
and finally the city SCs, thereby replacing the previous four-level system involving both
central and local CDIs and procuratorates.167 The new SC system, which will be discussed
below, is the sole anti-corruption agency that will be established to consolidate the multiple
anti-corruption agencies currently existing in China. The previous four-level system was
established to correspond to the four-level party and governmental system, which is
consistent with the old idea that the CDIs are the assistants to the local party. After the new
three-level anti-corruption system is established, the SCs will no longer correspond in this
same way to the party and governmental system.
What will probably follow is that the NSC will investigate corruption of provincial-level
officials, the provincial SCs will be responsible for investigating city-level corruption, and
the city SCs will be for the investigation of county-level corruptions. Once the new system is
in place, the SCs will be superior to the agencies or organizations they supervise, and
therefore will not be subject to the influence by them.
Vague and Incomplete Anti-Corruption Laws and Rules Leave Room for Party Control
The anti-corruption laws and rules in China provide insufficient legal and institutional
limits to regulate the local CDI and prosecutorial behavior in anti-corruption cases, and thus
create room for the party center to implement its “leading control” and even exercise its
discretion within the work of local anti-corruption agencies, consistent with the general legal

167

See the meeting communique at http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xwtt/201701/t20170108_92483.html.
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framework in China.
(1) China’s anti-corruption criminal law remains incomplete and unprincipled in several
respects. First, China does not criminalize accepting or giving illegal gratuity. China has no
such concept as ‘illegal gratuity,’ and specific intent remains necessary to convict someone of
a bribery crime in many parts of China. However, this specific intent requirement has been
loosened by some courts to cover situations in which a public official accepts illegal rewards
after legally completing his official act. In this situation, the official act may not have been
influenced, but the court nonetheless finds specific intent from the official’s subsequent
knowing acceptance of the illegal rewards.168
Second, as defined in Article 383 above, China currently recognizes only ‘property from
others’ as a bribe, clearly excluding other benefits that might be seen as comparable to
property rights, e.g. opportunities for job promotion, educational opportunities, and sexual
services.169 It remains unclear whether ‘property from others’ covers common gifts, such as
wines and cigarettes or the right to use cars and houses. However, courts in several
jurisdictions have extended the concept of a bribe to include travel opportunities, debt
exemption, and the provision of free services.170 Although the ninth amendment of China’s
criminal law (1997) includes property rights as a kind of bribe, the law still excludes some
frequently-seen benefits such as sexual services or the right to use cars and houses.171 Overall,
the definition of public corruption remains relatively narrow in China.
YU ZHAO, PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR PUNISHING GRAFT AND BRIBERY CRIMES [CHENGZHI TANWU
HUILU FANZUI SHIWU ZHINAN] 214–215 (2014).
169 Bingzhi Zhao, On the improvement of criminal rule of law on China’s anticorruption [Lun woguo
fanfubai xingshi fazhi de wanshan], 3 CONTEMP. L.R.[DANGDAI FAXUE] 53 (2013).
170 ZHAO, supra note 168, at 221.
171 Ninth Amendment of China’s Criminal Law, art. 44 (effective on Nov. 1, 2015),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2015-08/31/content_1945587.htm.
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Third, China currently requires that the bribed individual actually have received the
bribe and tried to act in a manner as to benefit the bribers.172 A narrow textual interpretation
of this requirement would exclude from the definition of bribery those situations where the
bribed individual made a promise but had not yet actually sought to benefit the bribers,
particularly where the bribed individual accepted the bribe knowing that the bribers had a
very specific request. Although a 2003 judicial interpretation clarified that bribery involves
three stages – the promising, the carrying out, and the realizing – and that satisfying any stage
would be sufficient to commit the crime of bribery, it remains in dispute whether this 2003
interpretation will be binding.173
Fourth, a benefit of over 5,000 RMB is sufficient to constitute a public corruption
criminal offence, e.g., embezzlement or bribery, and a conviction for receiving a benefit of
over 100,000 RMB could result in over ten years’ imprisonment, life imprisonment, or even
the death penalty.174 These two standards can be easily reached. But for allegations of corrupt
dealings that exceed 100,000 RMB, there is no further standard to distinguish the degree of
seriousness.175
In general, the current law in China does not provide practical standards to decide the
seriousness of public corruption allegations, which are then subject to local CDI leaders’
discretion. For example, in a small, less-developed city, allegations or records of dealings
over 20,000 or 30,000 RMB would normally count as serious, but dealings less than 20,000
RMB would be deemed ‘light’ – and if there is no proof, such cases may be dismissed. With

Zhao, supra note 169, at 54.
Zhao, supra note 168, at 241–243.
174 China’s Criminal Law, arts. 363, 386.
175 Zhao, supra note 169, at 54–55.
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the ninth amendment of China’s Criminal Law (1997), such numerical standards are
substituted by terms such as ‘relatively large amount’, ‘huge amount’, and ‘extremely huge
amount’, making the standards somewhat more reasonable and practical.176 However, anticorruption agencies still have much discretion to decide the seriousness of the allegations of
corruption, as the ninth amendment provides only those three standards.177 Moreover, the
Interpretation on Applying Law in Corruption and Bribery Cases issued by the Supreme
People’s Court (SPC) and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) raised the minimum
standard to trigger criminal responsibility for bribery from 5,000 RMB to 30,000 RMB,
making it more difficult to legally punish corrupt officials.178
Fifth, China’s criminal law has no independent criminal offence for conflict of interest.
The holding of conflicting positions, or specific acts based on conflicting interests, do not
trigger criminal liability unless those behaviors happen to satisfy the legal definition of some
other crime. China’s rules to prevent conflicts of interest remain in preliminary stages.179 The
Law on Judicature, the Law on Prosecutors, the Law on Public Officials, the Law on Audit,
the Law on Securities, the Law on Administrative Supervision, laws on procedures, and the
Regulations on the Punishment of Administrative Officers all have scattered articles
addressing withdrawals to prevent conflict of interest.180 However, none of them have
established institutions to investigate violations and enforce these rules. Due to China’s weak
Ninth Amendment of China’s Criminal Law, art. 39.
Ninth Amendment of China’s Criminal Law, art. 44 (effective on Nov. 1, 2015),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2015-08/31/content_1945587.htm.
178 SPC and SPP’s Interpretation on Applying Law in Corruption and Bribery Cases, art. 1 (effective on
Apr. 18, 2016) , http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-19612.html.
179 Ting Gong & Jianming Ren, Hard Rules and Soft Constraints: regulating conflict of interest in China,
22 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 1 (2013).
180 Zilu Nie, Theories and Practice on the Legislation of Public Officials Conflict of Interest Prevention
Law, [Fangzhi Gongzhi Renyuan Liyi Chongtu Lifa de Lilun yu Shijian], 6 CHINA LEGAL SCI. [ZHONGGUO
FAXUE] 160 (2013).
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administrative litigation laws, weak implementation of government information disclosure,
and deficient disclosure laws on conflict of interest, the general public has neither the
information nor the capability to push for investigations of such violations. As a result,
allegations of conflict of interest can hardly be deemed to constitute a case.
(2) There are very few rules governing the categorization of case information. As
indicated above, case categorization is essential because it determines whether an
investigation will be initiated and, if so, what kind of investigation – which can greatly affect
the final outcome of the case. Under the current procedures, file categorization remains
controlled by the Party and hidden to outsiders. Although social media helps quickly spread
certain information, anti-corruption cases exposed on the Internet comprise only a small
portion of all public corruption cases. And in many cases, information must be kept entirely
confidential to ensure the success of further investigations.
Standards for file categorization are not fixed in any published rules and can thus easily
be changed. Moreover, file categorization can be biased whenever the information
contradicts party concerns. Normally, when the information concerns a large number of
public officials and large or sensitive interests, and when the investigation might affect the
Party leadership and the political stability in the area, the information may be dismissed or
suspended in light of the Party’s concerns.181 This balancing of legal and political interests is
not legally based and is done in secret, thus providing a potential source of arbitrariness.
Moreover, no law governs the preliminary investigations that are performed either by
the CDI or by the prosecutor. The only rule regarding the CDI’s investigation is the Opinion
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on the Interview with the Suspects of Cases by the CDIs and the Supervision Agencies,
issued by the CCDI in 2006.182 The only legal requirement contained there is that more than
two investigators must attend the interview.183 Preliminary investigation by a prosecutor is
subject to similar rules. Current reforms to strengthen the superior’s control over local anticorruption work cannot rectify the problem of confidential, passive preliminary
investigations that might produce an insubstantial response to a public corruption claim.
Furthermore, no concrete standards or rules for dismissing corruption cases have been
established, and no reasons need to be provided in the record. The dismissal decisions are
neither available to the general public nor challengeable by the whistleblower, and the
decisions are made under the name of the entire committee, rather than the Case Leader,
which creates a ‘responsibility hole’ similar to that created by the judicial committee of the
court, as analyzed by Professor Xin He.184
In addition, no law or published rules govern the performance of joint investigations or
shuanggui. However, consistent with Professor Sapio’s study, I was told during interviews
that there are internal informal rules – but they basically only recognize the different roles of
each agency, and roughly outline the process.185 The informal rules are insufficient to prevent
the abuse of power during shuanggui. Several cases have been exposed on social media in
which the interrogated officials died abnormally during shuanggui.186 Laws are needed to
CCDI, ARTICLE 3, THE OPINION ON THE INTERVIEW WITH THE SUSPECTS OF CASES BY THE CDIS AND
THE SUPERVISION AGENCIES, PRACTICE HANDBOOK OF LAWS AND RULES COMMONLY USED BY CDIS AND
SUPERVISION AGENCIES IN THEIR WORK 1009–1010 (2006).
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http://news.ifeng.com/gundong/detail_2013_04/10/24047054_0.shtml ; Fen Liu, The director of a bureau in
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regulate this process, but strong pressure exists to prevent legal regulation.
(3) The scope, degree, and focus of case investigation, and the use of information
collected during the investigation, are subject to no concrete rules or laws. For example, I
found that corrupt officials were normally punished only for accepting bribes. De Ma, a
former city-level Party Secretary, was punished for public corruption crimes and sentenced to
the death penalty with two years’ reprieve. Only his acceptance of bribes was investigated
and punished. It was not until Guizhi Han, De Ma’s superior, was punished for accepting De
Ma’s bribes that De Ma’s giving of bribes was also disclosed and confirmed.187 Obviously, in
De Ma’s case, the information regarding Guizhi Han’s potential public corruption was
intentionally omitted.
Several factors may affect the selection or use of information in investigations:
(a) Sometimes, suspects give selective confessions. An admission of giving bribes
would further aggravate a suspect’s case and drag down other officials, particularly higherlevel officials, which would destroy the informal network that could potentially help the
suspect, both inside and outside of prison. Therefore, the suspect will often avoid confessing
to giving bribes.
(b) When a case involves almost all of the officials of an agency, or even within a
geographic area, the breadth of the case may be controlled by investigators, and only certain
high-level officials will be punished – taking into consideration the political stability of the
local society, the ordinary operation of the agency, and the preservation of confidence in the

For detailed discussions regarding the two cases, see Fenfei Li, Why do corrupt officials only accept
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local government. For example, in the Yinguo Luo case, Yinguo Luo disclosed the illegal
activities of over 100 local officials, but only a few of them were further investigated and
punished.188 Frequently, in public corruption judgments where several officials are involved,
the investigations of officials other than the convicted ones are marked as ‘resolved in other
cases’. However, no judgments related to them can be found.
(c) Finally, plea bargains between the prosecutors and the suspects can sometimes result
in selective omissions. During public corruption investigations, it is difficult to obtain
sufficient evidence because many corrupt transactions are made in cash. Prosecution and
conviction relies heavily upon confessions of the bribed individual and the briber. Thus,
prosecutors frequently offer to forego prosecution of certain activities in exchange for
confessions of other activities, in order to secure a conviction for those other activities. The
security of conviction is important for local prosecutors’ internal evaluations and promotions.
However, these factors are not guided or established by any regulations or internal
documents. The investigations are well controlled and isolated from the public. The inclusion
or exclusion of information cannot be reviewed or challenged. Selective omission of
information remains arbitrary and subject to the party’s leading control.
Most current CDIs’ anti-corruption work remains heavily controlled by ‘man’, not by
‘law’. The internal decision-making system concentrates power within the CDI leadership,
then in the CCDI leadership, and finally in the party center. With no other supervision, the
high-level discretion can hardly be regulated. Some local public corruption may also be

Guangdong Maoming City ex-mayor Luo Yinguo public corruption case has involved 218 officials at
district levels (xianchuji 县处级), XINHUA NET, (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2012_04/13/13874705_0.shtml.
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dismissed, if it is against the interests of the Party leadership in the area. Although such
dismissals may have politically clear standards within the Party, they are not governed by any
legal rule and thus can be changed easily by the political leader. Just as with the CDIs under
the traditional anti-corruption system, the case categorization standards, the decision standard
on preliminary and formal investigations, the standard for deciding not to prosecute the case,
and the rules regarding plea bargains all are insufficient to provide clear limits on the
prosecutor’s anti-corruption work, and thus leave room for the party’s leading control.
Expanding the CDI System and Cultivating a Well-Controlled Anti-Corruption Agency
(1) Making the CDIs Focus on Anti-Corruption
A main problem with the CDIs’ anti-corruption efforts is that they are indistinguishable
from the party committees, aiming to facilitate the party’s work generally, rather than
specializing in anti-corruption. Thus, the CDIs may refrain from fighting corruption when it
contradicts other missions, i.e., economic growth, or the overall situation.
Recent reforms under China’s new leadership have specialized the CDIs’ mission from
two distinct perspectives. First, the reforms have made anti-corruption the primary focus of
the CDIs’ mission. Second, the reforms have eliminated CDI tasks that are irrelevant to
fighting corruption.
In the Decision passed at the Third Plenum of 18th Central Committee of CPC, the
CDI’s supervisory responsibility was emphasized and the reform of the CDIs system was put
onto the schedule.31 The Decision especially emphasized that the CDIs shall function as the
specialized, inner-party (i.e., internal to the Party) supervisory agency.189 Compared with the
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previous CDIs’ mission, the new one abolished the task to “monitor the implementation of
the party line, guidelines, policies, and decisions,” which was too general and barely related
to corruption, and clarified that anti-corruption was the key to “uphold the party constitution
and party regulations,” and “to assist party committees in strengthening party style.”190
Along with the mission’s specialization, the organization and work style of the CDIs
have also become more specialized. All of these changes are represented within the “threetransform” (三转）reform of the CDIs promoted by Qishan Wang.191 The Year 2013-2017
Work Plans to Establish and Optimize the Anti-corruption Punishment and Prevention
Systems, passed by the new party center, stated that the CDIs shall transform their missions,
methods, and styles (转职能，转方式，转作风), withdraw from other tasks and positions,
and focus mainly on strengthening social norms against corruption and investigating public
corruption cases.192
Then, at the Third Plenum of the 18th CCDI, Qishan Wang systematically discussed the
“three-transform” reform, concretely explaining the meaning of the mission-transformation
and requiring all CDIs to carry out such reforms.193 He said that the CDIs should focus on
supervision, clarify their duty as distinct from party committees and other agencies, withdraw
from work that should be regulated by other responsible agencies rather than the CDIs, and
ensure that the CDIs do “not exceed, not omit, and not malposition” their authority.194 He
Id.
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provided, as an example, that the CCDI has decreased the coordinating institutions of other
government organs it attended from 125 to 14.195 By limiting the number of institutions, the
CCDI could affect, and thus be involved in, the resolutions of general affairs.
Moreover, these reforms have clear schedules and are to be carried out accordingly. The
planned schedule was to complete the reforms of provincial-level CDIs in 2014, then citylevel CDIs in 2015, and finally county-level CDIs in 2016.196 By May 18, 2014, the reform
plans for all thirty-one provincial CDIs were approved, and twelve had already completed
their reforms and started to operate.197 The CDI reforms all mainly address three aspects:
increasing the staff and departments to investigate cases, decreasing the number of
coordinating institutions, and adding internal supervision departments.198
By June 2014, at the national level, the previous total of 4619 coordinating institutions
had been decreased to 509; the national average percentage of investigative staff and
departments within CDIs had increased, to 57.6% and 63.3%; and all of the provincial CDIs
had added internal supervision departments.199 By June 2015, on average, over 85% of the
unrelated institutions had been eliminated at city-level CDIs, whose anti-corruption forces
represent over 60% of all its internal staff strength, and most CDI leaders are now exclusively
responsible for supervision.200 Thus, with these concrete models and clear schedules, the
CDIs now have adopted a specialized mission to fight against corruption, and have largely
Id.
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withdrawn from work unrelated to this mission.
(2) Making the CDI the Coordinator and Leader in Local Anti-Corruption Work
During the 1990s and 2000s, as public corruption grew quickly and pervasively, the
strengthening of anti-corruption norms and the investigation of public corruption cases were
firmly added to the CDIs' mission.201 The CDIs formally became the coordinator of anticorruption work in 2002.202 In 2008, the Central Party Commission urged all levels
nationwide to improve the operation of the Anti-corruption Coordination Teams at different
levels, and required that the CDI secretary become the team leader to coordinate anticorruption work among entities including the CDI, the judiciary, the procuratorate, the police,
and the audit bureau.203
As expressed in China's anti-corruption policy – i.e., that the party secretary leads and
the CDI coordinates – anti-corruption work in China is never just a legal issue, nor an issue of
certain identified agencies' institutional independence. It is a complicated situation, involving
a wide range of actors, from the party commission to every party and governmental
department. In this complex environment, although the party secretary has the final say, the
CDI drafts concrete work plans, coordinates the work of different departments, and makes
suggestions on case handling to the party secretary. Being the coordinator in anti-corruption
work, the CDI can also initiate a joint investigation to utilize the prosecutor’s anti-corruption
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forces, subject to the superior CDI’s approval.
(3) Prioritizing the CDIs in Investigating Corruption Cases
The CDI has priority to initiate the investigation of public corruption cases in an
overlapping jurisdiction, which may determine the final outcomes. The jurisdiction of the
CDI and the procuratorate in public corruption cases are largely overlapping. In cases
involving party members, the CDI's jurisdiction is much broader than the procuratorate’s. For
example, the CDI jurisdiction covers village cadres and violations of party discipline, while
the procuratorate only supervises “governmental civil servants 国家工作人员”,204 normally
excluding village cadres, and only investigates criminal corruption.
Until recently, all public corruption cases concerning provincial-level officials were first
investigated by the CCDI and then transferred to the SPP, and a large proportion of public
corruption cases of municipal-level officials were investigated by the provincial CDIs and
then transferred to the provincial procuratorates. In high-level public corruption cases, the
CDI decides whether to preliminarily or formally investigate the case (subject to both the
superior CDI and the local party secretary's approvals), conducts preliminary and formal
investigations, and decides whether to transfer the case to the procuratorate (also subject to
both the superior CDI and the local party secretary's approvals).
Moreover, as the anti-corruption team leader, the CDI can mobilize larger anticorruption resources and thus has a stronger ability to investigate corruption cases.
Frequently, when the CDI and the procuratorate get the information at around the same time,
or when the procuratorate, as the first finder, has insufficient resources to investigate the case,
Kilko Ko & Cuifen Weng, Critical Review of Conceptual Definitions of Chinese Public corruption: a
Formal-Legal Perspective , 20 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 359e378 (2011).
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the CDI will prevail over the prosecutor to investigate the case first. As the anti-corruption
team leader, if the CDI feels unable to conduct the investigation, it could borrow people from
different entities and start joint investigations, as the case may require, to help the
investigation progress. But the procuratorate has no such coordinative power. Cases requiring
such joint coordination will be first investigated by the CDI, even if the procuratorate is the
first finder.
Another advantage of prioritizing the CDI is that the information relating to violations of
party discipline is easier to collect, while the information involving criminal corruptions is
much harder to find. Often such criminal information comes from the investigation of party
disciplinary violations. Several CDI officers admitted during interviews that criminal
information discovered from the CDI's investigations often will not be transferred to the
procuratorate.205 The reasons include pressure from the party secretary, the CDI's own selfinterest, or social or political considerations.206 From the CCDI's 2015 annual work report,
only 12,000 of the 232,000 officers that were investigated and punished by the CDIs were
transferred to the procuratorates, a rate of only 5%.
Therefore, although the recent reforms have to some degree clarified the dividing line
between the prosecutor and the CDI, and have regulated the coordination between the two
within the large area of overlap in anti-corruption work, the party center clearly relies more
on the CDI system. Through the reforms, the party center has expanded the CDI’s role in
anti-corruption work, made the CDIs the primary coordinator, expanded its staff strength and
mobilizing power, ensured its funding support, and prioritized its investigative power in
205
206
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corruption cases. Because the legal requirements governing the CDI’s anti-corruption work
are much weaker than for the prosecutors, and because the party center’s control over the
CDI is both stronger and more discretionary than it is over the prosecutors, the party center’s
asymmetric reliance upon the CDIs in anti-corruption investigations represents another
measure for realizing the party’s leading control, i.e., by strengthening the particular agencies
that are better controlled by the party center.
Reforms of the procuratorate are simultaneously ongoing, but such reforms do not
increase the prosecutors’ relative importance in anti-corruption efforts. Although Wang
Qishan has emphasized the seamless connection between the CDIs and the prosecutors in
investigating corruption cases, and has urged the CDIs to transfer cases to the prosecutors as
soon as they find that the suspect’s behaviors violated the law, such words remain mere
words without concrete legal requirements or operative institutions to follow.
Until now, all corruption cases concerning provincial-level or higher officials were first
investigated by the CCDI and then transferred to the SPP, and all corruption cases of
prefecture-level leaders were investigated by the provincial CDIs and then transferred to the
provincial prosecutors. In these cases, the CDI decides whether to preliminarily or formally
investigate, performs the preliminary and formal investigations, and decides whether to
transfer the case to the prosecutor. The reliability of the CDIs in these high-profile cases has
earned the CDIs nationwide popularity and public confidence regarding the ability of the
CDIs to combat corruption, which has overshadowed the prosecutors’ achievements in lowerlevel corruption cases and thus makes the CDI’s eventual absorption of the prosecutors more
easily acceptable by the public.
156

(4) Establishing the SC System Based upon the CDIs
The party center recently passed the Decision to Establish the NSC System, and selected
Beijing, Shanxi, and Zhejiang provinces as experimental pioneer locations.207 The Decision
states that the NSC is supposed to consolidate multiple anti-corruption forces for greater
efficiency, with the NSC sitting at the top and two lower levels of supervision commissions
(SCs) below, at the provincial and city levels.
At the beginning of 2016, President Xi mentioned the urgency of reforming the national
anti-corruption system, which was confirmed in the Decision passed by the Sixth Plenum of
the 18th Session of CCP.208 Since then, there have been several routes discussed regarding
the rank of the NSC, its relation to the party committees, the National People’s Congress
(NPC), the State Council, and the judiciary, the role of the CDIs, the prosecutors, and other
anti-corruption agencies in the NSC, etc.
One route has the NSC established as a specialized committee directly under the NPC,
responsible for anti-corruption coordination and possessing the power to investigate possible
corruption of, and hear complaints against, the anti-corruption agencies. In another route, the
NSC is an independent national agency with equivalent rank to the State Council – not an
administrative agency under the State Council – reporting directly to the president, and acting
as the sole anti-corruption authority according to the anti-corruption law. In this route, the
CDIs, the Supervision Ministry (which was merged into the CDIs in 1993), the prosecutors,
and the National Corruption Prevention Bureau (NCPB) will no longer play a role in anti207 See CHINA.COM, 2017 Anti-Corruption Institutional Reform Starts Administrative Supervision Law will
be changed to State Supervision Act (Dec. 31, 2016),
http://news.china.com/domestic/945/20161231/30131674.html.
208 See Ma Guoying, National Commission opened! How to recreate existing anti-corruption agencies?,
PEOPLE.CN (Nov. 18, 2010), http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1108/c1001-28845567.html.
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corruption activity. According to a third route, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of the
Supreme Procuratorate could be upgraded to become the NSC, independent from the
procuracy system, and could absorb the anti-corruption duty of the CDIs, to become the sole
anti-corruption agency in China. In a fourth and final route, the NSC is only a coordinative
institution for realizing the seamless connection between the CDIs and the prosecutors, and to
ensure that the decisions of the CDIs are also followed by the prosecutors.
The party center’s Decision to establish the NSC, Wang Qishan’s later talk to mobilize
the implementation of this Decision,209 and the later-enacted NPC Standing Committee’s
Decision to Establish SCs Tentatively in Beijing, Shanxi, and Zhejiang Provinces210 all
indicate that in actuality, none of the above possible routes have been selected. Instead, the
party center has chosen to transform the CDIs to become the sole anti-corruption agency.
First, both of the aforementioned Decisions state that the NSC will be of equivalent rank
to the State Council, and the SC system will work jointly with the CDIs to include the same
people serving under two titles, i.e., 合署办公 (he shu ban gong). Through these measures,
the CDIs will be expanded from a party organization into a national anti-corruption agency,
and the CCDI will be upgraded from a ministerial-level agency to a national agency
equivalent to the State Council, in the name of establishing the NSC system.
Second, both Wang’s talk and the NPCSC’s Decision explicitly clarify that the anticorruption-related departments of the procuracy system, including the anti-corruption bureau,

209 See SINA CORPORATION, Wang Qishan: the essence of the Commission is anti-corruption agencies,
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the anti-dereliction of duty department, and the corruption prevention department, as well as
the National Corruption Prevention Bureau system, will be transferred entirely to the SC
system, including at least the people and the equipment thereof. After the transfer, these
agencies will become departments of the SCs and thus subject to the SCs’ leadership, which
is the same as the leadership of the original CDIs, and the procuracy will have no authority to
investigate corruption.
However, the prosecutor will still have the monopolistic power to prosecute criminal
cases. The CDI, under the name of SC, will then be able to command the anti-corruption
forces originally within the procuracy system, and the CDI will become the only agency that
can investigate public corruption. Its only duty will be to prevent corruption and supervise the
integrity and dereliction of duty of public officials. It will be able to use the investigative
measures possessed by both the original CDIs and the prosecutor’s previous anti-corruptionrelated departments, including shuanggui (双规), Appointed Interview (约谈), and legal
investigative measures. It will supervise both party members (previously covered by the CDIs)
and public officials, including nonparty officials, as well as private entities related to public
corruption, such as bribers (originally covered by the prosecutors). Additionally, the SC will
possess the power to make disciplinary punishment decisions, as the CDIs, and the power to
decide whether to initiate preliminary and formal investigations of disciplinary and legal
violations, and whether to transfer the cases to the prosecutors for prosecution.211
In addition to merging the two tracks of the previous dual-track anti-corruption system,
the dual-leadership system may also be reformed, as discussed below. Although the NPCSC’s
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Decision states that the provincial supervision commissions (PSC) will be elected by the
provincial people’s congress and will answer to both the provincial congress and the higher
supervision commissions, i.e., the NSC for the PSC, the local party and government will not
have a leadership role as it did under the original dual-leadership framework.212 The SCs will
not be established from scratch, outside of the existing organizations, but instead will be built
upon the existing CDIs and will use the same people as the CDIs.213
This means that after the establishment of the SCs, the CDIs will still exist and will still
operate according to the CDIs’ current institutional framework. Thus, it is implicitly clear
that the existing leadership institutions within the CDIs will continue into the SCs. Given the
institutional reforms that prioritize the higher CDIs’ control over deciding the CDIs’ leaders
and handling corruption cases, the higher SCs’ leadership role will also prevail over the local
party’s control. Although the dual-leadership framework may continue under the SCs, the
local leadership will be much weaker because the local leaders cannot overturn any decisions
made by the higher SCs regarding case handling or the nomination of local SCs’ leaders.
Providing Clear Instructions
It is widely recognized that authoritarian governance requires two fundamental features
in order to function: control over the inferior officials, and clear instructions for them to
follow.214 The former is represented by the central party’s control over the local prosecutor
and the local CDI within the current legal framework. The latter refers to the ways that the
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central party can deliver its instructions for how the anti-corruption should be carried out.
Such instructions can be divided into three categories: legal or quasi-legal rules, party rules,
and political instructions.
For the CDIs’ work, the CCDI issued Work Rules on Cases of CDIs in 1994 to
uniformly guide the casework of all CDIs regarding Party members.215 Later, the CCDI
issued several additional rules interpreting the meaning of certain articles within the Work
Rules. The primary interpretive rules are the Rules for Implementation, also from 1994.216
The Administrative Supervision Law and relevant implementing rules also govern CDI work
with regard to non-Party public officials. Regarding the scope of supervised activity, CDIs
rely on public corruption laws and relevant regulations and Party disciplinary rules.217
Together, these rules constitute a legal basis for the CDIs’ anti-corruption work.
The legal basis for prosecutors’ work is found in the criminal law, the criminal
procedure law, judicial interpretations issued by the supreme court explaining these laws,
work rules published by the supreme procuratorate, and several other laws and regulations
that concern corruption definitions and anti-corruption procedures.
Additionally, the central party has issued the Provisions on Inner Party Law Making to
establish a party rule system, parallel to the law system, to facilitate its delivery of clear
instructions for how anti-corruption work should be carried out. A recent series of party
provisions issued by the party center – such as the Inner Party Supervision, the Party Circuit

The Rules on Case Work of CDIs, (Mar. 25, 1994).
The Implementation Rules for the Rules on Case Work of CDIs (Mar. 25, 1994).
217 For detailed and comprehensive rules regarding the case work of CDIs, refer to CCDI, THE OPINION ON
THE INTERVIEW WITH THE SUSPECTS OF CASES BY THE CDIS AND THE SUPERVISION AGENCIES, PRACTICE
HANDBOOK OF LAWS AND RULES COMMONLY USED BY CDIS AND SUPERVISION AGENCIES IN THEIR WORK
(2006).
215
216

161

Inspection Work, and the Party Discipline Punishment provisions – provide standards for the
CDIs’ anti-corruption work, making up for much of the deficiencies of the anti-corruption
law in China.
Political instructions from the party leaders are also important. These come from
political lectures made by the party leadership at various public occasions, policy documents
issued by central agencies on behalf of the central party, regulation rules passed by the central
party or governmental organs, and supplemental articles published in official media. Lectures
can be given in public at the national scale, or in private at internal high-level meetings.
Similarly, policy documents can be issued broadly and openly, or confidentially and
internally. Through all of these multi-faceted approaches, as well as through the party’s
indirect influence over the law-making process, the central party outlines its requirements,
emphases, concerns, and attitudes to varying degrees (from clearly determined to relatively
uncertain) to both drafters and participants. Such outlines provide political instructions to the
local prosecutor and the local CDI, and help to shape the scope, pace, direction, mission, and
participant attitudes of the local anti-corruption forces.

C. THE COV SYSTEM HELPS TO ESTABLISH THE NEW ANTI-CORRUPTION
MODEL
As analyzed above, the power to decide whether and how to use the COV system is
currently assigned with very weak legal limits or challenging entities to the superior
prosecutor, who is generally subject to the authority of the party center. Reconsidering the
design of the COV system in light of the context of the entire mechanism of the new “leading
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control” anti-corruption model, my third alternative explanation for the use of COV argues
that COV has worked as part of the party center’s “leading control” over the local prosecutor,
and has helped enhance the party’s ability to communicate its desires and to exercise its
discretion with respect to anti-corruption cases within China’s legal framework.
a) Initiating the Anti-Corruption Campaign
As discussed previously under the second alternative explanation, regarding the COV’s
function of breaking up local networks, the most important role of the COV system in anticorruption work is to make sure that the anti-corruption investigation actually happens. In the
beginning, the CCDI circuit inspection team collects corruption information from the
inspected local areas and then transfers such information to the CCDI, which subsequently
carries out the investigations. Instead of relying on the local anti-corruption agencies, the
party center utilizes an anti-corruption force from outside the local area to investigate these
corruption cases.
The existence of the COV system as an exception to the default jurisdiction allows the
party center to legitimately instruct alternative anti-corruption forces to break up the local
network and to realize the central party’s leadership interest in starting an investigation. In
situations involving a large number of corruption cases of lower-level officials in a particular
area, COV makes it possible for the CCDI to instruct the anti-corruption forces of lower-level
CDI’s from outside the local area to conduct the investigation. Thus, COV largely increases
the anti-corruption powers of the CCDI. Through the two steps – i.e., cracking down on highlevel “tigers” and having alternative CDIs deal with relevant lower-level corruption – the
party center has been able to successfully initiate the recent anti-corruption campaign and
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revitalize the previously ineffective local anti-corruption mechanism.
b) The COV as Part of the Leading Control over Local Agencies
Aside from its importance in initiating the recent anti-corruption campaign, even during
more normal times the COV system constitutes an important part of the party center’s leading
control over local agencies. The COV system eliminates the monopoly that local anticorruption agencies would otherwise have over the investigation of \corruption within their
local area. COV also ensures that the local government will not be the sole and final decisionmaker regarding corruption issues in the area.
Policing power is a very important sovereign power of local governments. The existence
of the COV system transfers part of this local policing power to the superior, thereby limiting
the autonomy of local agencies. Even during normal times, the existence of the COV system
enables the central party to have the superior agencies, as well as agencies at the same level
but from outside the area, investigate corruption involving local agencies, so that the central
party can check on the behavior and loyalty of the local agencies and respond, consistently
and routinely, to their misbehaviors. Such capability forms an essential part of the central
party’s “leading control” over the local agencies, including both the local party leader and the
local anti-corruption agencies.
c) The COV Provides Part of the Legitimacy for the Leading Control
As discussed above, vague and incomplete anti-corruption legal rules leave ample room
for party control, because the party center can direct the local agencies’ anti-corruption work
according to its own leadership interests without bending or breaking any legal requirements.
In addition to all of the vagueness and incompleteness, China’s law has in some
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instances actually supported the realization of the party’s leading control. The COV system is
one example of such support, within China’s legal system, for the exercise of discretion by
the party leadership. The establishment of the COV system within the legal system – granting
only the superior the power to invoke the COV system, and without any governing legal rules
or limitations – has created a legal basis for the party center to mobilize the nationwide anticorruption forces for its own leadership interests, notwithstanding the legally-established
default jurisdiction rules. Such a design allows the party center to utilize the COV system
according to the wishes of the party center, without being legally challenged for violating the
default localized jurisdiction system.
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VII IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The previous chapters have presented the empirical findings and analysis of the data,
and have argued for three alternative explanations of the purposes of the COV system. In
particular, applying a holistic perspective, the COV system plays an essential role in initiating
the recent anti-corruption campaign and building up the new anti-corruption model in China.
This final chapter extends the previous conclusion on the new “leading control” model,
by discussing some of the underlying reasons for the existence of such a model and analyzing
the flexibility and advantages of the new model in relieving the current tensions in China.
The chapter concludes with an example of the kind of misbehavior in anti-corruption work by
local prosecutors that can illustrate the possible limits of the new model, i.e., insufficient
control over the local agencies.
A. REASONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE LEADING CONTROL, BASED ON
THE EXAMPLE OF LEGISLATION
As ongoing reforms in China make the government procedurally more open to the
participation of outsiders, another important application of the “leading control” model is that
the participation of outsiders in governmental activities is conditional upon the preservation
of the leading control of the party center.218 Such outsider participation is not so obvious in
the anti-corruption context, but it is easier to observe in the context of legislation. The
controlled outsider participation in legislation is also roughly comparable to the controlled
anti-corruption work by the local agencies, because both can be seen as participants in a task
assigned by the party center with the dual mission to both realize the leadership interest and
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complete the assigned task. Both the local agencies (in anti-corruption work) and the
outsiders (in legislation) have become directly involved in the task, i.e., by obtaining certain
procedural rights to participate in the process, while the substantive powers of both are
inconsistent with the nature of their respective roles and their participation. Because it is
easier to observe the reasons for the existence of the leading control in the legislation context,
the following section uses the legislation example to explain how the interaction between
procedural participation rights and substantive power affects the leading control.
In the legislation context, the limits of multi-party participative processes that guarantee
substantive deliberative bargaining help to shape a symbiotic relationship between the party
leadership and the court system, and determine the extent to which the leading control can be
preserved.219 The substantive power of participants, and the interests involved in the
expressed opinions, are the two main factors that limit the effects of the process over draft
content, informing the limits of leading control.220 To understand how these two aspects
affect and interact with the procedures, the next section first defines them and then draws
assumptions regarding their relationship.
The substantive power of participants refers to the power that participants have to
influence the final passage of a law through the legislative process. This can include direct
power (e.g., a congressperson’s right to vote for or against a law, or a drafter’s right to draft
or revise the content of a law). Such power can also be indirect (e.g., a party or governmental
leader’s right to nominate or to remove congresspersons or drafters or their candidacy). Such
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power can also be remote (e.g., the power to persuade and influence leaders). Such power can
be applied to varying degrees, ranging from strong to moderate to light to non-existent.
Perceptions of power by different actors can, to some extent, deviate from reality.221 Different
interests present different thresholds for the power to overcome and to operate. Power is
changeable, temporary, contextual, and can at times be applied only once. Factors including
political moods, public crises, emergent situations and social problems can all affect the
power of certain actors within a specific lawmaking process. Other more permanent ways to
obtain power involve delegation, authorization, struggle and conquest.
Some assumptions can be made about the relationship between substantive power and
the participatory process: (1) Procedural rights are derived from substantive power, without
which procedural rights cannot be created. (2) Procedures automatically conform to types and
differential degrees of substantive power, with some deviations due to their own value and
counter-effects on substantive power. (3) Substantive power can expand its influence
indirectly, by affecting participant attitudes so that those without power recognize their
inferior status, accept being ignored, and thus voluntarily give up bargaining or behave
passively. (4) Once established, procedural rights have their own value and can be used to
counter substantive power through habitual and customary exercise. Such countering effects
are limited in maintaining procedural rights that have achieved such habitual and customary
power. The longer these effects endure and the more fundamental they are, the greater their
value becomes.
With these basic assumptions, it is easier to understand the limitations of the
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participatory process in shaping the substance of the legislative draft. In a democratic polity,
substantive power is initially equal to the content of the law. Those with substantive power
draft and determine what the law should be. Procedures are established to help make law in
an orderly way. Procedures can also partly influence the content of the law. When procedures
are maintained for a long period of time and when lawmaking becomes sufficiently complex,
single participation in such procedures can affect the substantive content of the law.
It could be the case that after legislation exists for a long period of time, and becomes
significantly professionalized and complex, procedures become routinized. Then
opportunities to participate, and lengths of time given and ways to express opinions, can
become so important that the procedures become representative of substantive power. Unlike
invisible substantive power, procedural rights start being favored to ensure the realization of
democracy. Procedural rights thus become important factors for examining and evaluating the
democratic nature of a polity.
Everything has two sides. The existence of the leading control reminds us of the other
side of the story, i.e., the importance of having substantive power, at least initially. Unlike in
a democratic polity, where participation is intended to promote substantive independent
participation, procedural rights within an authoritarian regime are defined as participation
bestowed by the dictator at his will.222 Outsiders invited by the party center to attend
meetings were not afforded either direct or indirect power to substantively influence the
passage of the law. Without the requisite substantive power, procedures are only procedures.
Procedures alone cannot produce substantive power.223 Although outsiders could participate
222
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in meetings, they were not afforded substantive power to influence draft content. As a result,
their opinions were arbitrarily ignored and no meaningful negotiations were held.224
When substantive power is missing, participants’ rights to fully express their opinions
on procedures cannot be protected. When substantive power is missing from the start, no
amount of time is sufficient for the procedure to become representative of substantive power.
The procedure thus cannot influence the substance of the law. As time goes on, and even as
the procedure obtains its own value, its influence remains limited in ensuring procedural
rights, i.e., providing ways for actors to express their views, and can even limit such rights.
When no alternative resources produce the original requisite power, employing only those
procedures commonly observed in a democratic polity does not denote the true existence of
democratic progress, and does not promote more democratic lawmaking.
Interests also affect the procedure. Two characteristics of the interest function are as
follows: (1) The first characteristic refers to the contradictory nature of interests. When not
contradicting the drafters’ interests, even without substantive power, the powerless
participants’ views can be accepted. Such interests could also be important to opinion-raisers,
but because they are not contradictory, they are not contested. For these types of interests,
weak forms of substantive power can bring them into the drafting process. (2) The second
characteristic is the importance of the concerned interest. When an interest is not opposing,
and when it is important to a powerless opinion-raiser, as long as the opinion-raiser is given
an opportunity to elaborate on it, it is easier to persuade drafters and more difficult for them
to simply ignore it without at least some consideration. If it is considered an important view
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to the drafters, it certainly would influence draft content, regardless of whether the opinionraiser is powerless. The less contradictory and the more important an interest is, the more
likely it is to be reflected in draft content.
The situation is more complicated for cases in which participants have considerable
power but are clearly inferior to the party center. When an interest is slightly critical and
when it is very important to the participants, but not important to the party center, it can
easily be fully accepted despite the fact that such an article may be bad for the society.
However, when interests are directly contradictory and also important, and even when the
agency has considerable power, such interests might still be declined by the party center.
Thus, for participants possessing some power, the views of theirs that could plausibly
affect the substance of a legislation draft are those that are proportionate to the power of the
opinion-raiser. Different interests present different thresholds for the amount of power needed
in order to be successful. As in the case of substantive power, perceptions of the
contradictory nature of an interest and its importance can also have an effect. Organizational
problems such as fragmentation, organizational stages, and attitudinal problems can influence
both substantive power and interests. Representative and participatory problems may also
have an effect here.
Procedural rights, to some degree, represent substantive power – but they are not the
same as substantive power. In authoritarian regimes, when allowed by the party or by local
officials at the beginning, either through participation in legislation or by the agency in anticorruption, does not mean independent democratic participation or autonomy as it does in a
democratic polity. Potential agreements based on interests and substantive power among
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different parties define their meanings and make them different from their democratic
counterparts. Continuous changes in these factors and their interactions determine the limits
and evolving direction of the leading control in China.

B. THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE LEADING CONTROL AND LESSONS FOR
UNDERSTANDING FRAGMENTED AUTHORITARIANISM
The flexibility of the leading control and differentiated strategies of the central party
help to explain why the central party can maintain its leadership role while still allowing the
unitarian polity to be occasionally fragmented and at times responsive and consultative.
“Fragmented authoritarianism” was used to explain disjointed relations between ministeriallevel agencies and the central government in China.225 When decentralization reforms began,
\mainly in economic areas, authority was distributed across multiple lower-level agencies that
had formed their own institutional interests. Then, when enforcing their respective authority,
these agencies competed, bargained, or colluded with one another to realize their own
interests in such ways that enforcement mechanisms deviated significantly away from the
original goals of the central government.226
In contrast, the responsive state model captures another phenomenon whereby the
Chinese government actively responds to public concerns, outsiders substantively influence
lawmaking, and public pressures help to shape legislation.227 The leading control model here
further deepens the understanding of the fragmentation in an authoritarian regime, and
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discloses the underlying reasons behind the fragmented authoritarianism and the responsive
state model in China.
This dissertation’s findings extend the fragmented authoritarianism model into the
criminal law enforcement authority area. Previous literatures focused mainly on policy
making, and found that ministerial-level bureaucratic agencies realized their own interests by
influencing policymaking.228 Here, the analysis finds another strategy that lower-level
governments possess to realize their own interest, i.e., selective law enforcement. At least in
the anti-corruption area, there have already been lots of studies showing that anti-corruption
investigations have been used politically and selectively to crack down on those whom the
leaders do not want and create room for those in the leaders’ network.229
The findings here once again confirm that the local party leader previously had both the
motive and the capability to obstruct corruption investigations concerning its own interests,
even against the interests of the central government in terms of anti-corruption. Thus, besides
influencing policy making, lower-level governments could directly control the enforcement
of the law, which leveraged its ability to move away from the central government.
Although dangerous, this tool was very powerful to realize the interests of the local
government. On one side, criminal investigations involve coercive measures and may result
in imprisonment and property confiscation, which concern fundamental civil and property
rights, and thus anyone would be afraid of such kinds of investigations. Given the entrenched
nature of corruption in China, and balancing against such risk, it is much easier to make
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someone obey the interests of the local government.
On the other hand, as anti-corruption investigations may uncover the illegal behaviors of
the local party leader or obstruct their short-term “administrative achievement” (Zhengji), e.g.,
the GDP growth rate of that geographical area, the power to suppress such investigations
substantially ensures the security of the local government’s interest. The control by the local
party leader over law enforcement agencies – including the prosecutor, the police, and the
CDI – was essential to its ability to pursue selective law enforcement, and could be seen as an
authority delegated by the central government, incident to the decentralization reforms.
Current reforms decreasing the local party’s control over the anti-corruption agencies,
and making them more responsive to local corruption and more independent from the local
government than before, look like a symptom of the responsive state model that argues the
Chinese government has been responsive to societal and public demands. However, the
disclosure of the underlying “leading control” of the party center over the local anticorruption agencies, substituting for the local party control, proves that such responsiveness
is conditional in China upon preserving the party’s leading control.
Under the principles and outlines established by the party center to realize its leadership
interests, the party center allows the state mechanism to be sometimes fragmented and
sometimes responsive through the “leading control” institution. The disclosure of the
underlying leading control model reminds us that, when answering the fragmentation
problem, the party center may take some measures that respond to the social and public
demands. However, the underlying logic of such responsiveness is not simply that because of
loss of control, China necessarily moves toward further democratization. Instead, it means the
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party center has already built in its “leading control” to the responsive measures. Moreover,
the fragmentation does not necessarily mean the loss of control by the party center. Instead, it
may be because the party center allows the fragmentation to some degree, as long as its
leading interest is ensured.
Fragmentation alone cannot achieve pluralism. The statement that it is somewhat
fragmented, but not so fragmented to be counted as a pluralistic polity in China230, can be
misleading – because it seems to imply that sufficient fragmentation would turn an
authoritarian regime into a pluralistic one, where outsiders can generally exert their influence
over governmental decisions. Fragmentation means that identity and interest have been
horizontally and vertically disaggregated into multiple diverse or contravening ones, at
different levels, among party and bureaucratic agencies within the polity. Such
disaggregation makes the agency of lower rank more motivated and capable to some extent to
take actions directly or indirectly against the wills of its supervisors or leaders, rather than
just obeying the superior’s decisions. The extent of this autonomy depends upon how much
the lower ranked agency is motivated and enabled. This creates some degree of checks and
balances, both horizontally and vertically between the party and the governmental agencies
and within the party or the governmental systems. However, a sufficient fragmentation
creates only the possibility and the need for changes in the polity; but it does not necessarily
lead to a pluralistic change. As indicated by the study here, elimination of the local party
control over the prosecutor does not guarantee the independence of the prosecutor. Such
elimination may be substituted by the party center’s leading control.
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The leading control model presents advantages, by allowing for controllable activities by
the local anti-corruption agencies or the outsiders in different situations to relieve tensions
between the central party’s limited capacities and society’s demand for good governance, and
by connecting the central party to the public as a balance against bureaucracy. However, it
still has its limitations and problems.
As shown below, when the central party backs certain entities, these entities can
manipulate such support to realize their own interests, while attitudinal and fragmented
problems of other participants adversely affect their further participation. Weak entities and
unsupported parties are wholly ignored, and cannot operate as effective challenging or
balancing entities. Thus, while the focus, direction, and principles of anti-corruption work
may be in the central party’s interests, the manipulation by the local agencies can lead to
unwanted results.
Moreover, without deliberative discussion and professional participation, the central
party can make incorrect judgments regarding directions and principles. The capacity and
willingness of the central party to make good leadership judgments, the central party’s
control over participants embedded in further institutionalization and China’ Nomenklatura
system, the growth of the entrepreneurial class, and public determinations on the extent of
consultative authoritarianism could all affect such contradictions observed in China.
Will the party’s leading control be preserved, or transform into party leading
constitutionalism or some other form of modern democratic polity? It is widely recognized
that there are two main systems of democratic legislation.231 Under one system, the general
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public elects lawmaking officials after effective competition. Effective competition and
elections ensure that lawmaking remains democratic. Under the other system, laws are made
through deliberative discussion. This latter system does not focus on the election of
lawmaking officials but on discussions and negotiations held during the lawmaking process
for democratic purposes.
Concerning democratic systems, reforms made to China’s anti-corruption system, with
its continuous emphasis on sole party leadership, can only be in line with the second kind of
system. Procedural reforms, or the elimination of local party control alone, are insufficient to
facilitate a deliberative or democratic movement. For further democratization, it is necessary
to place constitutional limits on the central party’s degree of leading control, and such limits
must be afforded substantive power to become real and practical.

C. AN EXAMPLE OF THE LIMITS OF THE LEADING CONTROL MODEL
From the interviews of the prosecutors, with only the leading control over the local
prosecutor, the supervision is insufficient to prevent abuse of power in anti-corruption cases
by the local prosecutor. The prosecutors have the incentive both to actively investigate and to
manipulate anti-corruption investigations and prosecutions. Although the prosecutors want to
investigate and convict in public corruption cases, my research interviews show that they
seem to not care very much about the lawful investigation, rightful prosecution, and fair
punishment of these suspects. The misuse of the prosecutorial authority in anti-corruption
cases represents an example of the limits of the leading control, which fails to provide
sufficient supervision.
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1. The Prosecutors Have Motivations for Misbehaving in Anti-Corruption Cases
First, the prosecutors have financial incentives for misbehaving in public corruption
cases. The budgets from the local government, for most prosecutors, remain tight. If the
prosecutor wants to improve its working environment, build good office buildings, purchase
advanced equipment, hold trainings and team activities, and increase employees’ salaries, it
needs to find more money on its own. There has been an unspoken rule that the illicit funds
collected from the public corruption cases investigated by the prosecutor would firstly be
submitted to the local treasury and then partly returned to the prosecutor as a form of
financial assistance.232 Although now in some wealthy areas, such unspoken rule has been
terminated, in many poor areas it is still effective.233 The ratio varies in different places.
Thus, my interviews show that the prosecutors sometimes manipulate the investigation
and prosecution to gather more illicit funds in public corruption cases. The general method,
based on my interviews, is that the suspects voluntarily pay certain money, as illicit benefits
from his/her criminal activities, to the prosecutor in exchange for a decision not to freeze the
suspect’s assets, not to arrest, not to prosecute, or to impose a light sentence. Just as with the
illicit funds convicted by the court after trial, these illicit benefits collected during the
investigative period are also submitted to the local treasury and later returned to the
prosecutor at certain ratio.234
Provisions of the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Prosecutor, the Ministry of Public
Security, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Justice, and the Legislative Affairs Commission of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Several Issues concerning the Implementation of the
Criminal Procedure Law, art. 36 (effective on Jan. 1, 2013). This requires the submission to the national treasury
of the illicit funds collected in convicted cases. According to interviews, such funds in poor areas would still be
returned to the prosecutor.
233 Series of interviews conducted in Beijing, Henan, and Tianjin from March 2014 to April 2015；葛琳，
第 115 页。
234 Although the return of illicit convicted funds has been terminated in several developed areas, the return
of illicit benefits without conviction remains nationwide.
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During these bargains, the prosecutors behave like businessmen. These bargains have no
legal basis. According to the law, the suspects’ assets can become illicit only after the
conviction by the court, and plea bargaining is not allowed. Moreover, the calculation of
illicit benefits is unclear in the law. For example, in one case interviewed, the briber gave
bribes to the official to obtain certain business at market price. The profits earned from such
business were considered by the prosecutor as illegal because “the process obtaining the
business is illegal,” argued by the prosecutor-general.235 But such profits may not be
considered illegal in court, because when the result is based on the normal market price, it
depends whether the house has obtained any unfair competitive advantage for the suspect in
retaining this business.236
Although the General Office of the Party’s Central Committee and the General Office of
the State Council have issued a joint rule to regulate the confiscation of assets related with
criminal cases, the scope of the assets and the standard to decide such assets remain unclear,
and thus the prosecutors still retain great discretion in practice.237
Second, the prosecutors seem to aim for a high conviction rate and manipulate plea
bargains to ensure good evaluations. Annually, the prosecutor has to be evaluated
provincially, and the ranking is published publicly and recognized as a promotion factor. The
numbers of public corruption cases investigated and convicted annually are essential factors
in the internal evaluation, and have a substantial influence over the reputation and promotion
of the prosecutor. To achieve high evaluation points, the prosecutor must handle sufficient
Interview of a prosecutor-general conducted in Beijing in June 2014.
Interpretations on Several Issues in Applying Laws in Bribe-Giving Criminal Cases, art. 12, issued by
SPC and SPP (effective in Aug. 2012).
237 See the Opinions on Resolution of Assets During Criminal Cases, issued jointly by the General Office
of the Party’s Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council (Dec. 30, 2014).
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amounts of cases in general, and also sufficient cases of large monetary value or involving
senior officers, and a high conviction rate of docketed cases. As China’s anti-corruption law
is asymmetric and focuses on public officials, cases involving those receiving bribes are more
important than cases involving the bribers238.
Moreover, because of the victimless nature of public corruption, the evidence is very
limited in these cases. China requires the prosecutor to prove the illegal motive in public
corruption cases under a high standard of proof.239 The motive must be specifically related
with certain incidences of official activities, decisions, or omissions.240 In some cases, there
are notes or diaries written by the officials to record these corrupt activities. Such could be
the sufficient evidence to prove the motive. Otherwise, it is difficult to prove the motive,
especially because China has the culture of maintaining social life or network through gifts
and cash payments in “red envelopes.” Thus, the confessions by the officials or the bribers
are very important to ensure a conviction in public corruption cases. To secure the confession,
my interviews show that the prosecutor has to offer some kind of bargain, including
withdrawing the prosecution, prosecuting for a lighter crime based on only part of the
defendant’s criminal activities, or advocating for a lighter sentence.241
Because more serious cases have a heavier coefficient in the prosecutor’s evaluation,
and often involve a large monetary value, the successful investigation of these cases means
much more to the prosecutor than other small cases. The prosecutors will offer considerable
bargains to secure the confessions of the bribers or the inferior officials related to such
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serious corruption cases, such as withdrawing the prosecution of them.242 Accordingly, these
bargains can unfairly result in either no prosecution or a light punishment of the corrupt
criminals, thus obstructing the anti-corruption efforts.
2. Insufficient Challenging Power and Vague Legal Limits to Supervise the Local
Prosecutors
First, lack of supervision and lack of a separation of powers contribute to the ability of
prosecutors to manipulate the outcome. Unlike other criminal cases that are investigated by
the police and prosecuted by the prosecutors, public corruption cases are both investigated
and prosecuted by the prosecutors. There is no sufficient separation of powers here.
Regarding the use of arrest and seizure, the prosecutors can make the decisions themselves
within the prosecutorial system, rather than obtaining any warrant from courts. The arrest
decision needs to be approved by the superior prosecutor, which counts as a weak balance
because the superior prosecutor has similar incentives as the local prosecutor. As
demonstrated above, the influence of the local party leader, the superior prosecutor, and the
local CDI over the prosecutors’ investigations and prosecutions are limited. Although the
local party leader and the superior prosecutor lead and control the work of the prosecutors,
such checks aim to fight public corruption more harshly, or perhaps to protect the people in
their own network, rather than to protect individuals from abusive investigations or
prosecutions. There is little supervision over the prosecutors’ abusive use of coercive
measures.
Moreover, China’s criminal law authorizes the prosecutor to decide not to prosecute or
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to withdraw prosecution whenever the illegality of the case is small or the evidence is
insufficient.243 According to interviews, the prosecutor has several ways to manipulate this
power with little checks and balances. The prosecutor may intentionally omit some criminal
activities and make selective prosecutions.244 The prosecutors may also prosecute for a lesser
crime whose sentence is relatively light.245 Notice that the evaluation system only cares about
the conviction rate, not the specific crime or the specific sentence. As long as the case can be
convicted and sentenced, the needs of the evaluation are satisfied. The lighter crime or lighter
sentence could then be bargaining chips.
Second, weak or compromised courts and weak defense lawyers further contribute to the
problem. On one hand, as already noted by other scholars, courts in China are weakly
positioned in criminal trials246. Against the strong need and power of the prosecutors in
securing the verdicts they want, courts do not have much say over the final decisions in
criminal cases. The court has to maintain good relations with the prosecutor because the
prosecutor has the power to supervise the court. Moreover, the courts don’t even have the
power to balance the prosecutors’ use of coercive techniques, as such usage does not require
the issuance of a warrant by the court.
On the other hand, there are common internal needs to fundraise by the courts. There
was a case, discussed in the interviews I conducted, where the court became allied with the
prosecutor to charge the case under a lighter crime, because the lighter crime would allow the
court to fine the company while the truly deserved crime didn’t involve such a penalty. The
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criminal was finally found guilty, and received only probation for his giving of bribes of over
8 million RMB.247 By sustaining the lighter prosecution, the court protected the relationship
with the prosecutor, secured for itself a significant amount of the illicit benefits, and did not
need to worry about an appeal by the suspect.
Notice that in the particular scenario described, the defense lawyer would also likely
collude in the outcome, because it would result in a lighter sentence for the defendant. In
cases regarding abusive investigations and prosecutions, because the court is weak, and
sometimes even ends up in an alliance with the prosecutor, the rights of the suspect and the
defense lawyer as established in the law cannot be well protected – which is another aspect of
the fact that the defense lawyers in China have quite limited power.
Third, legal loopholes regarding bargaining behaviors, the use of coercive measures, and
the manipulation of the prosecution further rationalize the manipulation: (1) Under the
ideological view that the prosecutors cannot bargain with the criminal suspects, and that all
criminals shall receive full legal punishments, plea bargains are officially disallowed in China.
However, because plea bargaining widely exists in practice – and some of them are
reasonable – the lack of a clear legal rule here turns out to mean that all kinds of irregular
plea bargaining behaviors by the prosecutor can hardly be found illegal.
(2) The legal lines regarding the use of coercive measures, and the legal standard to not
prosecute in some small cases, are unclear and subject to the prosecutor’s discretion. For
example, the legal conditions to arrest are: (a) whether there is evidence proving the existence
of crimes; (b) whether the suspects could receive the penalty of more than imprisonment; and
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(c) whether the DRUS or the bail is insufficient to prevent the danger to the society.248 But
there is no concrete legal rule about when other coercive measures would be insufficient.
Moreover, there is no law authorizing individuals who undergo abusive investigations to
bring civil lawsuits against the investigators or prosecutors, such as the Section 1983 statute
that allows such claims in the United States.
(3) The option of prosecuting for a lesser crime, such as the bribe-giving-by-an-entity
crime, leaves legal room for prosecutorial manipulation. Article 393 defines the crime of
bribe-giving-by-an-entity as the bribe-giving crime committed by the entity leaders or
employees for the entity’s benefit.249 For this crime, the involved entity leaders or employees
may be punished for no more than five years, while in the case of an individual bribe-giving
crime, the individual could be punished up to life imprisonment.250 In the public corruption
cases, it is frequently unclear whether the briber is acting for his own benefit or for the
benefit of the company. It could be both, because the benefits of the company will eventually
result in individual benefits for the briber.
Therefore, because of insufficient checks and balances, a lack of separation of powers,
and a lack of effective supervision, the likelihood of a prosecutor being held responsible or
even being investigated for their misbehaviors during public corruption investigations and
prosecutions is pretty low. Because of legal loopholes and unclear legal standards, these
behaviors will rarely constitute a serious legal violation, even if there is an investigation.
Because of the absence of a legal right to make any claim in court for these misbehaviors, the
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victim does not have a good ways to protect himself or herself. Because the likelihood of
being held to account are pretty low, the prosecutors tend to manipulate and conduct their
investigations and prosecutions in public corruption cases in order to obtain extra illicit funds,
and confessions or other essential testimonies, which improve the prosecutors’ financial
situations and performance evaluation outcomes.
Such manipulations will adversely influence China’s anti-corruption efforts. Although
the number of public corruption cases has increased, and more criminals are being caught,
they are not being punished according to the law. The prosecutors have learned to manipulate
their powers to earn money for the institution, and thus internally think of themselves as
businessmen, not as fighters for justice. The prosecutors consider the public corruption cases
as not that wrongful, so they can accept the lack of prosecution of these criminals. The
suspects experience how the law gets manipulated, and how their legal rights get violated by
both the prosecutor and the court which is responsible for the enforcement of the law, which
leads them to condemn the value of the law and lose faith in rule of law.251 Consequently,
suspects come to think that they have not committed a serious wrong, and can receive no
harsh sentence even if the case is serious, as long as they can pay the money needed by the
prosecutor and the court. More importantly, the prosecutor has often abused its investigative
powers towards ordinary people, violating their property rights and civil rights through these
manipulations, for which these people have no good remedy.
This example of the local prosecutor’s misbehavior in anti-corruption cases for its own
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interest represents an important limit of the leading control model, in that the leading control
may be good enough to realize the leadership interest of the party center, but still insufficient
to prevent the misbehavior of the local prosecutor and to guarantee the good-faith operation
of the prosecutor in anti-corruption cases. The distorted financial incentives and the lack of
any challenging power are the two main problems that the leading control model needs to
resolve, so that it may further relieve the tensions between the party leadership and the social
demands for good governance.
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D. CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation started with an empirical study on the operation of the COV system in
resolving public corruption cases, trying to understand both the role of COV in the new anticorruption campaign and to comprehend the campaign and its future from the perspective of
the operation of the COV. The dissertation’s empirical findings, from an analysis of over 800
corruption cases in Beijing, indicate that – after accounting for other variables – sentences for
corruption did not increase after COV. COV utilization patterns and their effects are therefore
inconsistent with the “official” claims that COV is intended to prevent local judicial bias and
to protect the public image and authority of the judiciary.
Contradicting the accepted wisdom, this dissertation instead demonstrates that COV
works mostly to concentrate certain types of public corruption cases in a small handful of
courts known for efficiently rendering convictions. Because the empirical study only focuses
on Beijing, the findings here only represent the situation in Beijing. It is but one example to
understand the operation of COV in anti-corruption cases, and general predictions nationwide
cannot be made based upon these findings. However, since the design of the COV system is
the same nationwide, the generalized conclusion based upon theoretical analyses of such
design can be applied generally.
The use pattern of COV and the results found in the data cannot be explained by the
claimed purposes of the COV to prevent local judicial bias and protect the image of the local
judiciary. Instead, this dissertation argues for three alternative explanations for such findings,
which are also consistent with the findings from the interviews of local anti-corruption
agency officials and the judges. First, rather than preventing local judicial bias towards local
officials, COV reallocate resources within the city and cracks down on challenging and
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notorious cases to ensure the rapid and efficient completion of anti-corruption work. Second,
in light of the problems rooted in China’s previous anti-corruption system, where the local
party leaders primarily controlled local anti-corruption work, COV makes it legitimate for the
superior to direct offsite anti-corruption forces to investigate on-site corruption cases when
the on-site anti-corruption forces fail to function because they have been captured by the local
party leaders whom they were supposed to supervise. Thus, rather than protecting the image
of the local judiciary, the COV actually works to undermine local governmental control over
anti-corruption cases, revitalize the non-functioning local anti-corruption forces, and
invigorate China’s recent anti-corruption campaign. Third, targeting the institutional
problems of the old anti-corruption system, the CCP has made many efforts to weaken local
protectionism and consolidate central CCP control. The recent anti-corruption campaign in
China has a very different style from previous ones. Its long-lasting strength and broad
coverage, and the strategic relation with the subsequent anti-corruption reform steps, have
already distinguished it from previous anti-corruption campaigns, and indicate that it is a part
of an overall reform plan.
Moreover, with the expansion of the role of the CDIs in the new campaign, the decision
to have the CDIs absorb the procuratorates, and the centralized control over both the CDIs
and the procuratorates, the recent campaign has been institutionalized to transform the
previous “dual-leadership, dual-track” anti-corruption model into a party center “leading
control” model with a single anti-corruption agency. In the new system, COV helps to realize
the CCP’s leadership in anti-corruption reform, and constitutes an essential part of China’s
new anti-corruption model.
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The new anti-corruption model still has its risks and its limits. China is going through
great changes. Its semi-market, semi-state economy is being challenged by the new
information economy, while the state-party governance structure is being challenged by new
sources of power, including giant internet companies and civilized society. As an
authoritarian power, the party center has been struggling with centralizing and decentralizing
its control over the local governments vertically, and the different departments horizontally.
The expansion of the local governments and departments, during decades of economic reform,
has resulted in a fragmented polity and threatened the central party’s leadership.252
Environmental pollution, downward economic pressure, the growing social inequality, the
aggravating trend of an aging population, and the arising of new economic types have greatly
increased the demand for efficient and good governance. Serious corruptions of the party and
government have been deemed to contribute to these challenges, by obstructing the reforms
that could respond to them, weakening the party’s control and governance capacity, and
deteriorating the party leadership’s reputation.253
Facing all of these challenges, combined with political compromises and interest
alliances, as well as to uphold the party leadership, the new party center leadership has
chosen a vertical and horizontal centralization reform in the anti-corruption area, to make the
local party leadership symbolic in the campaign and to consolidate multiple anti-corruption
forces. So far, the new anti-corruption campaign has won the new leadership a lot of public
support, has strengthened its control over the inferiors, has largely decreased the facially most
obvious misbehaviors and corruptions of the government and party, has expanded the CDI
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system, and has paved the way for later institutional reforms.
However, there are also side effects. Being afraid to make mistakes, many government
officials begin to act passively. The increased supervision generates many additional burdens
on the supervised agencies broadly, including the new obligations to report to the CITs more
frequently, to hold criticism and self-criticism meetings, and to hold meetings to discuss the
party provisions. Many talented people, even at the senior level, have quit their public
positions and joined private companies, especially the new kinds of economic entities. It has
become more difficult to recruit new talents into public positions. Moreover, corruptions that
are secret are still ongoing, and new forms of corruptions tend to be more secret, because the
foundational reforms have been difficult to push forward. Industrial corruptions remain
serious and are not the focus of the current anti-corruption campaign.
Going forward, many challenges await. On the one hand, improper consolidation may
not produce sufficient efficiency to combat corruption. Insufficient legal rules and inadequate
supervision may allow the new anti-corruption system to be captured by the supervised
agencies, relying on strong political leadership, and abusing the anti-corruption powers. On
the other hand, the institutionalization and enhanced anti-corruption capacity may be too rigid
and too unified to accommodate the dynamic phenomenon of modern China. With a loss of
talent, the management ability of the party and the government may be further undermined,
forcing it to open the gates to let in talented outsiders who have different sources of power
and different ideologies. For the original officials who remain, without economic motivations,
the ideology of being loyal to the party may be insufficient to ensure their integrity. This will
become even more difficult after entering into the second and third stages of the anti190
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